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Democratic civilian control of the armed forces is an essential component to a free and 
open democracy. The states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rely on 
civilian control to encourage democratization efforts worldwide. This dissertation 
assesses how the politicians of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) managed 
to establish civilian control of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) after decades of military 
tutelage. Through a combination of constitutional, judicial, and military reforms, by 2011, 
the AKP had established control over the military. How did the AKP succeed where other 
political parties had failed? Using the theory of electoral competition, this dissertation 
demonstrates the link between elections and policy making, and how together these 
forces challenge military supremacy in democracies. Policies or budget decisions that 
infringe on military prerogatives lead to conflict with the military for control. Turkey 
represents a unique case study in civil-military relations that straddles research areas such 
as transition literature, coup prevention, democratic consolidation, and civilian control of 
the armed forces. Understanding how the Turkish politicians were able to consolidate the 
armed forces in the face of long-established military prerogatives can help explain how 
other states might also place the military under elected civilian control. 
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No protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national 
interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with 
its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the 
nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as 
required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference 
whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics. 
—PREAMBLE to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982 
(as amended 2001) 
 
Unlike many Western democracies whose preambles serve to delineate the rights 
of the citizens and the purpose of the constitution in defending these rights, the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 does the opposite by declaring the rights of the state and the 
limitations of political action by the citizenry. Because the 1982 constitution was written 
under the direct supervision of the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces or 
TSK), historical consensus holds that the very purpose of the document was to perpetuate 
the tutelary nature of Turkish democracy that had evolved since multi-party elections 
began in 1950.1 
The relationship between the military and the government is as old as either 
institution and has long been a source of analysis, from Juvenal’s “Quis custodiet ipsos 
custodies?” to Machiavelli and into the 21st century. Examples of contestation for 
control, however, span a wide spectrum, from the benign protest resignation by an officer 
to the extreme armed coup attempt to remove or replace a government. In The Man on 
Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, Samuel Finer identified the four primary 
ways the military changes governments: influence, blackmail, displacement, and 
supplantment.2 Least intrusive of these is influence, which includes normal constitutional 
roles of counsel. Blackmail includes intimidation of civilian authorities, while 
                                                 
1 Ergun Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 19. 
2 S. E. Finer and Jay Stanley, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 32. 
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displacement or supplantment includes threats against authorities, failure to defend 
authorities against violence, and outright violence directed at civilian authorities.3 
Since 1950, the TSK has engaged in each of these activities at various times in 
order to maintain governments that adhered to the Kemalist standards expected by the 
TSK and codified in the constitutions written under the supervision of the military 
juntas.4 This adherence to Kemalist ideals can be traced back to the 1931 Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party or CHP) program, and were also codified in its 
1937 constitution.5 Combined with an ambiguous constitutional requirement that citizens 
remain loyal to the principles of the greatest Turkish military hero Atatürk, it is not 
surprising that, throughout the history of Turkish democracy, when conflict arose 
between the military and the elected civilian government regarding the direction of the 
state, the military always resolved the conflict according to their interest.6 Figure 1 shows 
the multiple military interventions, their period of influence and regime type since multi-
party elections began in 1950, and demonstrate the prevalence of military influence over 
the political process. However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, from 2002 forward, 
the historical preeminence of the TSK has been successfully challenged by the governing 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party or AKP). Interestingly, the 
AKP has not only prevented the military from dictating the terms of the civil-military 
relationship in Turkey, but has also virtually reversed the traditional authority structure. 
                                                 
3 This graduated approach to interventions has been utilized in previous areas, more recently by José 
A. Olmeda, “Escape from Huntington’s Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Brunea and Florina Cristiana Matei 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 66. 
4 Kemalism is the term for a style of nationalism in government with a strong military actively 
involved in the operation of the state and is named for the first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The six 
pillars of Kemalism include Republicanism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism, and statism. 
Of these original six pillars of Kemalism (and the Kemalist CHP serving as the opposition party during the 
AKP decade), only republicanism, secularism, and nationalism have been mandated in each Turkish 
constitution. The modern TSK is directly descended from the military that was led by Kemal Atatürk and 
has always viewed nationalism and secularism as specific requirements of the country and reserved the 
right to define how these essential components of the state would be interpreted. 
5 Gerassimos Karabelias, “The Military Institution, Atatürk's Principles, and Turkey’s Sisyphean Quest 
for Democracy,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 1 (2009), 58. 
6 Republic of Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNAT), "The Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey," (Ankara, Turkey: Republic of Turkey, 1982). Preamble, paragraph 5. 
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As evidenced by the multitude of reforms enacted over the AKP decade and the mass 
resignations of the armed forces chiefs of staff. 
Event Period Regime 
Coup May 1960-Oct 1961 Military Rule 
“Coup by Memorandum” Mar 1971-Apr 1973 Martial Law 
Coup Sep 1980-Nov 1982 Military Rule 
Coup leader President 1982–1989 Military Tutelage 
“Postmodern Coup” 1997–2002 “Feb 28th Process” 
Figure 1.  Periods of military regime 
In July of 2011, the balance of power was visibly upended when all four of the 
top generals in the TSK (the service branch chiefs) resigned over a disagreement with the 
AKP. It involved the investigation and prosecution of military members on conspiracy 
charges stemming from the “Ergenekon investigation.”7 While not the first time military 
officers have resigned in protest over civilian policies, the resignation of all four service 
chiefs represented a significant increase in civilian leverage.8 
The Ergenekon investigation began in 2007. It explored the origins and intended 
uses of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-issued fragmentation grenades found 
in a private residence and later linked to a domestic attack. What began as the discovery 
of a weapons cache of grenades and bomb-making materials has since burgeoned into a 
massive investigation of actual and alleged TSK coup plans extending from 1980 up until 
the 2007 weapons discovery. By the time former Chief of Staff General Ilker Başbuğ was 
arrested—on charges of establishing and leading a terrorist organization for the purpose 
of eliminating the Turkish Republic—over 300 people had been arrested in conjunction 
with Ergenekon, nearly 100 of whom were members of the media. In March 2013, the 
prosecution finally concluded cases that had been underway since 2008. During the 
                                                 
7 Before the Ergenekon resignations, the most recent military general to resign occurred when the 
Chief of General Staff resigned in 1990 over disagreement with civilian policies on the Persian Gulf War 
and Islamism. This singular resignation also prompted analysis of growing civilian influence, but was 
unpaired with any actual increase in the legal control mechanisms that this paper will discuss, and did not 
correlate to actual diminishment of military leverage. 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 242. 
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process, the 26th commander of the TSK, as well as other general officers, spent months 
to years in prison. 
The thorough investigation into the conspiracy and subsequent resignation of the 
four heads of military branches—when combined with reforms to military prerogatives in 
the judiciary, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council or MGK), and budgetary 
oversight—evidence growth of civilian control of the Turkish military during the AKP 
decade that began in 2002. The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the following 
question: Given the Turkish military’s historically powerful and central role in politics, 
how did the civilian AK Parti gain and maintain control over the armed forces from 2002 
to 2011? 
In this dissertation, I contend that the politicians of the AKP were able to exert 
civilian control over the armed forces by demonstrating widespread popular support for 
the party at the ballot box. The politicians then used this support to legislate reforms to 
the military. While civil-military relations between the AKP and the TSK are informed 
by a variety of theories, electoral competition and the incentive structure created by 
elections best explains the ability of the AKP to succeed where previous parties failed. 
A. HYPOTHESIS AND CONCEPTUALIZING CIVILIAN CONTROL 
From the first Turkish multiparty elections in 1946, until the 2007 national 
elections, the military has played a continuous role in Turkish politics and has operated 
independently of civilian control. As will be established in this section, while both the 
1961 and 1982 constitutions identified civilian authority over the military, neither 
provided the necessary means to exert control. Meanwhile, both documents granted the 
military the authority to intervene in politics in the event of a threat to the nature of the 
state, as well as the right to define what constituted a threat to the state. 
In the Turkish case, intervention is a logical extension of military identity. One 
definition of “military intervention in politics,” from Samuel Finer, is “The armed forces’ 
constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the 
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recognized civilian authorities.”9 In Turkey, military interference runs the full spectrum, 
from the military’s simple public relations and educational indoctrination to full military 
coup d’État. This interference has been a defining aspect of Turkish politics since multi-
party elections began and was also present during the Ottoman era. The Turkish military 
could (and did) cite constitutional law and claim that intervention was a professional 
responsibility and constitutional obligation.10 
The focus on interventions is relevant to the historical narrative of Turkish civil-
military relations because interventions demonstrate who the ultimate authority is and, 
therefore, who actually governs the state. Are civilians the authority, with a monopoly 
over military power in the territory, or is the military its own authority? As political 
creations, all militaries are involved at least minimally in politics, but only a few 
challenge civilians for actual authority of the state. General military influence is more 
difficult to measure than forcible displacement and, therefore, more difficult to discern a 
noticeable increase or decrease in influence. General influence can, however, offer a 
better understanding of who holds the upper hand between the military and civilians on a 
day-to-day basis.11 The research question assesses the means by which the AKP gained 
and maintains control over the TSK, and the prevention of challenges to the authority of 
the civilians is a key indicator of who truly governs the state. 
With multiple military coups, hundreds of political imprisonments under military 
rule, and even military executions of civilians12  following a 1960 coup—along with 
innumerable instances of military pressure on political parties, the press, and the 
educational system—Turkish military involvement in politics established what Turks 
                                                 
9 Finer and Stanley, Man on Horseback, 23. 
10 During non-violent (unarmed) interventions the military would cite their constitutional roles and 
then civilian compliance with military demands followed shortly thereafter. On both the 1960 and 1980 
coups the military overthrew the government then after the fact went back and cited their constitutional role 
in upholding the republic. In all instances the TSK viewed military intervention as constitutionally justified 
military behavior. 
11 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), 219. 
12 Following the 1960 coup, the Turkish Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Finance Minister were 
all convicted by a junta-appointed court of high treason and executed. The 1980 coup saw over 650,000 
arrests and 7,000 sentenced to death. 
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refer to as their tutelary democracy. 13  That is, the state sustained the trappings of 
democracy, such as multi-party elections and peaceful transfers of power between duly 
elected political parties. However, when political parties went astray from the founding 
principles of the republic [in the estimation of the TSK], the military was there to step in 
and “correct” the course of Turkish politics.14 
After both the 1960 and 1980 coups, a period of military rule allowed for a 
constitutional rewrite and eventual return to civilian leadership under circumstances 
dictated by the military. Despite this “reset” of authority, in neither instance was the 
return to civilian authority enough to actually permit civilian control; in both cases, 
military tutelage was further protected in national law.15 The 1960 coup was followed by 
the coerced resignation of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in 1971 and eventually the 
1980 coup. The 1980 coup was followed by the “postmodern coup” in 1997, which 
ousted Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. 16 Civilian authority was, throughout, merely 
a notion, with no significant legitimate civilian control.17 The office of the president best 
illustrates the depth of military entrenchment in politics. From the inception of the state 
in 1923 through 1989, all but one Turkish president had been chosen from the ranks of 
current or former military officers.18 
                                                 
13 Ahmet T. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, 
and Communism,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012), 38. 
14 Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, 
Algeria, and Turkey (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 15. 
15 Ergun Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present, Middle East Today 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 21. 
16 The 1997 coup is referred to as the “postmodern coup” because of the manner in which it occurred. 
The national security council presented a list of 18 demands to which the prime minister could not 
acquiesce without alienating his base. Simultaneous to this the military mounted a public relations 
campaign against the Welfare Party attempting to undermine their legitimacy. 
17 Müge Aknur, “The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on Democratic Consolidation in Turkey,” in 
Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: State, Political Parties, Civil Society, Civil-Military Relations, Socio-
Economic Development, EU, Rise of Political Islam, and Separatist Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Müge Aknur 
(Boca Raton, FL: Universal, 2012), 213. 
18 While in many ways a symbolic office, the president still holds the authority to preside over the 
National Security Council, appoint the general staff, mobilize the military, and generally fill the role of 
constitutional oversight of the military. 
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With the elections of the AKP in 2002, the power structure began to shift. Due to 
constitutional guidelines on minimal popular vote thresholds for parliamentary 
representation by a political party, the AKP secured 363 of 550 possible parliament seats 
(66 percent) with only 34.3 percent of the popular vote. 19 While polling had revealed that 
the AKP would do well, no one had envisioned the AKP having the ability to form a 
government without a coalition, but the widespread voter disillusionment with 
establishment parties led to support for the new AK Party.20  
Since the 2002 election, the AKP had maintained a steady erosion of military 
prerogatives. Removing the military from educational oversight, changes to the laws 
allowing military trials for civilians, and a reduction in the frequency of MGK meetings 
were all areas of AKP success in reducing military prerogatives from 2002 to 2004.21 
Despite these reforms, however, nothing had prepared the country for the unprecedented 
resignations of all four top military officers of the TSK, the institution that had served as 
kingmaker since the 1923 foundation of the Republic. 
It is one thing for a military to accept minor reform; it is another thing entirely to 
have no courses of action other than but to resign over as critical an issue as the 
prosecution of military officers for conspiracy against the state. Experience had shown 
that TSK leadership simply did not resign in the face of civilian challenge. Yet in July 
2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calmly accepted the resignations while 
President Abdullah Gül moved to replace the Chiefs of Staff with generals more 
amenable to the AKP rule. 
What then explains this shift in relative power during the 2002–2011 period? As a 
crucial preliminary step, we must first ask, what constitutes civilian control of the 
military? How is that control enforced and maintained? Universal among democracies is 
                                                 
19 A political party in 2002 needed 10 percent of the popular vote in order to receive representation in 
parliament; only the AKP and the Kemalist CHP (Republican People’s Party) cleared that threshold. A full 
45 percent of the popular vote went unrepresented in parliament. 
20 Evangelia Axiarlis, Political Islam and the Secular State in Turkey: Democracy, Reform and the 
Justice and Development Party (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 251. 
21 William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the 
AKP (New York: Routledge, 2010), 88. 
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the notion that the displacement of elected civilian officials by the armed forces 
demonstrates a lack of civilian control of the armed forces by overriding what Feaver 
terms the democratic imperative.22 Though the coup d’état conjures images of tanks 
surrounding capitol buildings, as Finer pointed out, such measures are not always 
necessary for the military to displace civilian leadership. If we accept the notion that a 
military coup is “a direct action which changes the government in power, not just its 
policies,”23  where “the aim is to detach the permanent employees of the state from 
political leadership,”24 then the TSK has succeeded in four such actions. In 1960 and 
1980, the military forcibly displaced civilian leadership and assumed governance of the 
country. In 1971 and 1997, however, the civilian leadership was merely coerced into 
resignation under threat of an actual coup. 
The presence of civilian control can be measured only in degrees, as a lack of a 
coup is no more an indication of civilian control than elections are evidence of open 
democracy.25 Recognizing that civilian control is “more a set of relationships than an 
individual event,”26 Claude Welch asserted that one way of measuring the extent of 
civilian control is to assess the ability of the government to alter the roles and 
responsibilities of the armed forces.27 By linking control to changing military roles and 
responsibilities, we also can address the question of how control is enforced and 
sustained. Thomas-Durrell Young lists common control mechanisms over the armed 
forces, including limits on the military mission, budget, and the military.28 From 2002 to 
                                                 
22 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 6. 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 217. 
24 Edward Luttwak, Coup D’etat, a Practical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1979), 20. 
25 Aurel Croissant et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the 
Military in Emerging Democracies,” Democratization 17, no. 5 (January 2010), 954. 
26 Claude E. Welch, Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976), 1. 
27 Ibid., 317. 
28 Thomas-Durell Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in Who Guards the Guardians 
and How? Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), 26. 
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2011, the AKP successfully change each of these factors in the face of military 
challenges. Young further identifies formal control mechanisms such as constitutional 
and legal limitations, military culture, societal norms, and a free press.29 On each of these 
issues, the AKP was also able to alter the military functions and create conditions more 
favorable to civilian rather than military oversight. Thus, through these reforms, the AKP 
effectively changed the set of relationships, as described by Welch, to favor civilian 
politicians over the armed forces. Identifying and explaining how these reforms take 
place simultaneously demonstrates increasing control and describes the mechanisms to 
sustain and enforce that control. Having identified what control looks like, the question 
yet unanswered is: How did the civilians get control? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept 
that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to 
those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of 
Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are 
sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous. 
—General Douglas MacArthur, 1952 
 
Twentieth century analysis of civil-military relations began with Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State in 1957, wherein Huntington claims that the 
forces influencing the nature of a military include the threat to the security of society and 
the “social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.” Huntington 
posited that the relationship between the military and society is a contentious balancing 
of the security of the state with the conventions of society.30 
The linchpin for Huntington’s theory is military professionalism. For Huntington, 
the military professional was the one who obeyed civilian masters and a military that did 
not obey was by definition unprofessional.31 A more professional military meant a more 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 28. 
30 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 2. 
31 Ibid., 74. 
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loyal military that was accepting of civilian control. Effective civilian control was most 
likely to persist when military professionalism was maximized, and this maximization 
was most likely to occur when the level of coercive power that the military officer corps 
wielded over civilian groups was minimal.32 
In May 1960, the TSK was the most well trained, well equipped, and experienced 
institution in Turkey. The military was battle hardened and worldly from experience in 
the Korean War, familiar with the structure of the NATO alliance, and on the front lines 
of the Cold War. By all indications, the Turkish military was a professional war-fighting 
institution serving a democratically elected government. Yet on the 27th of May (almost 
exactly a decade after multi-party elections began), citing authoritarianism by the 
Menderes government, mid-level officers executed a coup against the state. Only by 
accepting a tautological understanding of the term “professional” could one argue that 
mid-level officers with the ability to execute a coup without alerting general officers 
could one call said officers unprofessional. 
Simultaneous to the 1960 coup, Morris Janowitz published an alternate theory of 
civilian control in The Professional Soldier. Janowitz’s theory has become known as the 
Civic-Republican Theory or “Convergence” for some scholars and posits that, as in 
ancient Rome, the nature of the military should tend towards civic service and the citizen 
soldier as representative of society rather than exclusive of society.33 To Janowitz the 
military officer desired to support the civilian authorities because to do so was to serve 
the republic.34  Importantly, this civic virtue did not preclude the possibility that the 
military could become more political in nature and wield extensive power over 
government policy.35 
Civic-Republicanism would posit that military intervention in government would 
be the result of a lack of republican values on the part of the membership of the armed 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 81. 
33 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Ann Arbor, MI: Free 
Press, 1964), 235. 
34 Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 22. 
35 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 234. 
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forces. If we hold that loyalty to the Republic means loyalty to the elected government at 
all costs, then the TSK was most certainly lacking in republican virtue. If one, however, 
considers loyalty to the state over that of the government as has the TSK throughout 
modern Turkish history (see chapter two) then the TSK historically has possessed a 
strong republican spirit (in the TSK’s own understanding of the notion). 
Both Professionalism and Civic-Republicanism would similarly look askance at 
the 1971 military intervention, termed the “coup by memorandum,” and assert that a lack 
of professionalism or a breakdown in civic values would explain the intervention. The 
manner in which the intervention played out, however, indicates that the TSK considered 
their actions both professional and of the highest republican spirit to protect the Republic. 
The memorandum sent to the president, signed by the three heads of the armed services, 
demanded that “an understanding above party politics” be achieved, else the military “use 
its legal rights and seize power directly to accomplish its duty of protecting and 
supervising the Turkish republic.”36 (Emphasis added) 
Rather than focusing on internal mores, Michael Desch advocates a structural 
theory of civil-military relations that assumes the internal and external threat environment 
places pressure on the military, civilians, and institutions and that this pressure leads to 
conflict. Drawing heavily from Kenneth Waltz’s work and, more broadly, international 
relations theory, Desch hypothesized that the most stable civil-military relations would be 
those that exist in a high external threat and low internal threat environment due in part to 
a “rally around the flag” effect.37 However, the internal and external threat conditions 
necessary to Desch’s structural theory do not change from 2002 to 2006 in a fashion that 
would predict a more stable relationship. 
As Chapter II discusses in depth, Turkey, between 2002 and 2006, experienced a 
decrease in internal security following the U.S. invasion of Iraq (which failed to receive 
parliamentary for Turkish support by a narrow margin due to lack of voter support), 
                                                 
36 Nasser Momayezi, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” International Journal on World Peace 15, 
no. 3 (1998), 8. 
37 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 14. 
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conditions that would predict greater, not less, military interference.38 Similarly, 9/11 
represented an internal threat to the Turkey and a potential target for terrorism like other 
regional allies, such as Jordan, who supported the coalition forces. An Islamic political 
party had recently won election, and the Islamist prime minister had recently taken office; 
structurally, Turkey in 2002 looked very similar to Turkey in 1997. Because control over 
the armed forces did change, and the threat levels of structural theory did not change in 
the direction that would predict increased military subservience, structural theory cannot 
accurately answer the research question. 
Publishing just after the 2002 election of the AKP, Peter Feaver proposed 
transposing principal-agent theory from economics (redubbed agency theory by Feaver) 
to explain the power relationship between civilians and the military. Specifically, Feaver 
argues that the military is the agent of the civilian principal, at all times and in all 
instances subject to the oversight, direction, and objectives of the civilian government, 
which is the ultimate arbiter of who determines acceptable risks and which conflicts have 
priority.39 Feaver suggests that the challenge to the civilian principal is how to effectively 
monitor the actions of the military and guarantee that the agent does not shirk the 
responsibilities placed upon it by government, the principal.40 
Also in 2002 newly minted Prime Minister Erdogan, asserted that inherent 
weaknesses of political institutions were largely responsible for lack of civilian control 
over the military when observing “the military intervened in politics only when there was 
a political vacuum: the military played a somewhat expanded role because the political 
will was weak.”41 For Peter Feaver, the strength of the political will should not be a 
factor for military control. Democracy means the civilians always have the right to 
control, if not the means to enforce control, regardless of their capacity or expertise. In 
Feaver’s estimation, this is the essence of democratic theory. 
                                                 
38 Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 47. 
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International Security 35, no. 4 (2011), 97. 
40 Feaver, Armed Servants, 59. 
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Feaver expects a consolidated democracy with firm civilian control of the military 
wherein the military accepts the notion that the civilians have “the right to be wrong.”42 
The agency focus on the United States, with an “exceptionally high level of civilian 
control of military missions” makes the shirking versus working concept difficult to 
transfer to countries where the militaries do not necessarily embrace civilian oversight in 
all matters.43 While principle-agent relations can exist anywhere asymmetric relations 
occur, not all militaries accept that they are an agent of the politicians, and measuring 
their lack of adherence to a construct they reject outright does not help us explain how the 
AKP gained control. 
Between each of the aforementioned theories is a shared view that militaries 
should be separate from politics. Contrary to these separation theories is Rebecca Schiff’s 
theory of concordance, which considers the politicians, military, and public as equal 
participants in the political process. 44  Schiff asserts that the “specific type of civil-
military relationship is less important than the ability of the three partners to agree upon 
four indicators: social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, 
recruitment method, and military style.”45 If the three actors agree on one or more of 
these aspects, then concordance theory predicts that the military will not overthrow the 
government.46 
Schiff’s concordance theory is a substantial departure from early civil-military 
theory, because it presents the notion that the “specific type of civil-military relationship 
adopted is less important than the ability of the three partners to agree upon four 
indicators: social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, 
recruitment method, and military style.”47 While useful for explaining why militaries 
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choose not to execute a coup, concordance does not purport to explain increases in 
civilian control. Furthermore, like agency theory, concordance effectively recuses itself 
from explaining the shift in Turkish civil-military relations by limiting explanatory 
power, in this case, to coup prevention. While military coups clearly breach civilian 
control, the lack of a coup is not itself indicative of civilian control. 
However, concordance does give rise to a Turkish specific hypothesis that should 
be addressed presently based on the popularity of EU accession during the first AKP 
government. The question that warrants addressing is: Was the European Union a 
necessary precondition for the civilian reforms from 2002 to 2006? EU accession began 
long before the AKP elections, and the coalition that preceded the AKP passed multiple 
harmonization packages of their own, none of which helped the coalition curtail military 
autonomy or prolong their own political life. Indeed harmonization packages passed full 
year before the 2002 elections that brought the AKP to power legislated 34 constitutional 
changes, yet the coalition was still turned out of office by an electorate angry at 
corruption, a failed economy, and poor leadership. EU accession was not enough to drive 
the rise of the AKP or the reform of the military. 
If EU accession were a necessary component for increasing civilian control over 
the armed forces, then one would expect political parties in Turkey to run for election 
touting their commitment to EU accession. The AKP, however, largely avoided 
addressing their EU interests until after winning the 2002 election and only began to tout 
membership when the EU could provide cover for reforms.48 After the 2002 election, the 
AKP pursued the same policy initiatives that they ran on: fighting corruption, expanding 
civil society, and improving the economy. These successful policy initiatives led to the 
even larger electoral success of the 2004 local elections. After this local election, one sees 
the significant reform efforts directed at reducing the influence of the military. 
Eurobarometer surveys from the 2004 elections show a considerable gap between 
                                                 
48 Luigi Narbone and Nathalie Tocci, “Running around in Circles the Cyclical Relationship between 
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Turkish respondents claiming a “European” identity and that of the rest of Europe.49 
Similarly Turks expressed greater pride in their national identity than any other European 
country. 50  For Turks, EU accession was always about opportunity not identity. As 
electoral competition predicts, the AKP used incentives to increase their political support, 
and this support led to the ability to challenge the other significant political actor: the 
Turkish Armed Forces. While EU pressure demonstrated a strong catalyst effect, the 
absence of the catalyst would not render the model unsuccessful, but merely made 
challenging the military that much easier for the politicians. 
As 2006 ended, Turkish political relationships were rapidly changing. The 
somewhat cordial relationship between the AKP and the CHP in the face of economic 
recovery and potential EU accession had begun to deteriorate as the economy had 
improved and relationships with the EU began to decline. As the tone of EU accessions 
began to move from how Turkey would implement the full acquis communautaire to 
internal EU debates among member states as to whether or not Turkey was even properly 
European, the demand among Turkish citizens for EU membership began to wane. At the 
same time as degenerating support for EU accession however military reform was 
accelerating. 
Alongside these civil-military relations theories, the field of democratization 
contributed extensive research on how successful democratization can be predicted based 
on who-civilians or the outgoing military-controls the transition. This literature, initiated 
by Philippe Schmitter and refined by authors such as Felipe Agüero and Craig 
Arceneaux, holds that the balance of power during the transition determines whether 
democracy will take hold and grow, independent of military influence, or whether the 
military will remain a dominant force in government even after the transition.51 These 
“modes of transition” frameworks explain different starting points in civil-military 
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relations by assessing who controlled the transition, what forces led to the change in 
control, and what prerogatives were left in place by the exiting regime.52 
A military-dominated transition will leave an empowered military, while a 
civilian-controlled transition will result in a military subordinate to the military.53 The 
mode of transition can be used to assess both military and non-military regime 
transitions, but for the purposes herein shall refer to the transition from Turkish military 
control or influence to civilian control.54 From 1961 to 1983, the military returned control 
to elected civilians after an intervention on three occasions. 
Similar to the aforementioned civil-military relations theories, the transition 
explanation is unable to explain the Turkish experience because nothing occurs after any 
of the military transitions (apart from the election of the AKP) that would explain the 
shift in control from military to civilian. In four instances, the TSK has effected a change 
in political leadership of the state, two by coups and two by coerced resignations of the 
prime minister. In each coup, the military dictated the terms of the transition from junta 
to elections. Both civilian resignations occurred when prime ministers saw that continued 
leadership was impossible with the threat of military coup overhead. And yet, five years 
after the 1997 post-modern coup, and not following any of the previous transitions, the 
AKP proved able to confront the military on key issues. This research applies a different 
theory of civil-military relations, Wendy Hunter’s theory of electoral competition, which 
is designed to provide an explanation of how elected leaders can overcome the 
advantages that a military establishes for itself during a period of transition.55 
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According to Hunter, elected politicians can overcome the institutional military 
advantages, such as those enjoyed by the TSK following transfer to civilian authority in 
1983, by leveraging two incentive types that democracy and electoral politics offers 
politicians: particularistic and programmatic.56 Particularistic incentives encourage the 
use of resources to build and maintain patronage networks that reinforce the standing and 
support of the politician. Programmatic incentives include the credit given to politicians 
for their successful policy initiatives. Hunter postulates two basic categories to 
controlling the military: those that attempt to monitor and exclude the military from 
politics, termed “military centered” (push method/the stick) and those that are intended to 
encourage the military to become more apolitical of their own volition, termed “civilian 
centered” (pull method/the carrot).57 
Electoral competition rests on the premise that politicians are interested primarily 
in “their own political survival,” as Hunter puts it—that is, winning elections, remaining 
in office, and increasing their political power. 58  The theory begins with a clear 
assumption—that politicians will seek their own political survival—and uses this 
assumption to explain the shift in control between the civilians and the military.59 In 
Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers, Hunter makes the 
argument that the legitimacy granted by electoral success, along with the competition 
between parties and politicians for votes, inevitably sets the stage for civil-military 
conflict. This impending conflict then forces civilians to adopt measures inhibiting the 
influence of the military. 60  Furthermore, while the military may enjoy institutional 
advantages conveyed by the nature of the democratic transition, the military’s ability to 
employ this force against the civilians is contextual, and is therefore restricted. 
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Conditions such as public support, internal cohesiveness, international pressure, and the 
unity of the politicians create the restrictions.61 
Unlike the previously dismissed theories, something in electoral competition does 
change that explains the shift in control; consecutive elections took place outside military 
interference wherein a political party was reelected. As the research will demonstrate, 
sources of influence such as European Union accession acted to mitigate military 
interference long enough to allow for consecutive elections, but it is this electoral success 
that explains the ability of the AKP to challenge the TSK over the tutelary state, where 
previous politicians and political parties were unable to do so. Hypothesis #1 predicts that 
electoral competition can explain this increase in civilian control in Turkey. 
Hypotheses #1 (Electoral Competition): The AKP was able to exert 
control over the TSK from 2002 to 2011 through repeated electoral and 
policy successes that enabled emboldened AKP challenges of TSK 
prerogatives. 
After winning the 2002 election, the AKP leveraged the particularistic and 
programmatic incentives described by electoral competition to increase voter support in 
future elections. Repeated electoral success translated into increased civilian control of 
the armed forces by providing the AKP the necessary defense against military 
interference: significant and ever-increasing voter support. How the AKP and Prime 
Minister Erdoğan remained in office long enough to win repeated elections when 
previous political parties or prime ministers were routinely banned, forced out by the 
military, or had coalitional governments fall apart (and thereby preventing the repeated 
electoral success critical for electoral competition) is an important question, and is 
addressed in Chapter III.62 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain trends 
irresistible commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to change 
or resist them. 
—English historian E. H. Carr 
 
This dissertation is a focused analysis on the increase in civilian control over the 
armed forces in Turkey under the AKP from 2002 to 2011. Hypothesis #1 describes how 
electoral competition could adequately explain this increase in control, through a process 
of elections, policy making, and military reform. The year 2002 is treated as a break from 
the previous 52 years of Turkish democracy wherein, prior to 2002, the military exerted 
control over civilians and, since 2002, the civilians have increasingly established first 
formal them actual control over the military. In order to effectively argue that an electoral 
competition is causal and not merely correlated to changes in control, there must be 
demonstrable evidence that the power relationship changed—that a previous behavior, 
norm, privilege, etc., was altered in some way that can be attributable to the influence of 
electoral competition. 
In this dissertation, both objective and subjective evidence is considered as 
evidence of change. Subjective evidence of changing control comes primarily in the 
forms of public pronouncements and/or communications by either the military or the 
elected politicians. These indicators are subjective in that they reflect potential “spin” by 
public figures making public statements.63 
Objective evidence in support of a hypothesis comes in several forms. The first 
objective source includes reports, findings, and studies by international institutions or 
organizations on Turkish civil-military relations. Reports such as the annual European 
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Commission Regular Reports provide analysis of Turkish progress towards achieving the 
Copenhagen Criteria for EU Accession by assessing evidence of military involvement in 
politics. As public products of various international organizations, documents do not 
require or allow a researcher to interpret conditions in Turkey; they have already done the 
interpretation in light of specific E.U. measures. 
The second objective evidence of changing control is the cumulative results of 
investigations, trials, referendums, etc., that demonstrate which entity is winning the 
struggle for control, the politicians or the military. The final and most important objective 
evidence of control are changes to the Turkish legal structure such as the laws and 
ministerial positions that redefine or restrict the authority of the military or, in the words 
of Serra: “redefine the tasks and nature of the armed forces.”64 These last sources of 
evidence provide the tangible changes in the power relationships, as Welch predicted 
would indicate increasing civilian control. In addition trials, regulations, and 
constitutional amendments also directly impact the prerogatives by redefining the limits 
of TSK authority. 
For Hypothesis #1 the critical component of establishing control over the armed 
forces is repeated successful elections. Assessing election results in the 2002 
parliamentary, 2004 local, 2007 parliamentary (moved forward by the AKP), 2007 
constitutional referendum, 2009 local, and 2010 constitutional referendum provides 
ample material to establish whether electoral competition contributed to the ability of the 
AKP to establish and maintain control over the TSK. If Hypothesis #1 were accurate, we 
would expect that with each successive election wherein the AKP remained in power (or 
achieved desired policy results such as a successful constitutional referendum) the party’s 
leverage over the military would grow. Growing control of the military can be 
demonstrated by analyzing military prerogatives and which party “wins” contestations of 
power such as trials and investigations. 
A possible challenge to Hypothesis #1 is why electoral competition did not take 
root sooner. The length between the removals of elected civilian leaders from power 
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essentially precluded a sample of unimpeded elections that would allow electoral 
competition to take place. Periods of 10, 11, 9, and 14 years between 1983 and 1997 
without consistent, reliable elections means the theory could not be effectively assessed. 
From 1983 to 1997, most governments required coalitions between parties, no 
government was in office long enough to effect its own five-year economic plan, and in 
some cases citizens were quite literally discouraged by the military for voting for a 
particular political party.65 What differed from 1983 to 1997 electorally, which could 
explain why electoral competition couldn’t take place during previous windows was the 
magnitude of the AKP success, the pure majority of parliamentary seats won in 2002 and 
allowed the AKP to act unilaterally in parliament. This majority also helps explain how 
Electoral Competition could “jumpstart” reforms in 2002. 
In summation: If Hypothesis #1 is accurate, it will explain both the initial period 
of civilian control of the TSK from 2002 to 2006 and the recurring civilian control of the 
military from 2006 to 2011. According to this hypothesis, electoral competition created 
the incentive structure and ability for the AKP to assert increasing control over the 
Turkish Armed Forces. This increase in control is demonstrable and measureable by the 
number of changes to the military role and responsibilities that the AKP enacted. The 
resignation of all four service chiefs in protest over coup investigations demonstrated the 
totality of AKP control over the military, achieved in just under a decade in government. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISSERTATION AND OVERVIEW OF 
ANALYSIS 
The field of civil-military relations has no shortage of extensive case studies, 
analysis, theory construction, and prescriptive formulas intended to demystify the 
complex relationships between governments and the armed forces charged with 
defending them. Some works, such as Huntington’s, focuses on the general aspects of 
armed forces across societies, while others on the specifics of individual states and their 
unique historical conditions. A preponderance of the latter has focused on the states of 
southern Europe and Latin America with the Philippines or Egypt or Turkey occasionally 
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added according to the interests of the researcher. Of these, Turkey represents an 
important case of civil-military relations precisely because Turkey represents so many 
subsets within the civil-military relations field. 
This dissertation seeks to enhance the field of civil-military relations by detailing 
the process used in Turkey to gain control of a historically and institutionally powerful 
military by civilian politicians. The ability to explain a complex and boundary case such 
as Turkey adds value to the field by demonstrating the efficacy of electoral competition 
against a complex and modern civil-military relations case. The boundary cases that truly 
represent challenging civil-military relations are those case studies that theories should 
have to address if they are to provide true utility. Additionally, boundary cases such as 
Turkey are likely to overlap and have value across subsets. Turkey, for example, would 
provide a useful case for comparative studies interested in civil-military relations in 
alliances. What influence has the NATO alliance had on Turkish civil-military relations? 
Turkish membership in NATO exceeds that of notables Spain and Germany and 
coexisted in the alliance while preceding state Portugal struggled with authoritarianism 
and neighboring Greece withdrew from the alliance due to the Cyprus conflict. 
Similarly, those scholars interested in studies on the transition between 
authoritarianism and democracy would find Turkey useful as a unique case to experience 
a multitude of transitions, each of which was different and represented another subset. 
The foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 provides ample material for studying 
transition to democracy after external conflict. The 1960 coup fits transitions to 
democracy after violent military coup and junta (including political executions), while the 
1980 coup provides a classic study in a military preparing the way for future 
interventions while willingly returning control (the willing return of control to civilians 
itself is an additional subset). The diversity between the TSK’s four successful efforts to 
change the state’s political leadership typically requires several states, and the ability to 
assess varied breakdowns in a single country represents a unique opportunity. 
While Turkish civil-military relations can be considered a somewhat moving 
target given that the military has shown a propensity towards intervention during periods 
of both domestic stability and instability, a decade of uninterrupted electoral participation 
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and governance under one political party provides an ideal opportunity to assess how 
well electoral competition transfers cases. Turkey matters precisely because the target is 
moving, and moving fast. Not merely a study in history, Turkish civil-military relations is 
also a study in the present evolution of the field. As a subset of democratization, 
explaining the civil-military relations in complex cases such as Turkey also feeds the 
main discipline and advances research that focuses on other aspects of democratization 
such as party politics, political economy, and civil society. 
Any state with a strong military and suboptimal civilian control will find value in 
knowing how a state in similar circumstances could consolidate control of the military in 
such a short window of time, and whether that consolidation is replicable. While the 
specifics of each case will always differ, a theory with strong utility should be able to 
speak to each of these differences with some degree of accuracy. South Korea, Pakistan, 
and Egypt are just a few such states whose civil-military dynamics look closer to those of 
Turkey than to those of the United States or other well-consolidated democracies. To 
these states, the vagaries of which U.S. military general published an opinion piece that 
differs from the official executive branch policy is likely less important than 
understanding how a group of politicians could reform a military a mere five years after a 
successful military intervention banned a political party and imprisoned the current prime 
minister. 
Following this introduction, Chapter II sets the stage for the research and analysis 
by explaining the origins and evolution of Turkish civil-military relations from the 
foundation of the Republic in 1923 to the 2002 reforms. From 1923 to 1950, single-party 
politics and the legacy of Atatürk dominated Turkish government. The period from 1950 
to 1961 saw the introduction of multi-party elections and factionalism, a direct affront to 
the military vision of society. From 1961 to 1982, Turkish politics was defined by 
changes to the powers of the military such as the Armed Forces Internal Service Law and 
National Security Council Law. These laws increased the ability of the military to legally 
interfere in domestic politics. The period from 1982 to 2002 saw the TSK solidify the 
prerogatives earned during the previous decades and establish themselves as the 
“guardians” of the republic in the political and martial sense. Finally, explanation of the 
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AKP reforms of the TSK, from 2002 forward, sets the stage for analysis of how these 
reforms were successfully pursued. 
The rest of this dissertation proceeds in a straightforward manner with Chapter III 
describing the use of programmatic and particularistic incentives of electoral competition 
to establish formal control over the TSK from 2002 to 2006. Chapter IV then explains the 
increase in civilian control during a period of open contestation with the TSK from 2007 
to 2011, and the mass resignations of the chiefs of staff. Lastly, Chapter V offers a 
conclusion of the performance of Hypothesis #1 and electoral competition in explaining 
the growth in civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey during the AKP decade from 
2002 to 2011, policy implications of this research, and identifies future research 
opportunities base of the findings herein. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
In order to assess the shift in control of politics in Turkey under the AKP, one 
must first understand how the foundations of the tutelage state came to be. To appreciate 
the extent of the entrenched military power and prerogatives that the AKP has overcome 
through electoral competition, one must delineate the myriad rules, regulations, and laws 
that have enabled the military to act as political arbiter since the inception of the Republic 
in 1923. The purpose of this chapter then is twofold: first, to explain why the military was 
able to perpetuate the tutelary state for so long and, second, to set the stage for how, from 
2002 forward, electoral competition would prove accurate in predicting and explaining 
increased civilian control over the Turkish military. 
Successful reforms that began in 2002 are most accurately analyzed against the 
backdrop of over a century of military involvement in Turkish politics. Understanding 
what methods of intervention were utilized and the legal justifications for intervention, as 
well as the conditions that contribute to the ability of the military to intervene, helps 
clarify why, of the various models of civil-military relations discussed in the introduction, 
only electoral competition can explain the Turkish case. As Craig Arceneaux observed, 
“one cannot understand transition control without a detailed examination of the period of 
military rule that preceded it.”66 
Turkey presents several different periods of military rule that preceded transitions, 
some democratic, others to back to the Ottoman Sultanate, but each essential to the 
evolution of Turkish civil-military relations. The periods, which have created the unique 
conditions of modern Turkish civil-military relations, include the Ottoman era up to 
1922, the single party period of 1923–1950, the introduction of multi-party elections from 
1950 to 1960, the rise of military tutelage from 1961 to 1982, and the tutelary state from 
1982 to 2002. 
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From the 19th century forward, the Ottoman military proved a significant driver 
of political change when the sultanate tended towards greater authoritarianism. 67 
Consideration of the period before the 1919 War of Independence and the creation of 
modern Turkey will illustrate the longstanding tendency of the armed forces to intervene 
in politics when the Turkish government did not perform according to military 
expectations.68 During the single-party period, the military lay dormant while former 
military leaders such as Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha (later İnönü) led the creation of 
a republic purposefully modeled on those of Western Europe. 
After World War II, Cold War politics and economic growth demanded a shift in 
Turkish politics to meet these challenges and, in 1950, multi-party elections began. After 
the first modern Turkish coup in 1960, the military introduced a new constitution that 
would allow for greater political participation. This constitution established the 
conditions that would lead to the rise of modern military tutelage and subsequent 
interventions. The period of 1980–2002 saw the military consolidate its role as the arbiter 
of Turkish politics, complete with another constitution clearly establishing the parameters 
of the tutelage state. 
A. THE MILITARY, THE STATE, CONTROL, AND INTERVENTION 
Understanding the evolution of Turkish civil-military relations begins with 
knowledge of the historical relationship between the Turkish armed forces and the 
Turkish (previously Ottoman) government. The relationship between the government and 
the military in Turkey is historically rooted in a narrative of control and intervention, and 
of which faction—the military or the governing regime—can effectively exert control 
over the other. Detailing the historical context that precedes modern Turkey sets the stage 
for analysis of how the civilians have finally found the means to exert lasting control over 
the military. 
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The manner in which a military relates to the government that fields and funds 
said military is unique across countries. In some nations, the military oversees the 
government; in others it protects the state and, in many, it represents the state in 
international institutions. In all cases the military remains a component of the state. The 
complex relationship between the Turkish military and Turkish governments is the result 
of a multitude of laws, institutions, and standards that have historically granted the 
military a high degree of latitude to interfere in the government of the state. Samuel Finer 
asserts that militaries are purposive instruments, rationally conceived to accomplish 
objectives such as defense, war, or the assistance of civil powers.69 These militaries are 
conceived by states, a centralized authority with a monopoly of military power over a 
given territory.70 
What happens in those instances where the military precedes the state, or 
potentially even creates the state? If a military survives the disintegration of one authority 
(in this case, the Ottoman Empire), unifies the remnants, defeats the same forces that 
caused the disintegration of that authority (Allied Forces attempting to enforce the Treaty 
of Sevres), and finally establishes a new authority under the leadership of the military’s 
most famous general, is this military still purposive as Finer proposes, or has it instead 
become the very crescive institution that Finer asserts a military cannot be? 71  What 
happens when the military conceives the state rather than the state conceiving the 
military? In scenarios such as these, the military might well see itself as vested with the 
creation and perpetuation of the state and associated norms.72 
This scenario is evidenced in the creation of modern Turkey. The Ottoman 
military was inseparable from the Ottoman Empire, and was in several ways the 
backbone of the empire.73 Essential functions of the state such as taxation and census, 
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bookkeeping and data archiving, and transportation and communication networks were 
all introduced to the empire by the military.74 The military periodically intervened in 
politics throughout the establishment, expansion, and contraction of the Ottoman Empire, 
often for the purpose of reform or national unity. It was the formal creation of a 
constitutional republic that created the real opportunity structure for political intervention 
by the military on a permanent and institutionalized basis. Moreover, it was the four 
consecutive constitutions themselves that established legal guidance for military 
intervention in the Turkish government. 
Beginning with the constitution of 1921 and continuing through each of the 1924, 
1961, and 1982 constitutions, responsibility for protection of the state from both external 
and internal threats was placed in the hands of the military.75 This was accomplished 
surreptitiously and demonstrated most recently through Articles 1 to 3 (the so-called 
“irrevocable provisions”) of the 1982 constitution. In these three articles, the Turkish 
state is defined as a Republic, secular in nature, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and 
based on the fundamental tenets of the preamble. Furthermore, the Turkish territory and 
nation are indivisible and the language of both is Turkish.76 Article 4 protects these 
articles by stating that Articles 1 through 3 “shall not be amended nor shall their 
amendment be proposed.”77 
Certain aspects of these irrevocable provisions, such as the republican nature of 
the state, the national anthem (Independence March), and the capital city (Ankara), are 
innocuous and common to constitutions. However, the nebulousness of provisions, such 
as loyalty to principles of the founder, to a certain type of nationalism, and the mandate 
of no “interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs,” begs the 
question: Who defines and identifies the “correct” nationalism, the true principles of 
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Atatürk, or when religious “feelings” become too enmeshed in statecraft? 78  As the 
introduction noted, inasmuch as these provisions were written under the guidance of the 
military, the logical conclusion is that the military officials themselves were intended to 
be the final arbiter. The military has confirmed this conclusion when citing constitutional 
obligations before, during, and after various interventions in politics.79 
Support for (and codification of) the military’s preeminent role in supervising the 
Turkish government is derived from two primary sources: the Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law of 1961 and the National Security Council. Article 35 of the 
Internal Service Law asserts that “the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and 
preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the 
constitution.”80 The language of the 1961 Internal Service Law was identical to that of 
Article 34 of the Internal Service Law of 1935, written during single-party rule, and 
demonstrated the continuity of the Turkish military in politics.81 The Turkish Armed 
Forces Internal Service Directive further explains, “it is the duty of the Turkish Armed 
Forces to protect the Turkish homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, 
against internal and external threats.”82 
While the Internal Service Laws and constitutions have delineated the role of the 
Turkish military, the institution of the MGK has been the mechanism that historically has 
allowed the military the unfettered ability to define the very threats against which they 
are charged to guard. Like the Internal Service Law, regulations governing the MGK 
have a long history in Turkish politics. The 1961 constitution originally established the 
MGK to advise the Council of Ministers on appropriate decision-making with regard to 
national security.83 The prerogative to define threats, internal and external, to the state 
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flowed therefore from the construction of the MGK. Another key component of the 1961 
constitution that provided leverage over elected officials was the Constitutional Court, 
which was endowed with impeachment authority for presidents, ministers, and other 
officials for failure to perform duties of the office.84 Of the eleven permanent seats on the 
court, two were reserved for the military, one from the Military Court of Cassation and 
the other from the High Military Administrative Court of Appeals. 
The 1982 constitution granted additional coercive power to the military by 
requiring that five of ten seats on the MGK be active military officers.85 Also included in 
the 1982 constitution were requirements that the Council of Ministers “give priority 
consideration to the decisions of the MGK concerning the measures that it deems 
necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the 
integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society.”86 
The 1961 constitution created the MGK, but it was the 1982 constitution 
ensconced it as the ultimate arbiter of state security. Language such as “measures that it 
deems necessary” gave the military incredibly wide latitude to pursue any desired course 
against threats both internal and external.87 The final legal authority for the military to 
maintain such deep influence over politics is the National Security Council Law of 1983. 
Article 2a clarifies: “National security means the defence and protection of the state 
against every kind of external and internal threat to the constitutional order, national 
existence, unity, and to all its interests and contractual rights in the international arena 
including in the political, social, cultural, and economic spheres” (emphasis added).88 
This law also created the office of the MGK General Secretariat that, until the seventh 
reform package (EU harmonization) was passed in July 2003, was required to be an 
active duty general or admiral. The secretariat is responsible for the creation of the 
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National Security Policy Document (NSPD) defining threats and appropriate responses, 
which would become a key component of military tutelage. 
To reiterate: successive constitutions define Turkey as a republic that is required 
to be loyal to the ideals set forth by military leader Atatürk. The internal service laws 
gave the responsibility to the military for maintaining the security of the state from 
threats. The MGK gave the military the prerogative to counsel civilian leadership on 
military-related matters, and the MGK General Secretariat (required by law until 2003 to 
be a military officer) was responsible for identifying threats. These laws are responsible 
for creating not just the opportunity structure but also (in the military view) the 
responsibility to interfere in politics if and when politicians themselves became a threat 
(as defined by the military) to the nation-state. In this Byzantine structure, the NSPD 
could be (and was) created to identify other members of the MGK or politicians as threats 
to the state (typically because of religious views). Therefore, the civilians charged with 
running the country might not only be prevented from accessing national defense 
material, but would in fact be the subject of such material. With a historical, legal, and 
even professional (as the defenders of a specific vision for the state) justification for 
interference, military commanders would be foolish not to use their influence to keep 
civilian leadership on the “correct” path.89 
B. BEFORE THE REPUBLIC: THE MILITARY AND THE OTTOMANS 
Well before the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the military of the 
Ottoman Empire had already established itself as an agent with the means and ability to 
exert political influence in the state. A politically active and educated officer corps that 
was familiar with the organization of the professional militaries of Europe became the 
means by which the military could force political concessions from the government.90 As 
in the modern era, the officer corps of the armed forces proved adept at entering and 
                                                 
89 Barany, Soldier and the Changing State, 27. 
90 Avigdor Levy, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the 
Eighteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 3 (1982), 238. 
 32 
exiting politics in order to secure concessions from the government while positioning 
themselves as a perpetual influence in politics. 
The political activity of the military from the late 19
th
 century through the end of 
World War I would echo into the fledgling republic mainly through the role of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, in Turkish the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), a 
collection of political groups collectively and colloquially referred to as the Young Turk 
movement. The Young Turk movement comprised three segments of society, originating 
from a determination to offer political opposition to the Hamidian regime, secret societies 
from universities, former Ottoman officials now living abroad, and secret cabals of army 
officers. 91  The specific political objective of these groups was the restoration of 
constitutional rule and of a representative parliament, both of which had been suspended 
in 1878.92 
During the Tanzimat decrees of 1842, the Ottoman military was reorganized into 
territorial armies, essentially leaving the Ottoman Empire without a national army.93 On 
the European landmass, these included the 2
nd
 Corps (Thracian) and the 3
rd
 Corps 
(Macedonian). Designed to improve military morale, the reorganization had the 
unintended effect of leaving each corps independent. When combined with the existent 
military prerogative to control officer education through military universities, these 
independent armies created the opportunity structure for the CUP to flourish.94 In July 
1908, under the leadership of the CUP, the officers of the 3
rd
 Army Corps marched on 
Constantinople and successfully demanded the reinstatement of constitutional rule.  
When Sultan Abdül Hamid relented on July 24, the CUP-led military had 
demonstrated the power of a popular military over an unpopular government and 
highlighted the conflict that can arise when confronted with a ruler without military 
support and a military without a legitimate mandate to rule. Despite nearly twenty years 
of strident opposition to the Sultan, the military neither took control of the government 
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nor deposed the Sultan, but merely set itself up as the guardian of the newly returned 
constitutional order. 95  The return of parliamentary rule had the additional effect of 
shifting power back to the Ottoman bureaucracy (and therefore the military) and away 
from the Sultan.96 
The 1908 coup was unprecedented in three ways: the action was perpetrated by 
conservatives, the intent was restoration rather than destruction or creation, and finally, 
the Young Turk Revolution ushered a new type of regime: one-party rule.97 Each of these 
aspects of the 1908 coup would become staples of the next century of Turkish civil-
military relation, wherein a conservative military would “restore” stability to the state. 
The conflict between the Sultan and the CUP would continue and, in March 1909, 
culminated in an attempted counter-coup by a collection of Islamists, liberals, and 
supporters of the Sultan, known as the 31 March incident.98 
To protect the 1908 coup, the CUP immediately organized an “Action Army” to 
put down the rebellion, which it successfully did.99 The coups of 1908 and 1909 had a 
profound impact on the future of Turkish civil-military relations by demonstrating a 
successful pattern: the military steps in to make corrections to the ruling regime, deposes 
failed governments (Sultan Mehmet V replacing Abdul Hamid in 1909), imposes martial 
law when necessary to protect the changes (martial law was declared from 1909 to 1911 
following the 1909 counter-coup), and alters constitutions to diminish the powers of the 
authorities over the military. Constitutional changes in 1909 dramatically reduced the 
powers of the Sultan by taking away the privilege of ruling the state, leaving the monarch 
a figurehead. 
As the Ottoman Empire continued to collapse upon itself, the military staged a 
final coup in 1913 in an attempt to stop the government from ceding the strategically 
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important former capital of the empire, Edirne. Against the backdrop of a public outraged 
at the government, the military stormed the Sublime Porte (the term for the head of 
government named for the entrance to government buildings; in Ottoman Turkish the 
Babı-Ali), killing the Chief of Staff, and forcing the Grand Vizier to sign his own 
resignation.100 After the Babı-Ali coup, the military was consumed with World War I 
when the Ottomans entered the conflict as an Entente power. 
C. 1923–1950: SINGLE PARTY POLITICS 
Having experienced the collapse of the Ottoman Empire—in large part due to the 
predations of external countries over the previous centuries, followed by the attempted 
division under the Treaty of Sevres—what became the Republic of Turkey largely 
viewed external states as an existential threat during the formative years of the country. 
During the single-party period, Turkey was largely removed from international affairs, 
focusing on the development of a viable Western-style nation surrounded by potential 
enemies. Civil-military relations during this period reflected this reality, with a 
government headed by former officers and current military leadership focused on 
external threats rather than the civilian leadership. After the War of Independence, those 
military officers who sought leadership in government in the new regime followed the 
example of Mustafa Kemal and resigned their military commissions. 
The single-party era of Turkish statecraft was dominated by the cult of personality 
surrounding Mustafa Kemal (after 1934 and the Surname Law Kemal Atatürk) from the 
conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence in 1922 until his death in 1938. Kemal 
rose to fame as an officer during the Allied assault on Gallipoli, which the Ottoman 
forces successfully repelled, but even before World War I was a well-known and active 
member of the CUP inner circle.101 It is suspected that Kemal was an advocate within the 
CUP of a complete disengagement of the military from politics following the 1913 coup, 
and was definitely an advocate of Turkish nationalism.102 Both of these characteristics 
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would be reflected in Kemal’s future leadership of Turkey, which demanded both a 
separation of military from the government that Kemal led, and a stridently nationalistic 
leadership style. 
Kemal was also the leader of the nationalist movement within the military during 
the Turkish War of Independence.103 While there were other officers of prominence, to 
Kemal fell control of the nationalist movement when Allied forces partitioning the 
remains of the Ottoman Empire occupied Istanbul. His success in defeating the recent 
victors of World War I at the helm of the only remaining military force in country—as 
well as the de facto commander-in-chief during the war years—gave Kemal the necessary 
prominence to take the lead in forging a new state after the War of Independence. While 
fame and fortune allowed Kemal a privileged position in the creation of modern Turkey, 
the military officers and leaders who fought the Allies in World War I and the War of 
Independence were virtually all members of the CUP. CUP members shared common 
history, from activity in the second constitutional period from 1908 to 1918, through the 
Balkan War in 1913, and through the creation of the state in 1923.104 From the return of 
constitutional rule in 1908 until the constitutions of the modern republic, the CUP was a 
constant presence in Turkish politics. 
The first constitution to govern the Turkish people following Ottoman rule was 
enacted in 1921 by the Grand National Assembly, which declared itself the only and true 
representative of the nation. 105  This statement had important implications for the 
immediate period, by proclaiming to occupying powers that the Sultanate no longer 
governed the nation, and for the future, by suggesting that whatever state followed the 
war would be representative. While minimal in coercive power (inasmuch as Turkey was 
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both occupied and still technically a monarchy), this constitution would serve as a 
foundation for future governments. 
After independence in 1923, the Grand National Assembly constructed a new 
constitution for the purpose of more accurately reflecting the status of the new nation as a 
constitutional republic. The 1924 document shared important similarities with the 
preceding constitution, such as the principle of national sovereignty as well as the 
condition that legislative and executive power would reside in the Assembly. The 1924 
constitution was majoritarian rather than pluralistic in design, assigning importance to the 
“general will of the nation.”106 While this document was intended to be democratic in 
nature, it also began to demonstrate the preeminence of the state over the citizens of the 
state and suffered from a lack of checks and balances. The latter proved unproblematic; 
the majority of the time that the 1924 constitution was in effect the country was under 
single-party rule of the Kemalist CHP, the same party serving in opposition to the AKP 
from 2002 to 2011. 
An early challenge for any new nation-state can be the creation of a “national” 
identity.107 From 1923 forward, the fledgling Turkish state went through dramatic and 
rapid change, everything from government to language, to dress and religious practices 
changed in accordance with the new nationalist, secular republic. During this period, 
military officers followed the example of Mustafa Kemal and left military service before 
entering the government, and the military served as a defender of the new republic and of 
the civilian regime. Turkish civil-military relations under Atatürk were most notable for 
inactivity, with many prominent politicians being former officers and confidants of 
Kemal. However, the military was used by Kemal as a necessary instrument in 
modernization, a role that would give rise to the sentiment that the military was intended 
by Kemal to protect the Republic even from itself.108 In every possible fashion during the 
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formative years of the Republic, Turkey was founded and led by current and former 
officers of the armed forces. 
D. 1950–1961: MULTI-PARTY POLITICS BEGIN 
As the world began to bifurcate along Cold War lines, so too did Turkish politics, 
with the introduction of elections and multi-party government shortly after World War II. 
As many of the political leaders during the single-party era were former officers, the 
division of Turkish politics into multiple parties and a voting electorate meant that the 
role of the military would be subject to the desires of future elected governments. How 
the military would respond to these early governments would set the tone for future civil-
military relations. As Turkey expanded international relations, the involvement with 
foreign governments would impact the relationship between the military and the 
politicians. Multi-party elections meant that, for the first time, the military could be 
subject to politicians who were neither former military nor Kemalists. At the same time, 
the budding Cold War meant that external threats remained a priority consideration, 
making the initial multi-party period a time of instability for the armed forces and the 
civilian politicians. 
The first opposition party sanctioned by the Kemalist establishment and the CHP 
was the Demokrat Parti (DP), founded in January 1946 by former CHP members 
discontent with the direction of both the party and the state. The external pressures of 
post-World War II international relations played an essential part in this multi-party 
expansion. A desire for American political, economic, and military support contributed to 
Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s conclusion that the chief shortcoming of Turkish politics 
was a lack of an independent opposition party, and declared that the 1947 elections would 
be free and direct.109 
When the DP gained prominence with the voters, the CHP chose to move 
elections forward from July 1947 to July 1946, substantially limiting the time that the 
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new opposition party had to effectively organize and campaign nationally.110 Despite the 
obvious political maneuvering by the CHP to maintain power, the efforts to expand 
political participation were enough to allow Turkey to make substantial inroads into the 
Western block of states aligning against communist Russia. In 1948, Turkey became a 
recipient of Marshall Fund aid, joined the Organisation of European Economic Co-
operation (CEEC), and received military credit to purchase arms from the United 
States.111 Accession into the Council of Europe in 1949 and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in 1952 completed the Turkish transition from an isolated single-party 
authoritarian state to an electoral democracy securely ensconced in the West for the 
coming Cold War. 
National elections were held again in 1950, this time after the opposition DP had 
several years to distance itself from the CHP and to make the voters aware of the DP as a 
viable option to the establishment CHP. The nature of Turkey’s d’Hondt method or 
parliamentary apportionment meant that winning a 55.2 percent of the general vote in 
1950—to the CHP’s 39.6 percent—gave the DP 415 seats in the new parliament, while 
the CHP received a mere 69 seats.112 With this majority position in parliament, the DP 
was able to nominate the prime minister, for which it chose founding member Adnan 
Menderes. For the first time, Turkey reached a minimalist level of democracy, with a 
peaceful transition from authoritarian CHP rule to the democratic regime governed by the 
elected DP. 
Among the first DP actions were a purge of senior military officers thought too 
loyal to the CHP and the reintroduction of Arabic during the call to prayer. Both actions 
directly challenged two key aspects of the Turkish military, autonomy and commitment 
to the Kemalist principle of secularism. In 1954, Turks again elected the DP to lead the 
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government, the party increasing their parliamentary majority to 503 of 541 seats 
available.113 Following this victory, the DP began to reflect the CHP of the previous 
decades, equating their government with the state itself, and using stridently majoritarian 
tactics to delegitimize the opposition CHP (tied to the military through their mutual 
origin in Kemalism).114 
Between 1954 and 1960, the DP grew increasingly aggressive, first by 
introducing new rules in 1954 to forcibly retire civil servants after 25 years of service 
(designed to purge the bureaucracy of CHP loyalists).115 Additionally, in 1956, the DP 
revived the 1940 National Defense Law to permit the military (after the purge thought to 
be more agreeable to the DP) to control prices and supply of defense-related goods, 
changed the press laws to advance government control (despite campaign pledges to 
liberalize), and banned political meetings except during election campaigns.116 Because 
the Turkish military had close ties with the governing CHP for the previous three 
decades, and as many CHP leaders themselves were former military officers, the DP had 
reason to question the loyalty of the military to their government. Despite the purge of 
officers in 1950, nine military officers were arrested in 1957 and accused of plots to 
overthrow the government. Owing to military prerogatives in the judicial branch, a 
military tribunal tried those arrested. Each was acquitted while the informant was 
convicted. 
Throughout 1957, the DP under Menderes continued to dismiss officials and 
judges, prosecute journalists, and essentially wage open political war against the CHP 
and former Prime Minister and President İsmet Pasha (İnönü), whose status as a hero of 
the War of Independence was still prominent amongst the populace and who also served 
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as a transitional figure between political eras.117 Using tactics identical to those used 
against them a decade earlier, the DP moved up parliamentary elections, from 1958 to 
1957, and in doing so clung to power, but by a much narrower margin and with less than 
50 percent of the popular vote. 
By 1959, relations between the DP and opposition CHP had deteriorated to the 
point of violence between deputies during parliamentary assembly. The corruption and 
pettiness of the Menderes regime was epitomized to many by what has since become 
known as the Kayseri incident. In April 1960, İnönü traveled through the Kayseri 
province to consult local CHP members who had allegedly been unfairly treated by local 
DP authorities; the Kayseri governor stopped him at the provincial border. After a three-
hour confrontation with the governor, İnönü was allowed passage, only to be stopped 
again the following day. This second time, İnönü simply walked passed the barricade to 
the salute of attendant soldiers. The Kayseri incident was considered to demonstrate not 
simply the base tactics that the Menderes-led DP might engage in, but also the level of 
support that the regime might expect from a military whose living legends were treated 
shabbily.118 When, later that April, the DP announced a parliamentary commission with 
sweeping powers to investigate the CHP, university demonstrations broke out.119 
The sometimes-violent riots continued until May 27, 1960, when the Turkish 
military occupied strategic spots in Istanbul and Ankara and, using recently confiscated 
radio stations, broadcast a “breakfast communiqué.”120 This communiqué included the 
military rationale behind the intervention, as well as insight into the role that the military 
officials saw for themselves: 
Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating 
the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen 
and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as 
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possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and 
impartial administration, and for handing over the administration to which 
ever party wins the elections.121 
Spoken by Colonel Alparslan Türkes, all three sections of this statement expose 
an essential aspect of what future civil-military relations would look like in Turkey. First, 
when “necessary” to keep the civilians in order, the military will step in. Second, the 
military will act as an arbiter over elections because the military is “above-party.”122 
Third, the military will willingly step down for properly elected civilians. This last clause 
established the principle of guardians, not authoritarians, of the state. That is, the 
military’s role would be to mentor the state and keep Turkey on the “correct” Kemalist 
path, as opposed to a permanent ruling class free from the restrictions of parliament. 
However, political parties and politicians to whom the military did not want to hand over 
control would simply be banned from political participation. 
When control was given back to the voters after the coup and subsequent military 
junta, the military had created the MGK and installed themselves as guardians with the 
Internal Service Law. They also created the Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu (Armed Forces 
Pension Fund or OYAK), which would become a powerful economic actor in the Turkish 
economy and give the military a source of funding outside parliamentary channels.123 
Despite the willingness of the military to step down, the Rubicon had been crossed; there 
could be no turning back. Cem Erogül postulates, “The greatest damage the Democratic 
Party inflicted on Turkey was that it nearly forced the army into politics, permanently 
injuring the tradition of civilian rule meticulously preserved since Atatürk.”124 
The National Unity Committee (formed by young officers after the coup), 
approved three death sentences: Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, along with his foreign 
and finance ministers. Both İnönü and the leadership of the opposition CHP (which the 
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DP replaced in 1954) attempted to intervene and halt the executions. On September 16, 
1961, the military executed the first democratically elected prime minister of Turkey. The 
new president of Turkey from 1960 to 1966 would be General Cemal Gürsel, former 
ground forces commander, recruited by the coup plotters specifically to provide general 
officer top cover.125 
The 1960 coup initiated a new cycle of Turkish military focus on internal security 
and development as core values belonging to the armed forces alongside the more 
traditional military role of external war fighting. In doing so, the military began to reflect 
a hybrid conception of professionalism combining traditional military roles with what 
Alfred Stepan refers to as “new professionalism.”126 According to new professionalism, 
militaries will study those conditions that enable revolutionary movements and then 
develop doctrines and techniques to crush such movements. 127  The combination of 
traditional and new professionalism explains how the Turkish military could claim 
loyalty to the state and professionalism as institutional values while simultaneously 
overthrowing civilian governments. When a military is operating under the aegis of new 
professionalism the scope of professional behavior becomes unrestricted, the military 
becomes more politicized, and military role expansion occurs. 128  Each of these 
characteristics of the new professional military is reflected in the Turkish case, and with 
each intervention these traits were made manifest. 
E. 1961–1983: THE RISE OF MILITARY TUTELAGE 
After the 1960 intervention, the military was able to operate as an autonomous 
institution and sought to protect the new regime it established for itself rather than a 
particular political party or government.129 In the eyes of the military leaders, stability of 
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the regime and the republic was the primary concern, and the military would be willing to 
act against any party that threatened the regime.130 Civil-military relations during this 
period were dominated by military threat considerations. Internal political violence and 
lack of consensus drove more military interventions while the military attempted to “fine-
tune” its role in politics. External threats such as Greece, the Cold War, and Cyprus 
encouraged the military to maintain a strong domestic role, and failures of democracy 
during this period received little to no criticism; Western allies in the U.S. and Europe 
were more concerned with a strong NATO military on the Soviet border than they were 
with the inability of political parties and actors to govern effectively under the growing 
military tutelage. 
The occupants of the office of president under the 1961 constitution (in place for 
nineteen years) demonstrate the preeminence of the military during and after the 
transition to civilian control. Despite provisions in Article 95 of the constitution 
stipulating that the president be elected from members of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (GNAT) by secret ballot, all three presidents serving from 1961 to 1980 were 
former military leaders. As the GNAT had been dispersed during the coup, parliamentary 
elections for new civilian leadership were held in 1961. This assembly had National 
Unity Committee leader and interim head of state General Cemal Gürsel imposed upon 
them as the new president. 
In 1966, when chronic health concerns forced Gürsel to step down, the leader of 
the majority Justice Party (Süleyman Demirel) offered the presidency to General Cevdet 
Sunay despite having the necessary votes to elect one of the party’s own members to the 
presidency. 131  Like Gürsel before him, Cevdet was not a member of the GNAT as 
prescribed by the constitution, but rather the highest-ranking military officer in the 
country: Chief of the General Staff. This pattern continued in 1972 when active Chief of 
Staff Faruk Gürler made a bid for the presidency that was defeated by a coalition of 
Justice and (typically pro-military) CHP. Alas, the defeat of Gürler required the 
acceptance by the civilians of former military commander Admiral Fahri Korutürk (also 
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not a member of the GNAT) as the third consecutive military commander to serve as 
president after the 1960 coup. 
In addition to controlling the office of president, the military used the 1961 
transition to alter the relationship between the government and the military on a 
permanent basis. Former members of the National Unity Committee junta were made 
lifetime ex officio senators, given full judicial immunity from prosecution resulting from 
any aspect of the coup, and provisional Article 4 of the new constitution stipulated that all 
laws passed by the military regime could not be challenged on the basis of 
constitutionality before the constitutional court. 132  Finally, large portions of judges 
(nearly half of the judges from the Council of State) were forcibly retired, and the judicial 
branch transformed into an instrument of “tutelary control over elected bodies.”133 
Essential to the 1961 constitution were efforts to increase political participation 
and encourage greater variance among political parties represented in parliament. This 
was done in a belief that expansion of political parties would help prevent the tendency of 
dominant parties to behave in an authoritarian fashion, as both the CHP and the DP had 
done during previous decades. By the end of the 1960s, however, the ease with which 
new political parties could gain access to parliament had severely destabilized the 
government, with eight political parties vying for control. As permanent gridlock set in, 
the inability of the government to meet the challenges of the 1960s led to political 
violence. Dissatisfied groups would reject the political process and take their concerns to 
the street, thereby undermining the very political institutions they had been elected to 
serve, as well as treading in civil disturbance territory that the Turkish military considers 
off limits.134 
Before the 1961 constitution, ideological political parties were nonexistent. 
However, the opportunity created by the 1961 constitution allowed leftist, 
ultranationalist, and Islamist groups to flourish. Parties such as the Marxist Labor Party 
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and the Nationalist Action Party became increasingly militant, with bank robberies, 
kidnappings, and commando training camps used to draw attention to platforms.135 
Under the leadership of former military officer Alparslan Turkeş (the same officer who 
delivered the breakfast communiqué radio address after the 1960 coup), the Nationalist 
Action Party even created a paramilitary youth wing known as the “gray wolves.”136 
From the left were organizations such as the Dev-Genç, a conglomeration of student 
groups and clubs whose political objectives ranged from university reform to outlawing 
American military presence in the country, to revolution. In response to the violence from 
the paramilitary gray wolves, Dev-Genç armed to defend (using guerilla warfare models 
imported from South America) leftist actors against both the fascist gray wolves and the 
police. 137  Ultimately, the fragmentation of both the military and society was an 
unintended consequence of the electoral system changes in the 1961 constitution.138 
In both 1962 and 1963, Colonel Talat Aydemir led additional coup attempts with 
significant support from other colonels and general officers. Due to disunity among the 
armed forces over the need for additional coups so shortly after transition to civilian 
control, these attempts and others throughout the 1960s were defeated or stillborn. In the 
case of Aydemir, a military tribunal found him guilty and he was executed for his coup 
attempts despite having factional support in the military. The 1960 coup had shattered the 
unity of the Turkish military itself, and this disunity would have additional consequences 
as the military struggled to find the desired mixture of civilian leadership and military 
tutelage.139 
While the government struggled with the inclusion of parties not necessarily loyal 
to the notion of representative government, the military itself began to fracture along 
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ideological lines as conservative members battled leftist colleagues unhappy with the 
direction of the state since the 1960 coup.140 As the decade closed, leftist forces within 
the military grew increasingly unsatisfied with the governing center-right Justice Party 
and began to foment another coup with the intent to implement a leftist government.141  
To prevent such a takeover of the Republic by radical forces, top military 
commanders instead conducted a pre-emptive “soft-coup” on March 12, 1971.142 Citing 
the failure of the Justice Party to quell street violence, the military delivered an ultimatum 
to the Demirel government demanding a “strong and credible government be formed that 
would be able to end the ‘anarchy’ and carry out reforms ‘in a Kemalist spirit.’”143 
Inasmuch as the anarchy resulted from the sheer impossibility of forming a strong 
government under current electoral rules, the memo essentially amounted to a demand for 
a Demirel resignation. The language of this ultimatum gives perfect insight into the 
minds of the military establishment throughout the history of the modern Republic. The 
military has seen itself not just as guardians of the Turkish Republic, but also as 
supervisors who share a role in guaranteeing the proper management of civil society and 
government. 
The 1971 coup had roots in the margins of the 1961 constitution that was 
designed to provide for greater multi-party participation in parliament. However, by 
1969, eight political parties were represented in the National Assembly. This expansion 
of represented parties meant constant gridlock. Once the process was effectively 
paralyzed, dissatisfied groups rejected the political process and brought their concerns to 
the street, thereby treading in the civil-disturbance territory that the Turkish military 
considered off limits.144 
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While the military left parliament in place, the cabinet was replaced with “non-
partisan” experts who would ostensibly serve above party interests.145 This new cabinet 
immediately implemented martial law, outlawed labor strikes, and engaged in the 
prosecution of any parties or individuals affiliated with the preceding political violence. 
From 1971 to 1973 (return to civilian rule occurred in 1973), three successive cabinets 
(none elected or appointed by civilians) amended the 1961 constitution to again expand 
military autonomy and limit freedoms previously granted to universities, radio stations, 
and political parties. 
The 1971 intervention brought to the foreground an enigmatic condition of 
Turkish civil society; support for a military intervention was strong, yet factionalized.146 
Many citizens were glad to see the military quell the violence and anarchy, and the 
intervention included a public endorsement by former President Inönü, who had left 
office in 1950.147 Future military interventions would similarly receive mixed responses, 
with some happy for the political reset and others upset about the interference by the 
military in civilian matters. The tendency of the TSK to poll high in opinion polls has 
sometimes been mistaken for support of intervention, rather than simple fear of insecurity 
or chaos in the streets from a lack of authority.148 
While the military had not disbanded parliament, throughout the decade of the 
1970s, the assembly had little ability to combat the struggles facing the nation. From 
1971 to the 1980 coup, Turkey endured eleven different governments, some in power for 
as long as three years and others for as little as four weeks. As parties lacked continuity 
or even general support, none proved able to improve the economy, stem violence, or 
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expand desired freedoms. Correlated to the disunity was the increasing political 
polarization between the right (which by this time included centrists, Islamists, and 
extreme nationalists) and the left (now composed of left-of-center parties, social 
movements, and Marxist revolutionaries). Combined with the powerless coalition 
governments of the decade, this made effective governance nearly impossible.149 Both 
left- and right-wing forces had even infiltrated the national police force to wreak havoc 
from within.150 
By the end of the decade, under the lack of law and order, the fabric of society 
had degenerated to the point where roving bands of vigilantes would confront citizens on 
the streets and demand to know (usually under threat of physical harm) their political 
proclivities.151 Between 1977 and 1980, political violence in Turkey was devastating to 
the political psyche of Turks. Statistically, the 5,200 plus deaths and more than 14,000 
wounded from domestic unrest were roughly equivalent to the casualty figures from the 
Turkish War of Independence waged against the Greeks from 1919 to 1922.152 
The origins of the 1980 coup reside in the defense of Kemalist ideology, 
manifested in the form of national security (internal or external) and secularism. Chief of 
Staff General Kenan Evren appealed directly to all parties to end the partisan fighting and 
work towards a broad-based nationally supported consensus before the military would 
have to guarantee the security and secularism of the republic. On September 6, at a mass 
rally at Konya in the heartland of Anatolia, Prime Minister Erbakan (in the eyes of the 
military) directly assaulted the Kemalist legacy as well as that of Atatürk. Religious 
fundamentalists demanded the return of Islamic law in Turkey, and “showed disrespect 
for the national flag and anthem.”153 Generals Evren and Saltik cited this rally as the 
“catalytic factor in their decision to intervene.”154 
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On September 12, 1980, with the prospect of civil war a strong possibility, the 
Turkish armed forces again intervened, this time completely dissolving parliament and 
suspending all political activity. Huntington noted such military intervention during times 
of civil unrest is not only a potentially beneficial act, but also the usual response to 
escalation of social conflict coupled with a decline in the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
elected leadership.155 The 1980 intervention enjoyed even stronger public support than 
1971, an important factor for the military because, unlike the 1960 and 1971 
interventions, in 1980 the military lacked significant organized support and/or political 
cover from any particular party or social group.156 
Public support reflects Huntington’s suggestion: 
In a situation of escalating conflict the military coup thus has the 
immediate effect of reducing the level of participation [in street violence], 
inducing withdrawal from the streets of the competing social forces, and 
producing a feeling of relief and harmony.157 
Evren’s October statement explains the military position that the stability of the 
state created by Atatürk was a justification for military intervention: 
The Turkish Armed Forces would never allow the Turkish Republic, 
which they inherited from Atatürk, to be taken over by traitors. No one 
should attempt, for evil purposes, to take advantage of the patience of the 
military and their seriousness of purpose concerning this issue…The sole 
raison d’etre of the Turkish Armed Forces is to defend this great country 
as an indivisible whole against its internal as well as external enemies, and 
of seeing to it that this country will always be secure and its citizens happy 
and well cared for.158 
Like military statements following the 1960 coup, Evren’s language is shockingly 
blunt. He does not shy away from two concepts pivotal to the military’s understanding of 
Turkish civil-military relations. First is the idea that the military inherited the Republic 
from Atatürk; the relationship is possessive in nature as opposed to subservient. Second, 
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the Turkish military considers itself as caretakers of the state, even to the point of 
providing security and taking care of the citizens. These values are reflected in four tasks 
the army set for itself during military rule from 1980 to 1983: (1) To suppress domestic 
terrorism, (2) to restore economic growth, (3) to prevent lapse into anarchy using a new 
constitution and legal institutions, and (4) to carefully prepare the way for smooth 
transition to civilian control after the achievement of these goals.159 
Coup attempts led by marginalized military factions but defeated by the military 
itself—in 1962 and 1963, along with the “soft-coup” of 1971, and the 1980 coup—all 
support the notion that the military acts to protect the state from fractious and destructive 
elements in both society and the military itself. That the military would suffer from some 
of the same issues that society does was a prediction of Janowitz and the civic-republican 
thesis.160 While not the expected behavior of a military dedicated to civilian control, the 
actions of the Turkish military from 1960 to 1980 do reflect the behavior one would 
expect from an institution rigidly loyal to a unique concept of the nation as created and 
bequeathed by the founder, Atatürk. In the mind of the military, the institution was 
“acting to save Turkish democracy from itself.”161 
Turkish policy expert Ahmet Evin noted that, contrary to popular beliefs, the 
military could not have intervened solely to establish law and policing functions because, 
in each of 1960, 1971, and 1980, parliament had already declared martial law, prior to the 
military intervention. 162  Something else had to be in play to motivate military 
interventions; the military had removed itself from government relatively swiftly after 
satisfying publicly stated objectives. Barany suggests two circumstances for reduced 
military involvement after a period of control: (1) failure at governing and, (2) “Mission 
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Accomplished.” 163  The words and decisions of the Turkish military following each 
intervention seem indicative of an institution that did in fact accomplish its objectives. It 
therefore had no further reason for remaining in control, but rather desired the return of 
civilian authority. 
The 1982 constitution focused on expanding the role of the presidential authority 
(not subject to popular elections and a position that the military can influence by 
pressuring elected politicians), along with that of the MGK, to prevent the political 
instability.164 Though ostensibly designed to make recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers regarding matters of national security (internal and external), the power of the 
military could make those recommendations closer to orders depending on how strongly 
the military presses for a specific course of action.165 
F. 1983–2002: THE TUTELARY STATE 
The period from 1983 to 2002 represents the pinnacle of military tutelage over the 
state. Each of the preceding interventions had placed greater privileges in the hands of the 
military and, during this window, the military served as mentors with the full force of 
history and jurisprudence over the civilian politicians. With the ability to define threats, 
recommend courses of action, and apply pressure to ensure that the direction of the state 
mirrored that which the military desired, the military dominated the civilians on issues of 
high politics such as national defense and foreign policy. 
Civil-military relations of the period reflected the dominant military position in 
controlling any and all political debates that touched on military concerns, including 
everything from the office of president to school curriculum and radio station 
broadcasting. While the collapse of the Soviet Union removed an existential threat to the 
country, the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War would have devastating effects on 
the national economy and the conflict with the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. With 
increasing European Union demands on Turkish sovereignty and failing faith in their own 
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political and military leadership, political dissatisfaction with the government would 
reach an all-time high by the turn of the millennium, and would propel the unexpected 
AKP victory in 2002. 
The 1980 coup represents the last time the Turkish military actually took control 
of the government. The generals of the MGK made clear from the outset that their 
intention was a full return to electoral civilian control, but not to the status quo that had 
motivated the military to intervene. To increase the authority of the MGK, 
recommendations by the body were given “priority” over other considerations by the 
council of ministers.166 
Some view the 1980 coup as a textbook case of the military engineering their own 
ability to intervene by creating tension in the state and then deciding on their own how to 
exit.167 The election of coup leader Kenan Evren as president was coupled with the 
passage of the new constitution (and therefore the only way to ensure military transition 
to civilian control), and gives credence to this position. Alternately, the military had a 
very legitimate case that their intervention was only necessary in order to prevent further 
bloodshed and destabilization of the NATO alliance.168 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
Cold War politics dominated the external threat environment for Turkey and NATO. The 
Turkish military would use the importance to NATO of a strong Turkey (the second 
largest force in NATO) in a volatile region as justification for a large and interventionist 
military.169 This military was also backed strongly by the United States, whose use of 
Incirlik Air Base beginning in 1983 led to massive military aid to the TSK, amounting to 
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$715 million in 1984 alone and putting Turkey third behind only Israel and Egypt for 
American support.170 
Initially supportive of the military involvement, years into the military 
government, society began to agitate for a return to civilian leadership, demonstrating 
Juan Linz’s assertion that legitimacy is a daily grant from society to leadership and 
cannot exist outside the consensus of individuals.171 Perhaps ironically, the 1980 coup 
and new constitution did dramatically restrict the ability of leftist organizations and 
parties to organize and disseminate their positions, effectively killing the Kemalist CHP, 
which had taken a hard left turn in the preceding decades in order to maintain electoral 
position.172 
The remaining years of the 1980s were spent with civilians, under the 
administration of Turgut Özal, attempting to consolidate their democracy. As Evren’s 
term as president expired in 1989, Özal put himself forward for the office. On October 
31, 1989, he was elected president of Turkey, the first without a military background 
since 1961. When Demirel resumed the office of prime minister in 1991, the overriding 
sentiment in Turkey was that the time of military intervention had passed, with Demirel 
himself asserting that neither Turkey nor the world supported an atmosphere that would 
permit coups.173 
As the 1990s progressed, however, Turkey again fell into domestic unrest and 
violence. In August 1992, 300 members of the PKK assaulted the town of Şırnak in the 
southeast corner of the country, shelling each of the military, the police, and the 
gendarmerie (quasi-military domestic police). The military leveled the entire city of 
25,000 mostly ethnic Kurds in response to the attack. This became the pattern for the next 
several years, with each side blaming the other for successive increases in violence.174 
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The government was shown to be not only unable to effectively govern large 
portions of the country but also corrupt when, in 1996, a scandal known as Sursurluk was 
inadvertently exposed following a car accident. The dead included a contract killer/gray 
wolf, his girlfriend, and the director of the Istanbul police education center. The sole 
survivor was a Kurdish tribal warlord who doubled as a member of parliament for the 
Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party or DYP). The implications of a wanted contract killer, 
a member of parliament with his own personal army, and a corrupt police officer in 
collusion shocked the public.175 
Investigations eventually revealed an assortment of politicians, military members, 
drug traffickers, organized crime, and domestic terror groups all linked together, and 
demonstrated to many Turks that theirs was an illusion of a well-run democracy.176 
National Security Policy Documents from the 1990s consistently listed domestic threats 
such as fundamentalism, separatism, and organized crime.177 Sursurluk represented each 
of these and, by tying the very threats to the state to the government itself; the military 
had cause to exclude their civilian masters from the formulation of national security 
policy. The combination of pretenses and implications—former Prime Minister (and 
current Deputy Prime Minister) Tansu Çiller using a parliamentary inquiry as an 
opportunity to defend the dead Sursurluk passengers as heroes of the state, and the 
implication (and subsequent resignation) of the Interior Minister Mehmet Ağar in the 
investigation—further damaged government legitimacy. Post-Sursurluk activism became 
one of the first civil society movements against the security state that had developed in 
Turkey from repeated military interventions.178 
The combination of government corruption and the threat to the secular republic 
from political Islam, proved too much for the military to accept. When Necmettin 
Erbakan (the first Islamist prime minister) used the office of prime minister as a platform 
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for highly symbolic religious behavior in public, the military responded with what has 
become known as “The February 28 Process,” wherein the military presented Erbakan a 
list of recommendations intended to deal with anti-secular forces in the country. 179 
Erbakan acquiesced to the military demands after brief hesitation. 
The military shortly thereafter amended the national security priorities yet again 
to reflect PKK terrorism and anti-secular activity as chief threats to state security. This 
permitted the Public Attorney to open an investigation against Erbakan’s Islamist Refah 
Parti for anti-secular activities. Refah and Erbakan collapsed under the combined 
pressure. The military had learned to use the prerogatives earned from previous 
interventions to push out political leadership at odds with the TSK vision for the state. 
The February 28
th
 Process represented a new dynamic in Turkish civil-military relations: 
anti-secularism would be staunchly rooted out through use of constitutional institutions 
apart from the military, and thereby preserve an appearance of non-partisanship on the 
part of the military. 
Following the collapse of Refah in 1997 and the formation of a weak coalitional 
government after the 1999 elections, the constitutional courts moved to close the 
conservative heir to Refah, the Felicity Party, for committing actions against the secular 
state. Refah, however, had not reconstituted itself solely as the Felicity Party but had in 
fact splintered into two parties, one of which was the conservative Felicity comprised 
mainly of older RP members. The other faction represented a newer generation of 
Turkish politicians who believed that open confrontation with secularism and the military 
was neither necessary nor productive to governance. 
This new political party, under the leadership of Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and university professor Abdullah Gül, called itself the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), and stormed to office in the 2002 elections, becoming the first Islamist 
party to ever win an outright majority in the Turkish Parliament by positioning itself as a 
party loyal to fundamental values and the Turkish constitution.180 The cause of the split 
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was not lost on the future prime minister who, in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 
coup, claimed that democracy was “based on free elections and the supremacy of the 
elected government.”181 This sentiment was later echoed by Spanish Defense Minister 
Narcís Serra, who bluntly observed, “there is no democracy if the military are in 
charge.”182 
At the turn of the millennium, Turks saw two very different potential futures 
begin to diverge from one another. On the one hand was the status quo that had now 
dominated politics for half a century. On the other hand was the possibility of European 
Union accession. Growing dissatisfaction with military tutelage, political parties with 
narrow views working in concert with the military, and a complete failure of politicians 
to prevent widespread economic suffering contributed to an overwhelming conclusion 
that the domestic politics were an utter mess. As the military and political parties lost 
esteem with the average Turk, so too did the policies and ideas that these individuals or 
institutions advocated. Before changes to the economy, the civil-military relationship, or 
other institutions of the state could be improved, however, the voters needed a party 
willing to, at a minimum, challenge the status quo. Out of a general distaste for existing 
options, the voters would look to a political party led by the man who had helped reform 
the country’s greatest city as Mayor of Istanbul Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan and his 
appropriately named Justice and Development Party. 
G. 2002–2011: CIVILIAN CONTROL BEGINS 
On April 27, 2007, the Turkish General Staff issued a memorandum that could be 
considered a veiled threat of political coup. The 2006 elections had returned the Islamist 
AKP party to power, and the military had now begun to feel threatened. The 
memorandum drew a firestorm of criticism from the public, culminating in many street 
demonstrations rallying to the slogan “neither Sharia nor coup.”183 The civilian backlash 
enabled the AKP to press aggressively against the military establishment. In 2008, Prime 
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Minister and AKP head Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took two actions that would push the 
military to the brink, first by pressing investigations and eventual indictments against a 
military conspiracy to overthrow the government (dubbed the Ergenekon movement) and 
second by moving up elections in part to demonstrate his confidence that the AKP had 
strong public support. 
The percentage of the vote that went to AKP was higher than ever. With this 
support, the AKP aggressively continued investigation of supposed conspirators to 
Ergenekon. This perceived persecution of the military, combined with the AKP’s 
continued Islamist tendencies were causal in the decision of the military leadership to 
offer their resignations in the summer of 2011. Military resignations were a new 
phenomenon. Whereas the February 28 Process might have previously been initiated by 
the military, this time no challenge was presented. How then did we arrive at a point 
where the military was without power to do anything but resign in protest? 
In 2002, the AKP did not seek election on a platform of military reform or even as 
a counterweight to military power in society, but rather as a conservative social party. 
The early party platform acknowledged the significance of Atatürk to the state and 
society, and even viewed Kemalism as a vehicle for improving Turkish society. 184 
Similarly, the election of the AKP was accepted by the military and newly appointed 
Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, who acknowledged the results as the will of the 
people.185 
On the November 10, 2002, anniversary of Ataturk’s death, the military took care 
to remind the people that the Turkish military would continue to protect the people 
against threats, notably fundamentalism and separatism. 186  From 2002 to 2004, the 
military and the AKP clashed on policy issues—from headscarves to education 
prerogatives and the U.S. intervention in Iraq. In each case, both the AKP and the TSK 
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used media outlets, direct public communications, and official news releases to represent 
their positions and apply pressure to the other party. In each case, tensions were kept 
from boiling over by a combination of compromise on the part of the AKP and an 
unwillingness of the TSK to escalate conflict against a party with such clear political 
support amongst the voters. 
The early years of the AKP-TSK relationship could be considered as guarded, 
with each strongly representing their own positions in society but unwilling to openly 
challenge the other. Survival was at stake for the AKP, while the TSK recognized that 
their own legitimacy was a product of their role above politics. Without a meaningful 
opposition party to challenge the AKP in parliament, the TSK was disinclined to interfere 
without significant cause. 
The first major changes to the military authority came in 2001 when constitutional 
amendments were passed; they curtailed the formal position of the TSK in government 
and the security council, but without significantly diminishing the influence of the 
military over security policy formulation.187 Early AKP efforts at reform came in 2003 
with the seventh harmonization package that changed the civil-military dynamic in 
Turkey in several important ways. The general secretary of the Security Council had 
executive powers removed and replaced with administrative responsibilities, and could 
now be filled by a civilian (previously only flag officers were eligible). The council itself 
had its frequency, secrecy, and unfettered access to the internal documents of civilian 
agencies curtailed. Finally, military courts lost the authority to try civilians in times of 
peace. 
In addition to the European Union harmonization packages, several events stand 
out as critical junctures in the inversion of control between the military and civilians from 
2002 to 2010. These include the re-election of the AKP in 2007, the battle for the 
presidency in 2007, the constitutional crisis (which resulted from the presidential 
nomination process), and the Ergenekon investigation into military coup planning. While, 
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from 2002 to 2006, the relationship between the AKP and TSK was contentious, it has 
not yet reached adversarial; each party worked to advance their control. From 2006 
forward, the military and the AKP both played to win, with winning implying total 
victory over the other party. 
Going into the 2007 presidential elections, the AKP could (by virtue of their 
absolute majority of parliamentary seats from the 2002 election) nominate anyone of their 
choosing to the post—the position similar to that of Demirel’s Justice Party in 1966. 
Unlike 1966, however, the AKP intentionally put forward a candidate directly opposed 
by the TSK and the Kemalist CHP—Abdullah Gül; both groups rejected the candidate as 
too religious for the post of president. A constitutional crisis ensued when parliament 
attempted to prevent the elections from taking place by withholding the necessary 
quorum.188 When the AKP was unable to secure the election of Gül, the party took the 
unusual step of moving forward national elections from 2008 to 2007 (as permitted 
constitutionally due to parliament deadlock over presidential elections), and forcing a 
confrontation with opposition parties and the military at the ballot box. 
The AKP won historically yet again, this time taking home over 60 percent of 
parliament seats. Rather than nominating a different candidate, the AKP again put 
forward Gül. This time the smaller far-right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) refused to 
boycott the presidential elections and Gül was elected. The loss to the Kemalist CHP and 
the military were threefold: the presidency went to an Islamist, the AKP was reelected 
with a larger majority, and the electorate had demonstrated a lack of support for the 
military position. Convinced that consensual government with opposition parties and the 
military was no longer feasible, and emboldened by the electoral success and presidential 
victory, the AKP embarked on programs that would have been impossible just a few 
years prior.189 Having used a new constitution as a platform in the 2007 elections, the 
AKP pushed for constitutional referendums and also moved to lift the ban on headscarves 
at university, a highly symbolic action guaranteed to challenge the secular military. 
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By 2008, the AKP was in open conflict with the secular state establishment, 
including the opposition CHP and the TSK. In 2008, a closure case was brought to the 
Turkish Constitutional Court seeking the dissolution of the AKP as a political party and 
the imposition of five-year political bans for 71 members. The move fell one vote short of 
success, but succeeded in confirming for the AKP their position that there would 
eventually be one winner in the conflict between the party and the military/secularist 
forces. 
Concurrently to the actions against the AKP, the Ergenekon investigation was 
gathering steam, focusing on military officers, organized crime, businesses, journalists, 
and even artists charged with plotting a coup against the AKP. If Sursurluk forced people 
to question the security-government nexus, then the discovery of a cache of grenades in 
the seaside port of Trabzon, which initiated the Ergenekon investigation, called into 
question the very integrity of the military establishment.190  Similarly, in June 2007, 
police raided the domicile of a retired officer in Istanbul and discovered another cache of 
27 hand grenades.191 With mounting evidence, in July 2008, prosecutors issued a 2,455-
page indictment of coup plots against Erdoğan’s government. By 2012, Ergenekon had 
grown into 16 different court cases with nearly 300 suspects on trial for participation in 
anti-government movements, most prominently the Action Plan Against 
Reactionaryism.192 
From 2008 to 2012, as the trials played out in court, the AKP and supporters 
fought the security establishment and their supporters over the veracity and authenticity 
of the coup allegations. The original Ergenekon flourished into investigations into coups 
both real and imagined as far back as living coup plotters could be found. In April 2012, 
former President Kenan Evren himself was put on trial, alongside another top former 
commander, for initiating the 1980 coup. On the day before the 16
th
 anniversary of the 
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February 28, 1997 coup, Ankara prosecutors arrested five former military generals for 
their role in the intervention. 
Debate over the veracity of the claims was put to rest in February 2013 when 
internal documents from the Turkish General Staff submitted to the 13
th
 High Criminal 
Court confirmed the prosecution’s allegations that a military-backed plan had launched a 
campaign to undermine the AKP and religious social movements in the country.193 The 
five-year trial ended in August 2013, with dozens of guilty verdicts returned for mostly 
retired flag officers, many of who received lifetime sentences. 
As in 2011, when the top generals had no recourse except resignation when 
protesting the investigation itself, in the aftermath of the Ergenekon verdict, the military 
was eerily muted. The first official statement from the TSK read, “We, the TSK, 
believe—as required by our respect for the rule of law—that the trial will be concluded in 
a fair manner within boundaries of the principle of fair trials.”194 After the prime minister 
accepted the mass resignations by the General Staff in 2011, the TSK leadership had 
nothing left in the aftermath of 2013 coup verdicts except more resignation, this time to 
civilian authority. 
Previous estimations that Turkish civil-military relations had grown beyond the 
coup stage have proven incorrect. However, with lifetime sentences for former military 
commanders, indictments against former presidents of the Republic (even the military 
never moved against the president), and complete acquiescence of the military to the new 
hierarchy, it is safe to state that the civilians have effectively consolidated their control. 
This then returns us to the question: What changed? What would allow the AKP to 
accomplish such a complete reversal against such an entrenched interest? 
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III. FORMAL CONTROL: ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN 
TURKEY, 2002–2006 
From 2002 through 2006, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved 
multiple reforms that vastly expanded formal civilian control over the military. These 
reforms, which affected a broad swath of military privileges, were carried out in stages: 
constitutional reforms that provided general guidelines to government institutions led to 
reforms to the legal codes that govern governmental institutions—most importantly, 
changes to the laws governing the National Security Council. Together these reforms 
enabled compliance with European Union harmonization packages. 195  Harmonization 
packages address areas of Turkish civil-military relations incompatible with EU acquis 
communautaire, the collection of laws, rulings, and policies aimed at ensuring the four 
freedoms of the EU: goods, services, capital, and persons.196 
How can the extent of these changes be reconciled with the fact that a vigilant 
Turkish Armed Forces previously had not allowed the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) maneuvering room on most issues?197 How did the AKP achieve such reforms 
when other parties had been unable to do so? This second question is particularly 
interesting given that during the reform period, the neophyte political party, which had 
been created from members of a political party banned just a year before the 2002 
national elections, was being led by Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan, a devout Muslim banned 
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from participating in the elections, during which he underwent investigations by the 
constitutional court.198 
This chapter provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that electoral 
competition can explain the increase in formal control of the military during 2002–2006. 
Beginning with the 2002 national elections that swept the AKP into office and 
concluding prior to the 2007 national elections, the electoral competition hypothesis can 
explain how the civilian government was able to achieve, through legislation, formal 
control of the military, in the form of National Security Council (MGK) reforms, 
constitutional reforms, and the European Union Harmonization Packages. 
The first section of this chapter presents the background and assumptions of 
electoral competition regarding Turkey under the AKP, including the incentive structure 
that electoral competition uses to explain changes in civil-military relations, and the 
actual election results and voting patterns in Turkey. The second section describes how 
the various programmatic and particularistic incentives of electoral competition increased 
the ability of the AKP to exert formal control over the Armed Forces by increasing public 
support and legitimacy for the government. Meanwhile, the European Union acted as a 
catalyst for political reform alongside these incentives, a dynamic also analyzed in the 
second section. The third and final section discusses the reforms themselves, specifically 
how changes to the MGK and the constitution, and the passage of harmonization 
packages, increased formal control over the Turkish Armed Forces. 
A. ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND TURKISH ELECTION RESULTS, 
1999–2004 
While both types of incentives increase politicians’ chances of winning additional 
elections, they also have the potential to challenge a politically active military in a post-
transition setting, especially if the military controls the transition to democracy, as in the 
Turkish case on multiple instances and most recently in 1997 with the February 28 
Process. Programmatic incentives that increase political participation, advocate social 
                                                 




mobilization, or seek to change fundamentally the political status quo directly challenge 
the TSK and allied political parties. 
If by pursuing the policies necessary to survive politically, politicians also 
challenge a politically active military, such as the TSK, how then do politicians—or their 
party—succeed in the face of entrenched military interests? Hunter proposes that, while 
electoral competition creates the incentives to challenge the military, it is election results 
that enable the politicians to overcome the military.199 The magnitude and the nature of 
an electoral victory become important because the military will be disinclined to risk its 
position against a government with strong political support: “the greater the mandate a 
government enjoys, the less likely military elites will be to work aggressively to offset 
civilian attempts to diminish their political standing.”200 After repeated wins in elections, 
the results become cumulative, granting a political party stronger voter support and 
greater latitude to enact reforms over the military.201 
In the 2002 elections, the AKP won outright control of parliament and the right to 
form a government without a coalition of parties. The AKP margin of victory enabled 
government unity that, in turn, allowed the party to pursue policies beneficial to and 
demanded by the public (that is, programmatic incentives), while also using resources to 
build and maintain personal networks (i.e., particularistic incentives) without support 
from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). These efforts created additional 
public support for the politicians in future elections. The AKP won more votes than 
opposition political parties in national elections in 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2011. This 
growth of support made it difficult for the armed forces to openly challenge military 
reforms instituted by the AKP. 
An additional prediction arises based on the logic of electoral competition, as we 
would expect it to play out in the Turkish context. As shifting voting patterns increase 
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AKP support, each successive election won by the political party should increase the 
power of and expand the ability of the government to push for greater incentives and 
eventually, additional military concessions. While this chapter focuses on the 2002–2007 
period, the cyclical nature of electoral competition and the increased ability of politicians 
to exert control over the military became even more pronounced in the period of 
contestation from 2007 to 2011, as discussed in Chapter IV. In this Turkish civil-military 
relations study, this cycle culminates in 2011 with the mass resignation of the chiefs of 
staff in response to the ongoing Ergenekon investigations into military coup plots against 
the government. 
The data presented in Figure 2 supports the prediction that voter affiliation will 
shift and follow incentives by showing vote allocation according to party in each of the 
1999, 2002, and 2004 (local) elections. This voter support reflects support for policies 
reducing military power and provided a bulwark against significant TSK incursions into 
politics from 2002 to 2006, while also allowing for increasing formal reforms of the 
military through the aforementioned constitutional, MGK, and harmonization package 
legislation. 
 
Figure 2.  Turkish election results 1999–2004202 
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Between 1999 and 2004, Turkey experienced a significant realignment of voters 
towards two parties and away from the multi-party electorate that had reigned since 1983. 
In 2002, the center-left parties received a mere 20 percent of the vote (and no 
parliamentary representation), with many voters shifting their allegiance to the CHP.203 
Similarly, the center-right parties that dominated the 1980s and 1990s (Motherland Party 
[ANAP] and DYP) also faded, evidencing a significant realignment of the electorate as 
voters coalesced around two parties of different ideological origins.204 While showing a 
substantial rebuke of establishment political parties in the national election, Figure 1 also 
illustrates that even at the local level, in 2004, voters chose to be represented largely by 
the two major parties elected in 2002. 
1. 1999 General Elections 
In the 1999 contest, voters cast ballots for twenty political parties, five of which 
received the necessary 10 percent minimum to earn seats in parliament. Those that did 
garner enough votes for representation included the Democratic Left Party (ideologically 
Kemalist and advocating social democracy and receiving 22 percent of the votes), the 
Nationalist Movement Party (representing the far-right nationalist electorate and 
receiving 18 percent of votes cast), Virtue Party (Islamist descendent of Welfare and 
receiving 15 percent of votes cast), Motherland Party (representing economic liberalism, 
social conservatism, and Turkish nationalism and receiving 13 percent of votes cast), and 
True Path Party (also economic liberals but social conservatives and receiving 12 percent 
of votes cast). These parties represented an electorate fractured across the country and 
thus unable to form a strong government from 1999 to 2002. 
With the February 28 Process still fresh, the 1999 Virtue Party election campaign 
attempted to revise the historical narrative of the country, arguing that true republicanism 
(and therefore true loyalty to Atatürk) meant a commitment to citizen government, with 
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civilians accountable to the people and, by correlation, the military to the civilians.205 
Campaign posters included the slogan “The Republic is Virtue” and, as Atatürk himself 
made the original statement in the early years of the nation, the signature of Atatürk was 
scrawled below the motto.206 Pre-election General Staff messages stressed the military’s 
continued interest in fighting Islamic fundamentalism (clearly aimed at Virtue and 
reminding voters and politicians alike what happened to Welfare).207 
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court found the Virtue Party guilty of violating 
the secular principles of the constitution and banned the party after a female Member of 
Parliament (Merve Kavakcı) refused to remove her headscarf during her swearing-in 
ceremony.208 The ban of Virtue a mere three years after the dissolution of Welfare (and 
under similar circumstances) demonstrated that the military and secular allies maintained 
tight control over acceptable political behavior heading into the 2002 national 
elections.209 
2. The 2002 and 2004 Local Elections 
Figure 1 also demonstrates the shift in votes between 1999 and 2002, from 
establishment parties to the AKP and CHP. The largely Kurdish southeastern Turkey was 
the only region to maintain political support for the same party in both 1999 and 2002. 
The sparse population, however, could not propel Kurdish candidates over the 10 percent 
threshold. Pre-election day polling showed that the AKP was likely going to be the top 
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vote earner, with the CHP behind them, and two more additional parties passing the 10 
percent threshold.210 
Voters ultimately supported the two parties not tarred by the failures of the 
previous coalition partners, and expectations that the AKP and CHP would be forced into 
a coalition government were high. In reality, the actual results were so overwhelmingly in 
favor of AKP that Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand declared the results a “civilian 
coup,” insisting that the election was less a ringing endorsement of the AKP than a 
popular rebellion against the political class.211 Just 48 hours after the election, Birand 
appeared to foreshadow the role electoral competition would play in the coming years 
when cautioning the AKP to remain within the secular system, predicting that doing so 
would “bolster the AKP’s credibility. And, to the extent that it bolsters its credibility, it 
will be able to extend its time in power.”212 
In 2002, over eighteen political parties and several independent politicians earned 
votes in the national election, but only the victorious AKP and the opposition CHP 
exceeded the minimum threshold. The general outrage at government over the previous 
tumultuous three years (when combined with the entire decade of poor governance 
throughout the 1990s) resulted in 35 percent of the vote being shared across the four 
major parties (Virtue having been banned) from the 1999 election, none of which earned 
seats in parliament.213 A full 90 percent of incumbent members of parliament lost their 
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seats and Turks anticipated a more stable government with the formulation of the first 
two-party parliament since 1948.214 
In the final tally, the AKP won 363 out of 555 seats (almost exactly two-thirds) 
with 34 percent of the votes, while the CHP won 178 seats (the remaining total and 
almost exactly one-third) with 19 percent of the total votes cast. Despite only receiving 
slightly over one-third of all votes cast, Turkish apportionment gave the AKP not just a 
large margin of victory but the ability to form a unified government with an 
unprecedented majority. Single-party government would (as electoral competition 
predicts) give the AKP significant leverage to pursue those programmatic and 
particularistic incentives necessary to secure their political standing and prolong the life 
of the party, while simultaneously protecting against military incursions into politics. 
Publicly, the TSK and Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök maintained that the 
military would “protect the Republic against every kind of threat, particularly 
fundamentalism and separatism.” In light of the overwhelming election results, however, 
the military privately recognized that movement against the AKP without provocation by 
the civilians (violations of secularism or threats to do so) was unfeasible. Özkök further 
observed that the 2002 national elections were “very much in line with democratic norms. 
Results reflect what our people wish and I respect this.”215 
The March 2004 local elections confirmed and solidified the position of the AKP 
as the preeminent political party of choice. While no members of parliament were up for 
election, voters from over 3,000 villages, towns, and cities voted for the AKP in higher 
numbers even than the historic 2002 elections, roughly 42 percent. Also up for election 
were the city council seats of all 81 Turkish provinces. The Kemalist CHP received 
roughly 19 percent of the vote and no other parties achieved significant percentages. An 
electoral map of the 2004 vote reveals that the AKP was preferred regardless of 
geographic location. The AKP won in urban areas (Istanbul, Adana, and capital Ankara 
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all went AKP) and rural areas (the Anatolian heartland). Even in traditional Kurdish areas 
the AKP won more seats than the Kurdish Democratic People’s Party. 
The region of Urfa in southeastern Turkey on the Syrian border is a useful 
anecdote on the growth in support for the AKP. In 1999, the region went solidly for the 
party it always had, the True Path Party (DYP). In 2002, the DYP failed to cross the 
threshold and the Kurdish Democratic People’s Party represented Urfa. In the 2004 local 
elections, however, Urfa went to the AKP. The results of the 2004 election are all the 
more telling because there is no minimum threshold for regional government, meaning 
the party that ends up representing a district is the party that received the most votes in 
said district. 
There is one remaining decision made by the Turkish parliament that also would 
be fresh in the mind of voters driving them to support the AKP, the decision by 
parliament to deny the U.S. military a northern front in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 
Turkish GNAT rejected the U.S. request by a vote of 264 in favor of and 250 against the 
invasion. Turkish parliamentary proceedings, however, require a motion to receive a 
majority of votes cast, and 19 abstentions meant that the American request fell three 
votes short.216 The denial was influenced by the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, which 
cost the Turks billions in lost foreign trade from Iraq and contributed to the economic 
difficulties during the 1990s.217 
Aside from economic losses, the Turks also feared that an unstable Iraq would 
unleash greater terrorist activity from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and threaten 
territorial sovereignty.218  This assessment was correct. From 2003 onward, the TSK 
faced rapid escalation of terrorist activity in southeastern Turkey, with the PKK formally 
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taking up arms again in 2004 after a brief cease-fire.219 The growing view that the U.S. 
was not concerned with Turkish security led the Turkish voters to look unfavorably on 
U.S. requests for a northern front; therefore, as the party in power, the AKP benefitted 
from the appearance of a strong government willing to stand up to outside interests.220 
These factors contributed to yet another electoral success for the AKP. The 
electoral competition hypothesis would predict that, following a second decisive victory 
wherein the only opposition party of consequence (CHP) received an even smaller share 
of the vote, the winning party would be emboldened to pursue even greater programmatic 
and particularistic incentives, pushing for more political support. This is in fact exactly 
what happened. The 2004 local elections increased the legitimacy of the AKP 
government by demonstrating a wider level of political support than that received in 
2002. Because of the threshold requirements for parliamentary seats, roughly 45 percent 
of votes cast in 2002 went to parties that failed to earn representation in the Grand 
National Assembly, giving AKP critics the ability to assert a lack of broad consensus. 
The 2004 local elections helped refute these allegations by demonstrating that the AKP 
was in fact increasing political support and broadening their appeal through the effective 
use of programmatic and particularistic incentives. 
The presence of Özkök in the Chief of General Staff position was a boon for 
AKP–TSK relations following the 2002 elections. Appointed in August 2002, Özkök 
represented a unique officer in the role of chief, one who was personally a devout 
Muslim.221 While Özkök would never have earned the office were he not also a strong 
Kemalist and advocate of a secular Turkey, his personal piety allowed a more muted 
response to the election of the AKP. In turn, this helped the military adopt a “wait and 
see” mentality rather than an aggressive defense of Kemalism without first determining 
the level of challenge that the AKP would present.222 
                                                 
219 Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner, 8. 
220 Giray Sadik, American Image in Turkey: U.S. Foreign Policy Dimensions (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington, 2009), 12. 
221 Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey, 170. 
222 Ibid. 
 73 
B. PARTICULARISTIC AND PROGRAMMATIC INCENTIVES 
Because so many political parties failed to pass the 10 percent threshold for 
parliamentary representation, nearly 45 percent of all votes cast went unrepresented in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNAT) following the 2002 election. The AKP would 
have to govern with the awareness than nearly half of all votes failed to receive 
representation. The party addressed this issue by promoting policies and reforms that 
benefitted society as a whole rather than just the AKP constituency. One such example 
was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms initiated by previous governments, 
which the AKP inherited once elected. Despite fears that IMF requirements would harm 
the rural Turkish voter, IMF support was essential in order to improve the domestic 
economy, and the AKP maintained the IMF reforms. 
Programmatic incentives include the anti-corruption Urgent Action Plan, the 2004 
Law of Associations, and the Diyanet and IMF reforms, all aimed at increasing political 
support by implementing political policies the public desired.223 Particularistic incentives 
designed to distribute resources to friendly political constituencies include hiring new 
imams and targeting the defense industry and TSK funding streams. Though not every 
AKP policy or legal reform is included in this section, many major policies are, and the 
nature and success of these policies demonstrate a party committed to survival, and 
successful in increasing electoral support. Moreover, each of these represents a challenge 
to military autonomy. IMF reforms demanded austerity measures which meant reduced 
military spending, changes to the Diyanet and education system meant diverting 
resources and reducing the military oversight role on these issues, and changes to the 
Law of Associations also meant reduced military oversight of civil society. 
1. Anti-Corruption Programmatic Incentives: Urgent Action Plan 
Voter demand for a corruption-free government meant that strong AKP policies to 
combat irresponsible government enacted by the AKP would likely lead to increased 
support, and was a staple of both the AKP election platform and the platforms of previous 
conservative parties. Since the Welfare Party government in 1996, anti-corruption 
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measures have been a staple of conservative party politics in Turkey.224 The 2002 AKP 
Election Manifesto included promises to fight bribery and corruption, both legislatively 
and in the courts.225  The implementation by the AKP of the Urgent Action Plan in 
November 2002 sought to leverage soft and hard measures to combat corruption and 
improve the Turkish economy.226 Between 2002 and 2006, the AKP passed three key 
legal reforms or updates to laws aimed at combating government corruption, a chronic 
complaint of the Turkish electorate. Together, these three initiatives demonstrated the 
party’s awareness that voter anger over political corruption played a major part in 
sweeping the AKP into power.227 
The first policy targeting public administration reform and corruption was the 
2003 Law on the Right to Information, which provided the public an avenue to request 
information from all “public institutions and the professional organizations which qualify 
them as public institutions.”228 When the Official Gazette published the law in 2004, the 
official release message delivered by the Office of the Prime Minister emphasized the 
importance of public access to government information as an essential component to 
transparent government. The law applied to all ministerial officials, the governor, and 
local authorities. This law also challenged military autonomy by demanding that military 
documents as well be made accessible to public requests, similar to U.S. Freedom of 
Information Act requests. 
The most important policy initiative to focus on corruption was the creation of the 
Council of Ethics for Public Service (CEPS), established within the office of the Prime 
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Minister in 2004, by Law No. 5176, specifically to fight corruption of public officials. 
CEPS was created to be both proactive and reactive, having the authority to investigate 
allegations of corruption and the responsibility to embed ethical culture in government 
employees by using a combination of seminars, academic studies, and public ethics 
training programs.229 Empowered by the Code of Ethics that entered into effect in 2005, 
CEPS has the authority to post calls for witnesses and supporting evidence through the 
Official Gazette.230 As an initial effort, CEPS proved a significant step towards reducing 
corruption. However, it is worth noting that because only designated public officials are 
subordinated to the Code of Ethics—with the legislature, universities, judiciary, and 
armed forces conspicuously absent—and because of serious resource constraints, CEPS’ 
power has been limited to date.231 
An additional anti-corruption measure was the Regulation on the Principles of 
Ethical Behavior of Public Officials (Regulation 25785) that became effective in April 
2005. This regulation was an outgrowth of CEPS and consisted of 42 articles that strictly 
defined the boundaries of ethical public service, including provisions on conflict of 
interests, the illegality of benefiting from public office, and transparency.232 Several of 
the articles focus on the role of public officials as servants of the community, the 
accountability of the public official to the taxpayer, and impartiality of government 
employees before the citizens. Together the three initiatives of the Urgent Action Plan 
brought increased oversight of government officials and corruption, issues of importance 
to the voters needed by the AKP to continue in office. 
2. Civil Society Programmatic Incentive: 2004 Law of Associations 
Ioannis Grigoriadis contends that civil society is “one of the most accurate 
indicators of the existence of a substantive, participatory democracy. A high degree of 
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citizen participation in civil society associations is positively correlated with a flourishing 
democratic system.”233 Turkish civil society has historically been stunted by a focus on 
security over democracy in the public sphere.234 Where the military maintain this status 
quo, civil society itself becomes the battleground.235  The primary means of military 
repression of civil society was to require that citizens subject themselves to government 
monitoring and supervision.236 A series of weak governments and lopsided civil-society, 
with pro-Kemalist organizations able to operate while reformist groups were monitored 
or shut down, was unable to effect change on those discourses set by the military.237 
In 2004, the AKP passed a new Law of Associations that prevented security 
forces from entering meetings of private organizations without a court order, and also 
abolished the previous requirement that civil society organizations notify government 
officials of the date, time, and location of meetings and invite a government official to 
said meetings.238 These restrictions had been previously implemented by the military 
following the 1980 coup and were designed to limit political activity.239 Following the 
AKP reforms, records from the Ministry of Interior Affairs showed increases in civil 
society organizations from 2002 through 2006. Following the 2002 elections, Turkey 
went from approximately 61,000 voluntary associations to 73,378 by 2006, an increase of 
over 20 percent in four years.240 
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Many of these new organizations were created to fulfill religious purposes, 
providing the AKP with additional support networks (as the recognized party of Islamic 
values voters) without a similar increase in civil society organizations targeting the 
AKP.241  In these cases, the programmatic incentives proved beneficial by providing 
policies that increased the opportunity for organizations to gather, facilitate party support, 
electoral campaigns, political parties, and lobbying for issues. 
Laws expanding the ability of voters to organize and advocate can also benefit 
politicians when these policies improve the citizens’ view of their government, 
specifically the party in government. Many Turks desire to participate in civil society 
organizations but cite state interference, more accurately military interference and 
monitoring as a major hindrance.242 Ali Çarkoğlu and Cerim Cenker conclude that in 
addition to opportunity, citizens’ “perceptions of the political and economic system are 
also significant determinants of civil society involvement.”243 
3. Political Islam Particularistic and Programmatic Incentives: Diyanet 
and Imams 
Despite the fact that the AKP has consistently marketed itself as a conservative 
party rather than Islamic, Turkish religious voters overwhelmingly support the AKP. 
Therefore, either an increase in conservatism or religious freedoms in Turkey would 
benefit the AKP.244 Turkish society has grown in conservatism since the mid-1990s, as 
the leftist parties of the 1970s and 1980s lost voter support.245 However, while Turkish 
society has moved away from leftist parties or politics towards more conservative 
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politicians, society itself has not statistically grown more Islamic.246 While taking care to 
avoid the image of being an Islamic political party (to deter military threats against the 
party), the AKP is led by pious Muslims, counts on political support from the Islamic 
voter, and pursues policies designed to increase this voter support, especially those 
granting Muslims freedom to practice religion apart from government interference. 
The violence and factionalism of the 1970s led the military to the conclusion that 
Islam could be used to provide common identity and deter political violence. 247 
Following the 1980 coup, the TSK and secular elites attempted to bring Islam into the 
political fold through the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.248 While Islamic displays of faith or 
piety are discouraged at official Republic functions, the state still runs public Islamic 
schools, requires education in Islam, and, through the Directorate of Religious Affairs / 
Diyanet, maintains all Turkish Imams on the public payroll. 249  The Diyanet is a 
controversial institution and a prerogative of secularism in Turkey, protected by the Law 
of Political Parties, which makes illegal any political proposal to abolish the Diyanet.250 
Since the inception of the Republic the Diyanet has maintained absolute control over 
appointments of all religious functionaries down to village prayer leaders, thereby 
providing oversight to preserve secularism as a national value. 251  The origin and 
continuation of the Diyanet demonstrate the top-down nature of Turkish secularism, 
imposed from above rather than being a natural product of Turkish democracy.252 
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From 2002 through 2006, the AKP made several attempts to provide incentives 
organized around political Islam that would increase the opportunities for Muslims to 
participate in the public sphere. These policy initiatives could increase AKP leverage 
over the TSK by solidifying the conservative base of the AKP while the party pursued 
other less popular incentives such as IMF reforms opposed by their political base. In 
2003, the AKP sought to hire an additional 15,000 imams to service the approximately 
22,000 mosques without a prayer leader.253 A provision for mosques in each multi-family 
residential building, introduced by the AKP in conjunction with the sixth EU reform 
package, was also pushed, but defeated by a combination of secular forces including 
media, military, and judicial advocates.254 
In 2004, Erdoğan made two separate attempts to reduce or eliminate restrictions 
on the headscarves in educational institutions, both of which were challenged and 
withdrawn shortly thereafter. 255  On the defeat, Erdoğan himself noted that, 
institutionally, the government could not make the change despite the fact that nearly 70 
percent of the populace favored allowing female university students to wear the 
headscarf.256 Even before the 2004 elections (and showing supreme confidence in their 
platform), the AKP pushed to change the Turkish penal code in February 2004 to 
criminalize prohibitions against teaching, religious prayers, or religious ceremonies.257 
These changes challenged the military by eliminating secular bulwarks as well as 
permitting more schools to the military tutelage of children institutionalized in public 
schools. Demonstrating how far the party had come since 2002, in June 2005, the AKP 
succeeded in passing the new criminal code in spite of a presidential veto by President 
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Sezer.258  This new penal code reduced the sentence for opening illegal educational 
institutions (typically Islamic schools) from three years to one and completely abolished 
the provision that the institutions themselves are closed down upon discovery. The new 
law (previously tabled due to Presidential veto before the 2004 election) was a major 
victory over the secular establishment and a clear demonstration of the growing strength 
of the AKP.259 
While the AKP attempted many policy changes directed at increasing the 
maneuvering room for political Islam and decreasing the position of the TSK on religion, 
a general view of the success of the party on religious policies from 2002 to 2006 argues 
for determined AKP avoidance of conflict with the military on key Islamic issues.260 
Issues of governance and equality before the law took precedence over political Islam 
during this period. 261  This avoidance policy would change after a second national 
election, but during the first AKP government the politicians chose instead to counter 
opposition party charges of Islamism by working around potential conflict areas with the 
military specific to Islam. 
4. Economic Programmatic and Particularistic Incentives: The IMF 
Reforms 
Economic policy is an essential component of electoral competition, with both 
programmatic and particularistic incentives encouraging political parties to leverage state 
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resources to electoral support. In times of plenty, politicians can craft policies designed to 
provide additional goods and services to their political supporters, while in poor 
economic times, policies that decrease wasteful spending and increase growth will 
increase political support. In a period of economic crisis, a government that can respond 
successfully and improve economic conditions will also see political support increase, 
especially when the government is solving a crisis caused by other political parties. 
Eurobarometer surveys during the first AKP government show that Turks consistently 
rated unemployment and general economic conditions as the most important obstacles 
facing the country. The only security related issue was terrorism, which fell well behind 
these two factors to voters.262 
This dynamic was at play in Turkey, where the AKP came to power following the 
massive financial crisis of 2000 and 2001. While the precise causes of the financial crisis 
are still debated, the results were devastating.263 At a February 2000 MGK meeting, 
President Sezer accused Prime Minister Ecevit of failing to investigate accusations of 
malpractice at the three state banks and allowing corrupt ministers to remain in their 
positions.264  The disagreement (coupled with a history of shaky Turkish government 
coalitions) fed a belief that the government and the IMF-backed financial program in 
place since 1999 were near collapse, and caused a run on the banks. Two public banks 
could not meet their obligations and the government responded by allowing the lira to 
float. The lira devalued by 50 percent in two months, triggering a massive recession. 
The combination of poor financial oversight and a weak government devastated 
the economy. The three-year IMF program initiated in 1999 went from 3.6 billion in 
credit to 24.9 billion. The economy contracted by 9 percent in 2001—well above the 
IMF’s prediction of a 3 percent contraction—and the national debt increased 500 percent 
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in two years. Economic improvement was an immediate requirement of the new 
government and a key campaign issue as voters abandoned those parties that had 
governed when the crisis hit. 
The election of the AKP contributed to an immediate sense of national economic 
relief, with the hopes that a single-party government could avoid the political infighting 
of the coalition and deliver genuine economic leadership.265 In addition to committing to 
a review (though not a repudiation) of the IMF package, the AKP initiated structural 
plans to reform the economy, focusing on disciplined public spending, transparency, 
privatization, and tax reform. 266  As will be discussed in the next section, a key 
component of IMF reform and economic recovery was establishing better oversight of 
military spending. 
The decision to review but not revoke IMF aid sought to ease the concerns of the 
rural AKP voter while also signaling to business interests that the AKP was committed to 
the difficult measures that IMF reforms demand. Between 2002 and 2006, the Turkish 7 
percent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth and combined with millions of new 
jobs, despite labor force rate stalls in 2004, was exceeded only by countries such as India 
and China, and was proved a major economic success for the party and their commitment 
to IMF reform. 267   iya  niş attributes this turnaround in part to a “single-minded 
commitment to fiscal discipline” by the AKP. 268  Especially important for electoral 
politics, as local elections took place in March 2004, during the first quarter of 2004, real 
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Turkish GNP increased at an incredibly high rate of 12 percent and confidence in the 
economy soared.269 
The economic turnaround from 2002 through 2006, and commitment to IMF 
reforms, challenged the notion that the AKP would act in a partisan fashion on important 
national issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by the sources of criticism and sources of 
support for AKP IMF policies from the two main industrial associations in Turkey, the 
Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turk Industry and Business Association or 
TÜSİAD) and the Müstakil Isadamlari Dernegi (Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association and henceforth MÜSIAD). Politically, TÜSIAD is Kemalist 
in orientation and viewed the 1961 constitution as too democratic while supporting the 
1980 coup.270 MÜSIAD meanwhile follows a more Islamic business model; having been 
established in May 1990 by young Muslim businessmen who, in their own words, 
claimed to be “committed to social and economic development in the country by 
promoting production in industry, honesty and fairness in trade, and high ethical and 
moral politics.”271 
The AKP’s dedication to IMF reforms and principles had TÜSİAD supporting the 
AKP while being ideologically opposed to the party. Conversely, MÜSIAD was highly 
critical of the IMF reforms despite generally supporting the AKP, whose leadership ranks 
are filled with middle class Muslim businessmen. 272  That the typically Kemalist 
TÜSİAD would support economic policies pursued by the AKP while these same policies 
were opposed by AKP supporters in MÜSIAD demonstrates a greater theme of the AKP 
economic efforts during their first government, a willingness to eschew partisanship in 
favor of results. By standing by existing international agreements and economic reforms 
against their constituency’s demand for greater latitude in social welfare programs than 
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IMF reforms allow, the AKP established themselves as a party that would seek 
performance over politics, precisely what voters were looking for. The party 
demonstrated a willingness use policy to improve the lives of all Turks, not just those that 
had elected the party.273 
5. Particularistic Incentives: The TSK Budget and Its Sources 
Following the 2001 economic crisis, attention shifted to how state institutions 
were being financed. In particular, oversight of the TSK budget became increasingly 
important to voters.274 The relative priority that politicians assign to military spending is 
an important indicator and can be evidenced by budget shares.275 That is, the absolute 
value of the slice of pie that is a military budget is less important than how the military 
slice compares to the rest of the pie. Importantly, even politicians who prefer and support 
a robust defense apparatus will be induced to minimize defense spending in order to 
maximize resource distribution amongst voters absent a threat to national security.276 
Understanding of how civilians provide oversight of the Turkish military budget 
(and expenditures) requires an equal measure of understanding of the multiple ways that 
the Turkish Armed Forces receives funding. Because military autonomy is higher where 
defense industries are in the hands of the military, asserting oversight of the military 
budget was a critical component of increasing civilian control.277 Constitutionally the 
Turkish Armed Forces are funded through parliamentary budgeting. In practice, however, 
various funds and foundations established after military interventions have created 
funding streams for the armed forces that are extremely difficult to monitor. 
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Writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Nurhan 
Yentürk breaks down Turkish defense spending into three categories: transparent, limited 
information available, and virtually no information available.278 Transparent institutions 
include Ministry of National Defense and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries 
spending. 279  Limited information about spending category spending consists of 
organizations such as the Defence Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi Destekleme 
Fonu or SSDF), the Secret Fund, military research and development, and financial 
transfers to Northern Cyprus.280 Lastly, those institutions about which information is 
nearly impossible to obtain include the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (Türk Silahhı 
Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı or TSKGV) that contributes funding for the TSK, which 
is not subject to civilian audit.281 Founded to prevent dependence on foreign military 
technology transfers, the value of the TSKGV contribution to the TSK is unpublished and 
cannot be precisely determined, but the purchasing power of the institution is 
significant.282 The TSKGV has shares in 18 companies, and has so much purchasing 
power that, in 2005, the holding company was able to maneuver to take over Turkish 
Aerospace Industries and establish a holding company, 80 percent of which was owned 
by the military.283 
The additional purchasing power of DISF, which lies under the supervision of the 
Directorate of Defense Industry, stems from a 1985 law (No. 3238 of the DISF founding 
law) permits extra-budgetary purchases of arms and equipment through the DISF. Extra-
budgetary sources of income that escape oversight include, for example, national gaming 
revenue, racetrack betting profits, the national lottery, and shares of taxes on 
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corporations. Each of these institutions was established to prevent dependence on foreign 
arms sales for equipping the military.  
While not explicitly created to provide independent revenue streams for the armed 
forces, these institutions have since metastasized to do just that. Apart from these 
institutions, the Turkish military also receives unmonitored funding through a 
relationship with the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (Türkiye 
Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu, or TÜBİTAK), which supports research and 
development. 284  Individually these various organizations were created to provide a 
specific service for the armed forces: domestic military infrastructure. Collectively, they 
weave a nearly untraceable web of purchasing power apart from the national budget 
voted on by elected members of parliament. 
The final institution that lies outside parliamentary oversight is the Armed Forces 
Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK). Created by Law No. 205 in January 1961 by the 
National Unity Committee following the 1960 coup, ostensibly to provide middle class 
lifestyles to military officers, OYAK enjoys a legal status that enables privileges of both 
private and public law.285 Since 1961, OYAK has grown into a colossal economic power 
in Turkey, comprising 60 companies (29 of which are entirely owned by the fund), and is 
one of the five largest holding funds in Turkey.286 
OYAK’s maintains a unique legal status that not only gives the holding economic 
advantages, but it also tax benefits that come at the expense of the state. Exempt from 
income, corporate, inheritance, and other taxes, the holding enjoys mandatory deductions 
from member’s salaries without mandatory disbursements. As OYAK falls under the 
military administrative courts rather than civilian, it also enjoys de facto immunity from 
its own members. Finally, OYAK holdings are defined as state property, and are 
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therefore both protected from confiscation 287 and also become the problem of the 
taxpayers, who are the recipients of any companies that go bankrupt. 
Due to lack of transparency in expenditures, the military budget approved by 
parliament itself also represents a significant impediment to eventual to democratic 
civilian control. In many Turkish budgets, the single item “Defense Services,” which can 
contain up to 99 percent of all military official spending, is the only detail on which 
civilians have to vote.288 Typical parliamentary votes for budget approval are unanimous, 
and lack virtually any oversight of defense spending. Comparison of the budgets 
proposals released by the Ministry of Finance for the TSK, the National Police, and the 
ministries of Finance, Health, and Interior demonstrate the oversight disparity. While the 
police and ministries deliver to parliament budget proposals of 28, 41, 24, and 13 pages, 
respectively, the budget delivered by the TSK (whose budget far outstrips all of the other 
institutions), runs roughly 2.5 pages and is devoid of any detail on how the budget will be 
allocated.289 
Complete oversight of defense spending in Turkey by civilian governments is a 
nigh impossibility, though the AKP did make significant efforts to establish better 
civilian control from 2002 to 2006. For example, in 2004 Parliament amended article 160 
of the 1982 constitution to increase transparency over auditing the military, and in 2010 
also mandated greater transparency for the Court of Auditors to support the 2004 reform. 
Importantly for oversight purposes, as part of AKP efforts to increase government 
transparency in 2003 the party also passed law no. 5018 on public financial management 
and control. This law forced the Ministry of Finance to publish information on military 
spending (as well as the spending of other government institutions) and greatly increased 
civilian awareness of military spending. 290  In addition to these efforts at expanding 
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political oversight of military resources, the AKP also made early and large cuts in the 
military budget allocated by Turkish parliament from 2002–2006. 
After a 32 percent increase in 2002 by the outgoing coalition government, annual 
TSK budgets dropped significantly from 2002 to 2006 under the AKP.291  The 2003 
budget was the first wherein the Ministry of Finance worked with the TSK to develop a 
budget. At 9 percent of the total Turkish budget, the military still received larger slices 
than any other ministry.292 Importantly however, the AKP reduced the percentage of 
GDP allocated to the military from a 3.9 percent in 2002 to 2.5 percent by 2006. The 
reduction of nearly four billion dollars in four years cut the parliamentary budget of the 
TSK by roughly 20 percent during the first AKP government. When we recall that the 
Turkish economy also experienced economic turnaround and increase in GDP during 
these same years, military cuts in real terms and GDP become even more dramatic.  
These reductions moved the TSK budget as a percentage of GDP from alongside 
Russia to a spending level closer to NATO allies Greece, France, and the UK.293 By 
reducing the military budget both in real terms and relative to total GDP, the politicians 
freed up billions of dollars for spending patronage networks and the incentives discussed 
previously such as economic reform, hiring prayer leaders, and infrastructure. 
Not content with merely reducing the budget, AKP parliament cancelled major 
weapons purchases such as Cobra attack helicopters and Boeing airborne warning and 
control aircraft.294 Importantly, while the AKP reduced the military budget each year 
from 2002 to 2006, and began to challenge specific procurements during that same time 
period, the party continued to refocus the defense industrial sector capacity towards 
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confronting regional conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and internal counterinsurgency 
against the PKK. Though the AKP sought control over the military and expenditures, the 
party also recognized and valued the importance of a strong military in safeguarding the 
country against the growing violence stemming from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
which all senior Turkish leaders feared.295 
In other ways, too, AKP security policy was structured to avoid civil-military 
conflict prematurely. Even while cutting the military budget both as a percentage of GDP 
and in real dollars, Prime Minister Erdoğan allowed significant leeway to the military to 
pursue policy objectives important to the generals. Due to lingering effects of the 2001 
crisis, from 2003 to 2004, the Turkish defense industry was in danger of collapse, which 
could make the country completely dependent on foreign arms sales to equip and 
maintain the military. 296  To avoid this scenario, parliament passed a resolution that 
transferred the civilian-controlled Turkish Defense Industries to the Turkish Ministry of 
National Defense, under a three-star general, and increased military autonomy over the 
domestic defense industry.297 Similarly, in 2006, Prime Minister Erdoğan approved the 
creation of a defense industry holding company with 90 percent of the shares being held 
by the TSKGV, despite opposition from local industrialists.298  Thus, while reducing 
military spending significantly, the AKP also insured that the military remained properly 
equipped to conduct the roles necessary for state security that were being increasingly 
identified by the civilian government, while also providing for domestic defense 
industrial capability. 
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, EU HARMONIZATION, AND 
MGK REFORMS 
Effective leveraging of the programmatic and particularistic incentives enabled 
the AKP to pursue reforms designed to limit the role of the TSK in domestic politics. 
Changes to the constitution provided the legal basis to reduce the military influence in 
several areas, most significantly the role of the National Security Council. In addition to a 
reduced role on the MGK, the TSK saw a reduction or elimination of their influence over 
security courts, radio, the educational system, and other areas of government. 
In many cases, reforms were aimed at compliance with European Union acquis 
and implemented in conjunction with EU harmonization packages. Military reforms 
served the dual purposes of increasing civilian control and making Turkey more 
marketable to those EU member states that might eventually allow Turkish accession. 
Between 2002 and 2006, significant military reforms were legislated by parliament in 








. While these 
harmonization packages included legal reforms to a variety of government functions, 
only those reforms that changed the relative power between the civilian government and 
the TSK are discussed in here. Though tempting to consider EU accession as a potential 
issue of concordance between the military and civilian politicians, it is important to recall 
that concordance sought to explain a lack of coups rather than increasing civilian control. 
Thus, while EU accession might have prevented the military from ousting a political 
party, this is not the same as accepting the severe reforms and limitations placed on 
military autonomy by the AKP. In Turkey we should consider EU accession instead as a 
catalyst accelerating the natural tendencies of electoral competition. 
Creating, repealing, or amending laws are the responsibility of the Turkish 
parliament, which consists of 16 standing committees that generally conform to 
individual ministries.299  Sessions cannot be opened without one-third of all deputies 
present, and decisional quorums require an absolute majority of votes cast.300 Laws take 
effect 15 days after passage and are enforced by the president unless the president returns 
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the laws to parliament for changes within that same window. A law passed a second time 
without written changes overrides the presidential veto and becomes binding unless 
challenged by the president before the Constitutional Court.301 Thus, while a political 
party that maintains an absolute majority can pass laws without regard to presidential 
veto power, and a government cannot be recalled unless by majority of members of 
parliament, parties which challenge the president can risk challenge at the Constitutional 
Court level. 
1. 2001 and 2004 Constitutional Reforms 
The 2001 constitutional reforms included amendments to Article 118 of the 
constitution, which governs the relationship of the MGK to the government. While AKP 
leadership did not oversee the passage of the reforms, the AKP was responsible for 
implementing and enforcing of the amendments set to take effect in 2003. Together, the 
2001 and 2004 amendments resulted in the amending of a full one-third of the 1980 
constitution, representing major changes by civilians of a document crafted under the 
direct supervision of the military.302 The changes to the MGK were part of four targeted 
areas of military reform pursued by the AKP between 2002 and 2006. While changing 
the nature and composition of the MGK, the AKP also acted to remove MGK—selected 
representatives from civilian boards, subject the military budget process to full 
parliamentary oversight, and reduce the scope of jurisdiction possessed by military 
courts.303 
In addition to amending Article 118 pertaining to the National Security Council 
(discussed in greater detail below), constitutional reforms in 2004 amended Article 131 
regarding the Higher Education Council, Article 160 of the audit courts, and Article 143 
on state security courts. The amendments to articles 131 and 160 were necessary to allow 
future regulatory changes to the Higher Education Council and audit court system. 
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Removing military oversight of the education system meant reduced indoctrination of 
military values in grade schools and also increased the opportunity for students 
graduating from Imam-Hatip schools to gain admission to university. Article 143 
removed a significant source of military interference by completely abolishing state 
security courts, the hearings of which were closed and thus produced decisions virtually 
impossible to appeal, processes incompatible with EU democratic norms.304 The state 
security courts were implemented by the TSK following the 1980 coup and were a 
significant source of military authority. As the courts had the power to identify and 
prosecute alleged threats to the Republic apart from civilian oversight or control, their 
elimination was a significant blow to military independence while also guaranteeing that 
civilians would be tried in civilian rather than military court.305 
In 2004, the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts 
was also amended to remove the ability of the military courts to hold suspects beyond 
four days and required immediate notification to next of kin when a suspect was detained. 
Additional added civil protections included provisions against using findings obtained 
illegally as evidence.306 By changing the language of the constitution written after the 
1980 coup, parliament was able to pave the way for the numerous future reforms that 
would be passed through parliament and then branded as EU harmonization packages. 




 EU harmonization package was the first that entered force under the AKP 
government and was legislated in part by the AKP, taking effect in July 2003. This 
package removed military prerogatives by altering much of the legal infrastructure that 
enabled military autonomy on security issues, such as the ability of the state security 
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courts to try suspects without legal counsel. Similarly, the definition of terrorism was 
changed to require force or violence in order to define an act as “terrorist,” a change 
targeting the propensity of the Turkish military to accuse political dissidents of terrorism. 
These changes demonstrated the intention of civilians in government to take control over 
the state security discourse that had been dominated by the military for decades and, 
when combined with the aforementioned reforms to military courts, benefit the voter by 
removing the ability of the military to try civilians as terrorists for such infractions as 
criticism of the military or advocating Kurdish rights. 
Constitutional definitions of Turkey as a unitary state, the people of which are 
Turks, had been used to justify provisions against radio or television broadcasts and 
education in languages other than Turkish (most frequently Kurdish), while accusing 
those who sought to use other languages of dissent against the Republic for employing 
foreign languages not recognized in the constitution.307 The 6
th
 harmonization package 
also permitted both public and private organizations to use languages other than Turkish, 
and protected this reform by amending Article 6 to remove the MGK representative from 
the Board of Supervision. This was the first of many government boards that would no 
longer require a member of the military serving on the board as a condition of the right of 
the institution to operate.308 
Just one month later, in August 2003, the first major reform package introduced 
by the AKP took force. With the 7
th
 harmonization package, the civilian government 
began to exert significant formal authority over the TSK.309 In addition to the reforms 
themselves, the manner in which the civilians legislated these changes was also telling. 
Military reforms passed and packaged as the 7
th
 harmonization package bypassed the 
traditional step of submitting draft laws to the MGK for feedback. Instead, the AKP took 
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all draft laws directly to parliament to reduce military influence over the laws that 
targeted the armed forces.310 
Included in the 7
th
 harmonization package was an amendment to Article 159 of 
the Penal Code reducing the mandatory sentence for “insulting” or “deriding” state 
institutions (specifically the military) and eliminating any penalty for publicly criticizing 
them.311 An amendment to the Law on Foreign Language Education and the Learning of 
Different Languages and Dialects by Turkish Citizens removed the provision of 
consulting with the MGK before beginning language instruction, returning this authority 
to the civilian Council of Ministers.312 In addition to changes to the form of military 
authority, serious changes to the functions of TSK autonomy were included in the 7
th
 
harmonization package, specifically reforms to the relationship of the judiciary to the 
military and the MGK to the government.313 
Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military 
Courts removed the authority of the military to try civilians for criminal offenses such as 
discouraging the public from military duty.314 In a major change to budgetary autonomy, 
the Law on the Court of Audits was amended to allow the court to (at the request of 
parliament) audit all accounts and transactions where public funds were used. 315  In 
amending the Law on the Court of Accounts, parliament essentially legislated itself the 
right to audit any military spending at any time when tax dollars were involved in the 
transaction. 
Perhaps most importantly, the 7
th
 harmonization package took direct action 
against the significant military authority contained within the body of the National 
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Security Council. While discussed in detail below, it is worth noting the multiple changes 
to the MGK that reduced the power of the institution from an organ of state security 
policy crafting and implementation to a mere advisory council.316 
 All Secretary General executive powers were eliminated. 
 Military Access to civilian agencies was eliminated. 
 Secretary General staff confidentiality was eliminated (now being subject 
to parliamentary inquiry). 
 Regular MGK meetings became less frequent. 
 Requirement for Secretary General to be a military officer was 
eliminated.317 
In 2003, the AKP civilians in both the prime minister’s office and parliament 
succeeded in legislating reforms of the military, targeting the military budget, leadership 
structure, and tertiary roles in a variety of other government institutions. The 2003 
Regular Report published by the European Union concluded that the significant changes 
to the MGK, Court of Audits, and the reduced role of the TSK in the judicial process 
provided much improved formal control over the armed forces.318 Negative critiques in 
this report were limited to the informal mechanisms the military still enjoyed, such as 
public speeches on current events or policies of the government.319 
Parliament passed the 8
th
 harmonization package in 2004, which again curtailed 
the role of the TSK and MGK in advisory roles outside national defense. The Law on 
Higher Education was amended to prevent a General Staff member from serving on the 
council, while the Law on the Establishment of and Broadcasting by Radio and 
Television Corporations repealed the MGK member position on the Supreme Board for 
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Radio and Television. 320  MGK positions were also eliminated from the High 
Communication Council and from the board representing the Law on the Protection of 
Minors from Harmful Publications. These efforts represented breakthrough steps towards 
eliminating the “semi-authoritarian” infrastructure established by the military in the 
preceding decades.321 





harmonization packages had shifted the balance further towards the civilians but, like 
earlier reports, noted that the formal reforms still had to be implemented and maintained, 
while attempting to diminish informal military mechanisms in the future.322 The 2005 
report specifically commented on the propensity of the military to use informal outlets to 
influence political outcomes, citing generals commenting on the EU process, critiquing 
previous Regular Reports, and regularly exceeding the confines of national defense-
related issues.323 
The final harmonization package passed between 2002 and 2006 was the 9
th
, in 
2006. This package again amended the Law on the Establishment and Legal Procedures 
of Military Courts, this time by abolishing the courts’ authority to try civilians during 
peace unless specifically authorized by parliament. Parliament also altered the provisions 
of the law to allow for retrials based on the European Court of Human Rights for those 
civilians previously convicted by the military courts. 
Collectively, the reforms legislated by parliament between 2002 and 2006 vastly 
expanded the formal control over virtually every aspect of military involvement in 
politics. The AKP parliament dramatically curtailed military prerogatives in budgeting, 
judicial proceedings, influence on civilian boards, in civil society, and the National 
Security Council itself.324 The multiple constitutional amendments and reform packages 
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helped convince contemporary Turkish scholars that, during the formal control window, 
Turkey had made significant progress in undoing the “semi-authoritarian legacy of the 
MGK regime.”325 
3. Implementation of National Security Council Reforms 
The AKP implemented reforms of the MGK by amending through parliament the 
laws governing MGK roles and responsibilities derived from Article 118 of the 
constitution. The strongest MGK reforms occurred in 2004 and were part of the reforms 
that would comprise the 7
th
 harmonization package and came on the heels of the 
overwhelming Turkish electoral success in March 2004. The first of these was an 
amendment to Article 4 of the Law on National Security Council and the Secretariat 
General of the National Security Council, which was rewritten to reduce the advisory 
power of the Council. Prior to this change, MGK recommendations were to be given 
priority consideration, which by default meant giving the military generals priority 
consideration. 326  Having reduced the importance of MGK counsel, Article 5 was 
amended to decrease the frequency of council meetings from monthly to bi-monthly and 
also repealed the authority of the Secretary General to convene meetings of the council, 
reducing the opportunities for the generals to use the MGK as a means to pressure the 
civilian government.327 
Also in 2004, Articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the National Security Council and 
the Secretariat General of the National Security Council were repealed, thereby 
eliminating the executive powers of the secretary general. Article 13 was similarly 
amended to make the role of the secretary general match that of the council. These three 
amendments first made the council administrative in nature rather than executive, and 
then limited the role of the secretary general administratively running the council, in turn 
making it even less likely that future reforms could be contested by the military.328 
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Amending Article 15 was perhaps the most important reform, changing the 
appointment process for the secretary general to allow for civilians to serve in the role 
previously reserved for military officers. Under the new process the prime minister 
nominates and the president approves the position, without military input, whereas before 
the military would select from amongst their own ranks one to serve on as head of the 
(then largely executive) MGK. As the Turkish MGK has been a highly effective 
institution for implementing security policy, establishing civilian control over the 
institution was of critical importance.329 
Finally, Article 19 was also repealed, eliminating the ability of the MGK to 
demand classified or non-classified documents from various organs, including ministries, 
public and private institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. 330  Previously the 
supervisory role of the MGK over much of society enabled the military to demand 
documents from any public or private organization without cause and allowed the MGK 
to monitor suspected dissidents and (when combined with previous judicial prerogatives) 
potentially use these documents in criminal proceedings against those same individuals or 
organizations. 331  For decades, the MGK had acted as the focal point for military 
interventions in politics, deciding who or what represented threats to state security, 
directing civilian politicians how to deal with these threats, and on occasion labeling 
those same politicians as the threat itself.332 
Even more than reducing the military budget or implementing audit controls over 
military expenditures, the reforms to the MGK eliminated the formal capacity of the 
military to intervene in domestic politics. As we will see in Chapter IV, by the time the 
TSK next decided to challenge the authority of the civilian politicians, the military had no 
leverage other than the threat of armed intervention, like in 1960 or 1980. The AKP had 
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effectively wielded the “virtues and legitimizing power of democracy” to render military 
interference as illegitimate.333 
D. CONCLUSION 
Recalling that Hunter’s central thesis is that “electoral competition creates 
incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a politically powerful and active 
military, and that broad popular support enhances their support to do so,” 334  these 
policies and reforms enacted by the AKP during the initial control phase provide 
substantial evidence that Hypothesis #1 explains the change in control. 
Hypotheses #1 (Electoral Competition): The AKP was able to exert 
control over the TSK from 2002 to 2011 through repeated electoral and 
policy successes, which enabled emboldened challenges by the AKP of 
TSK prerogatives. 
Between 2002 and 2006, the AKP won national elections and local elections in a 
strong enough fashion to organize and implement single-party government with nearly 
two-thirds of all available seats in parliament. Because nearly 45 percent of votes for 
parliament cast in the 2002 election went unrepresented, as the votes were cast for a party 
that did not cross the minimum threshold, there was no possibility for minority parties to 
form coalitions against AKP policies and agendas in the parliament. With the ability to 
pass legislation and override a presidential veto, the AKP was able to pursue 
programmatic and particularistic incentives that would increase political support for the 
party and therefore lead to additional success in future elections. While successful 
policies between 2002 and 2006 did increase the share of the votes that would go to the 
AKP (as evidenced by the increase in vote share in the 2004 local election and as the 
2007 elections will show in Chapter IV), they also engendered significant resentment 
towards the AKP from the minority party in parliament, the CHP.335 
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The AKP was able to leverage the power of their election wins towards greater 
political support by (1) taking actions aiming to shore up their political base, including 
hiring Imams and reducing restrictions on Islamic education; while also (2) pursuing 
pragmatic policies that held broad appeal without the risk of alienating a constituency 
and/or that demonstrated legitimacy, such as IMF reforms, anti-corruption programs, and 
increases in civil society organizations’ rights to organize. Broad political support 
combined with a deep base of party loyalists allowed the AKP to pursue greater civilian 
oversight of the military budget and the role of the TSK in society. These programmatic 
and particularistic incentives demanded (and enabled) by domestic pressure worked in 
conjunction with a period of warm EU relations to create the opportunity structure for a 
variety of formal reforms to the role of military in Turkish politics. 
Challenges to the military included eliminating TSK control of the National 
Security Council, the chain of command, the jurisdiction of the courts, the role of the 
military in civil society, the economic structure of the military, and the national education 
system. In almost every area where the military was politically involved, the AKP was 
able to increase civilian authority. The civilian politicians did not just challenge the 
military from the office of prime minister. Parliament also proved adept at leveraging 
political support and the opportunity provided by EU accession negotiations to work 
around the military and increase parliamentary power over the military.336 
Consideration of the policies and reforms that led to the closure of the gap 
between the civilians and the military in relative political power provide strong support 
for Hypothesis #1. Beginning with the unprecedented success of the 2002 national 
elections and continuing with the success of the 2004 local elections, voters 
overwhelmingly demonstrated a desire for AKP leadership. That Chief of General Staff 
Hilmi Özkök and the TGS recognized this fact made it that much easier for the AKP to 
depart from the path-dependent process that historical institutionalists would have 
predicted based off the 1997 intervention, February 28 Process, and the Constitutional 
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Courts banning of the Welfare Party.337 Furthermore, that the most significant reforms of 
the period took place in the summer of 2004 following the local elections adds strong 
evidence that the increase in voter support for the already overwhelmingly popular AKP 
made challenging the civilians all the more difficult for the military, who ended up 
yielding their formal position in government rather quietly. 
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IV. CONTESTATION AND CONTROL, 2007–2011 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By leveraging electoral victories into programmatic and particularistic incentives, 
the AKP succeeded in exerting formal control over many aspects of military prerogatives 
from 2002 to 2006. The multitude of constitutional reforms and changes to those laws 
and institutions, which the military implemented following the 1980 coup, also made 
possible the “parallel military reforms” to the  SC, the military budgeting process, and 
military involvement in the judiciary.338 In 2002, the electorate coalesced largely around 
two distinct political parties (with the AKP receiving a pure majority of seats in 
parliament). This demonstrated to both the military and the politicians that society was, at 
least temporarily, more interested in pursuing issues such as economic prosperity, 
political freedoms, and fighting corruption, rather than the largely ideological issues that 
kept society divided during most governments. This social cohesion had the added 
benefit of discouraging military intervention long enough for the TSK to enact 
substantive legal reforms.339 For Chapter IV and the period of contestation and control 
from 2007 to 2011, the focus moves from policies seeking to improve political lifespan to 
open contestation between the military, the secular establishment, and the AKP, for 
ultimate control of the government. 
Could the formal controls that were enacted between 2002 and 2006 actually 
withstand a concerted effort by the military to maintain political privileges and the ability 
to intervene in politics? It is one thing to legislate a reduction in military autonomy, it is 
another thing to see those reforms accepted by the military and become permanent 
fixtures of the institution. Recalling the research question: “How did the civilian AK Parti 
gain and maintain control over the armed forces from 2002 to 2011?” could the civilians 
maintain control over the armed forces in the face of a direct military challenge to 
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civilian authority prompted by infringements on a military’s professional interests by the 
politicians? 
Hypotheses #1 (Electoral Competition): The AKP was able to exert 
control over the TSK from 2002 to 2011 through repeated electoral and 
policy successes that enabled the AKP to challenge TSK prerogatives. 
Contained within Hypothesis 1 is an attempt to answer the civilian control 
contradiction: how to strongly promote civilian control without encouraging military 
interventions, with a focus on continuous repetition of electoral and policy success. The 
success of the AKP in election after election affirmed to all actors that, when allowed to 
choose between the AKP and other political parties, voters continued to select the AKP 
and the policies the party enacted, including military reforms. Furthermore, when polled 
voters consistently support nearly all aspects of the AKP platform, from constitutional 
reform to Ergenekon investigations, and democratization efforts.340 
As the title implies, the purpose of Chapter IV is to link the formal controls 
discussed in Chapter III to the period from 2007 forward, which is marked by open 
confrontation between the AKP on the one hand, and the military and their secularist 
allies, on the other. As this chapter will show, during this later period, confrontation over 
the office of president led to a constitutional crisis, special elections in 2007, and a 
constitutional court case that narrowly failed to ban the AKP and its members from 
politics. In the aftermath of these challenges, an emboldened AKP emerged, one that 
controls all significant levers of power in Turkish government, has just won a special 
election necessary to break a deadlock over the office of president, and survived an 
existential threat from what remained of the security establishment in government. Led 
by Prime Minister Erdogan, this bolstered AKP determined that political survival no 
longer meant just winning elections, but the unconditional submission of the military to 
the civilian authorities.341 
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In order to institutionalize the formal controls implemented during the early AKP 
years, the party aggressively pursued investigations into military coup plots; most notable 
among these were the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations. Together, these 
inquiries saw hundreds of military members indicted, tried, and jailed for charges of 
conspiring to overthrow the government.342  Not content to remove only current and 
recently retired officers, these investigations would also include arrests and indictments 
against those officers who prosecuted the 1980 coup, including General Kenan Evren, the 
Chief of General Staff overseeing the 1980 coup and military rule from 1980 to 1983, as 
well as those military officers responsible for the 1997 February 28 Process and those 
behind the 1971 “coup by memorandum.”343 
With opinion polls showing public and international support solidly on the side of 
these investigations, and most formal prerogatives regarding the judiciary previously 
eliminated, the military was unable to prevent the widespread indictments and trials.344 
With commentators observing that the generals had been isolated from public support, 
and to protest the detention of hundreds of officers, the top four senior military officers 
resigned in 2011, citing an inability to defend their comrades-in-arms from the judicial 
process.345 In 1997, during the February 28 Process, the military forced the resignation of 
the Welfare Party government. After a decade of AKP government, the only path 
available to the same military was for the generals themselves to resign. As Prime 
Minister Erdogan calmly replaced the generals with those more amenable to his policies, 
the institution of subjective civilian control of the military was finally accepted by the 
TSK.346 
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The remainder of Chapter IV is organized chronologically to illustrate this 
process of consolidating civilian control. Section B presents the changing domestic and 
international circumstances that contributed to a period of increased hostility from 2006 
to 2007, which eventually resulted in a constitutional crisis over filling the office of 
president. Section C then depicts the open contestation between the AKP and the TSK, as 
well as between the AKP and the Chief Prosecutor (the office responsible for bringing 
closure cases against political parties) that took place between 2007 and 2008. When the 
closure case against the AKP failed in 2008, the elected and now vindicated AKP pushed 
aggressive investigations into coup plotting, targeting military officers, civilians, and 
journalists suspected of attempting to overthrow the government. This 2008–2011 period 
is detailed in Section D. Finally, Section E assesses the consequences of the coup trials 
and the state of Turkish civil-military relations as 2011 and the period of contestation and 
control came to an end. 
B. INCREASING HOSTILITY, 2006–2007 
As 2006 drew to an end, two fundamental Turkish relationships underwent 
changes that altered the power dynamics between the military leadership and the civilian 
politicians. The first relationship change was the retirement of General Hilmi Özkök as 
the Chief, a position then filled by General Yaşar Büyükanıt. Turkish conservatives had 
high hopes that this change would halt the progressive momentum that grew under 
Özkök. 347  Under Büyükanıt, several sources of contestation between the AKP and 
military would arise, including the 2007 presidential election and subsequent 
constitutional crisis. The new hostility towards the AKP by the Büyükanıt-led TSK 
demonstrates electoral competitions prediction that particularistic and programmatic 
incentives will lead to conflict with the military. The resolution of this crisis would mark 
a turning point for the TSK under Büyükanıt where, before the crisis, the TSK was more 
hostile to the AKP; after the crisis and with the elevation of Gül to president, the military 
became muted in challenging the AKP. 
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The more significant relationship change was that of the European Union and 
Turkey. Near the end of 2006 and into 2007, this relationship began to deteriorate. The 
tone of accession talks on each side became more strident, with Turks arguing that major 
legislative reforms had brought Turkey much closer to EU acquis. In Europe, however, 
discussion began to migrate away from a sense of inevitability on Turkish accession and 
towards normative discussions on whether Turkey even belonged in Europe, with France 
and Germany leading the way in overtly viewing Turkey through a religious lens.348 
Focus on Turkey as a large, populous, Muslim country, with a lower per-capita income 
than much of Europe, created cultural backlash among Turks who had, for decades, 
pursued European integration. As the EU lost luster, the political dynamics inside Turkey 
changed as well. Politicians were moving beyond political, economic, and military 
reform in an effort to align with the EU acquis, and towards implementing legislation that 
served the dominant AK party interest.349  Similarly, the decline in EU support also 
removed an impediment to an active military, and events in the spring of 2007 were 
driven largely by this active military under Büyükanıt. As interest in EU membership 
diminished in Turkey and national pride increased, spurred in part by anti-Turkish 
sentiment in Europe, the conditions became more favorable internally for military 
intervention, thereby triggering the conflicts between the AKP and the secular 
establishment of the CHP, TSK, and Constitutional Court. 
1. Waning EU–Turkish Relations 
The early years of AKP leadership were marked by nationwide enthusiasm on EU 
accession. After several setbacks on accession, however, Turkish faith in the process and 
the benefits of membership began to wane.350 The decline in EU–Turkish relations also 
served as a loss of the catalyst that had helped accelerate early AKP military reforms. 
Thus, the decline in Turkey–EU relations was important for electoral competition 
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because the loss of Turkish support for membership meant that pressure for adoption of 
the EU acquis was similarly reduced, including military reforms demanded by the EU. 
On the civilian side, the accomplished reforms from 2002 to 2006 and the loss of EU 
leverage gave the civilians the ability to pursue conservative domestic policies targeting 
issues important to their electoral base; they no longer had to worry about EU input 
(headscarves being one example). No longer fearing the effects of EU criticism on the 
Turkish public and with rapidly decreasing voter support for accession, the tie that bound 
the AKP and TSK together on reforms for much of 2002 to 2006 had been severed. In 
response, the military under Büyükanıt also proved more willing to attempt a reassertion 
of military influence in politics following the loss of support for EU accession, including 
more strident public pronouncements against the civilians, and eventually culminating in 
a direct effort to influence a presidential election. As the possibility of EU accession and 
a waxing of public interest had assisted in driving military reform, so too would the 
waning of public opinion on EU matters drive the growing divide between the military 
and civilians. 
EU support for Turkish accession consists of two styles: (1) materialist 
supporters, who see Turkish membership as benefiting the Union economically and 
military, and (2) normative supporters, for whom democracy and secularism are EU 
norms and who focus on the character of Turkish government rather than the benefits of 
to the EU from Turkish accession.351 Beginning in 2004, the latter of these increasingly 
focused on the difficulty of integrating Turks and Muslims with the largely Christian 
Europe, and whether Anatolian Turks, whose support had plummeted as terrorism 
flourished, were properly European.352 The materialist supporters meanwhile consented 
that, under the AKP, Turkey had made significant progress towards implementing the full 
acquis, and focused instead on the already close relationship between the EU and Turkey, 
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such as the NATO alliance, the Customs Union, and the importance of anchoring Turkey 
in the West.353 
In the end, both parties got what they wanted. EU leaders decided on an “open-
ended” negotiation process with Turkey and no guarantees of full membership, despite 
the level of compliance with the EU acquis that Turkey might accomplish. Turkey 
remained the only country to enter the Customs Union before the EU, and without a 
promise of a future accession.354 Stringent and unique conditions that were placed on 
Turkish accession exceeded typical EU accession negotiations, specifically Turkish–
Cyprus relations, possible permanent restrictions on Turkish migration throughout the 
EU, and a potential “privileged partnership” in-lieu of full membership.355 In Turkey, 
however, decisions to prevent Turkish accession for at least another decade (the 
Commission stating that accession before 2014 would not be permitted) struck citizens as 
disingenuous; the states of Central Europe powered through the accession process with 
economies similar to Turkey’s and with a much shorter history of integration.356 
The rejection the Turks felt by the EU accession process immediately led to 
declining domestic support for EU accession, and by a corollary decline in reforms aimed 
at acquis compliance. 357  As the Turkish economy improved under AKP and IMF 
reforms, the EU became all sticks and few carrots. Without a guaranteed accession after 
full acquis compliance, Turkish public opinion polls on EU membership plummeted.358 
From December 2005 to May 2006, Turkish respondents to the question, “Do you have a 
favorable image of the EU?” dropped from 60 percent favorable to only 43 percent, a 
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statistic would that would continue to decline as the EU entered its own fiscal crisis in the 
latter half of the decade.359 Similarly EU barometer reports in 2008 showed Turkish trust 
in the EU lower than all other candidate states and member states at 31 percent (EU 
average 50 percent.360 While influential European leaders such as German Chancellor 
Angele Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy openly opposed Turkish 
membership and France criminalized the denial that Armenians were victims of genocide 
in World War I, Turks reacted with anti-EU rallies across the country.361 
The decline in Turkish support for the EU cut across party affiliation and 
economic or social status, and was predominantly based on the negative discourse 
emanating from Europe towards the possibility of Turkish membership.362 Going into the 
2007 presidential elections, Turkey had experienced rapid economic improvement, 
significant political and military reforms, and major changes to civil society and election 
pre-polling demonstrated that these advances registered with the voters more than joining 
the EU, which by then little to no impact on internal politics.363 The 2007 EU barometer 
surveys in Turkey found that 76 percent of respondents who were pleased with their 
quality of life held higher expectations for their future than member states (44 percent 
versus 37 percent) and had more trust in their government institutions than European 
states (71 percent versus 41 percent in Europe).364 By 2010, domestic surveys in Turkey 
showed that fully 50 percent of voters viewed EU membership to have diminished in 
importance.365 In short, the benefits of EU membership declined, and public perception 
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of hostility towards Turkish candidacy for identity reasons caused Turks to lose faith in 
the institution.366 
2. Waxing Turkish Nationalism 
Public opinion polls from 2006 and 2007 showed low levels of trust and support 
for the European Union membership by Turks.367 While Turkish support for the EU 
collapsed, nationalism grew rapidly in Turkey from 2006 to 2007, in part from the anti-
Turkish sentiment from the EU.368  This growing nationalism was a product of both 
internal and external factors as voters across the political spectrum saw European and 
American policy decisions as directed against Turkey.369 The growth in nationalism led 
many voters to the right and towards support for traditional Islam in public arenas, and 
began to create a political environment that would invite the TSK to again test the waters 
for political intervention.370 Internationally, the failure of the EU to hold the Republic of 
Cyprus accountable to the Annan Plan (agreed to in 2004 by Turkish Cypriots) and 
provide an avenue for reconciliation—as agreed to in the Annan Plan—directly assaulted 
the Turks’ sense of fair play.371 Once Cyprus was admitted to the EU in 2004, the Union 
ceased efforts at neutrality and instead treated Turkish–Cyprus relations as a proxy for 
Turkish enthusiasm for the EU. Increasing nationalism led to a more active military by 
stimulating political parties such as the CHP and the MHP that favored a stronger 
military. The increase in nationalism was important because the coming 2007 elections 
would determine the outcome of previously enacted military reforms. Would growing 
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nationalism turn voters away from the AKP, or would the party adapt strategies and 
maintain their position in government? 
The AKP and supporters took an ironic turn towards increased nationalism 
themselves after the 2005 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision rejecting 
an appeal to allow women to wear headscarves on Turkish university campuses. The case 
had been taken to the ECtHR by conservatives and the AKP with the hopes of receiving a 
European ruling that freedom of religion, according to European norms, demanded that 
female students be allowed to wear headscarves. Instead, the increasing European 
Islamophobia resulting from al-Qaeda and terrorist attacks targeting European countries 
led to restrictions on Muslim religious freedoms in Europe generally and, following from 
that, a negative ECtHR ruling against Turkey.372 This rebuff on religious freedom by the 
ECtHR was all the more problematic for the AKP because the decision pitted EU 
candidacy and norms against the core AKP constituency of conservative Muslims.373 
Increasing nationalism was not limited to politicians and the public. In 2006, the 
PKK resumed terrorist attacks against Turkish interests and assets in the southeastern 
parts of the country, breaking a six-year cease-fire in the process. European Parliament 
demands that the Turkish government pursue peaceful resolutions with the Kurds further 
strained relations.374 While the military looked askance at European focus on member 
states’ security interests at the expense of Turkish security, the open violence that broke 
out triggered the military’s strong prerogative in protecting the singular sovereignty of 
the Republic.375 With military members being killed in southeastern Turkey fighting a 
new insurrection, plus the EU seemingly disinterested in Turkish security affairs and an 
electorate disenfranchised by the EU accession process (due to EU failure to uphold the 
Annan Plan, support religious freedom in Turkey, and the normative discussion of 
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Turkish Europeanism), the TSK under Büyükanıt began to test the boundaries of the 
formal control mechanisms enacted in the previous five years.376 
3. The Constitutional Crisis 
Beginning in October 2006, the TSK began to signal a growing interest in the 
domestic political events to come in 2007, with both a presidential election and national 
parliamentary election set to take place. At the opening session of the Grand National 
Assembly on October 1, President Sezer warned the members of parliament (still led by 
the majority AKP): “The danger of Islamist reaction is one of the threats against our 
internal security…it can be seen that the reactionary threat has not changed its objective 
of altering the basic characteristics of the state.” 377  The following day, Büyükanıt 
extended this warning with an impassioned speech at the Turkish military academy, 
criticizing the national police, the AKP, intellectuals, and other parties outside the 
security establishment. Büyükanıt further dismissed EU criticism of the military’s role in 
politics and accused the AKP government of engaging in “Islamic reactionism.” 378 
Future Chief of General Staff Ilker Başbug was also involved in TSK efforts to reassert 
authority and claimed: “Protecting our republic’s principles has nothing to do with 
domestic politics. It is a duty given to the armed forces laid down by law. Those who 
compare the Turkish armed forces with the armies of other countries are not aware of the 
facts of Turkish society and its history.” 379  Between the change from Özkök to 
Büyükanıt and the loss of EU pressure, the TSK prepared to make 2007 a year of open 
contestation. The TSK would challenge the reforms yielded to the civilians under Özkök, 
while maintaining that the office of president should be a bastion of secularism. 
Under the 1982 constitution, the Turkish president is elected for a single seven-
year term by the parliament from amongst its own members. A maximum of four rounds 
of elections take place, with a two-thirds majority being necessary in the first two rounds 
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to successfully elect a president, but only an absolute majority on the last two rounds.380 
In practice, the d’Hondt system of representation has necessitated that most governments 
form by coalition and therefore most presidential nominations a “compromise candidate.” 
Before 2007, apart from the self-appointed military presidents, only one political party 
had the means to successfully elect one of their own members and did so with the 1983 
election of Turgut Özal. According to Article 102 of the 1982 constitution, failure to 
produce a majority of votes in the fourth round of elections triggers dissolution of the 
parliament and new parliamentary elections.381  In 2007, the AKP maintained a pure 
majority just shy of two-thirds of parliamentary seats owing to the 2002 national election 
results, giving them the ability to nominate and elect one of their own to the office of 
president. That candidate was former party head Abdullah Gül. 
In the run-up to the elections, the minority party CHP actively lobbied other 
political parties to boycott the election. This was an attempt to deprive the AKP of the 
necessary votes and force early parliamentary elections, in which the CHP thought they 
would perform well.382 The first round of elections was held on April 27, when Gül 
received 357 votes (the AKP held 353 seats) with only 361 deputies present. The CHP 
then argued that a quorum of 367 members was required for the vote to be valid (184 is 
required number according to the 1982 constitution) and took the issue to the 
Constitutional Court in an effort to nullify the vote.383 Just before midnight on April 27,
 
2007, the military issued what became known in the press as the “e-coup,” a document on 
the official TSK website titled “On reactionary Activities, Army’s Duty.” 384  As in 
previous military interventions in politics, the military made clear that their role stood for 
a certain vision of the state, claiming “it must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed 
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Forces do take sides in this debate and are the sure and certain defenders of 
secularism.”385 The same communiqué also contained the now standard military threat to 
intervene, claiming that, should circumstances necessitate, the military would display 
their “position and attitudes.”386 
Unlike the Welfare Party experience a decade prior, the AKP directly and 
publicly challenged the legitimacy of the military to interfere in electoral politics, with 
party spokesman Cemil Çiçek pointing out that, in democratic Turkey, the constitution 
demands submission of the military chief of staff to the prime minister.387 Demonstrating 
a shifting reality in Turkish politics, whereas previous military threats were typically 
honored by the party in power and cheered by those parties that stood to benefit from the 
intervention, the 2007 criticism of the military extended beyond just the subject AKP. 
Both center-right political parties, True Path and Motherland, attacked the legitimacy of 
military intervention. Even the Republican People’s Party stressed that the electorate, not 
the military, should handle a presidential election.388 Internationally, both the European 
Union’s Commission for enlargement and American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
condemned the military memorandum.389 
On May 1, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the CHP and Kemalists, 
breaking with years of parliamentary elections and holding that a quorum of 367 
members of parliament was in fact required to validate a presidential election. While the 
CHP celebrated the verdict and prepared for new elections with an eye to taking back 
parliament and keeping control of the presidency, the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan 
decried the court decision as a blatant assault on Turkish democracy.390 Though the AKP 
could have continued with additional rounds of elections until a failed fourth attempt, at 
this point, the party made a strategic decision to demonstrate a willingness to let the 
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voters decide the issue. Prime Minister Erdoğan called for early parliamentary elections 
to be held on July 22. Moving the elections up prior to a failed fourth presidential 
election allowed the assembly to stay in session, a key ingredient to AKP plans for the 
electoral season while also demonstrating that the party was confident in their standing 
with the electorate. 
C. OPEN CONTESTATION, 2007–2008 
The constitutional crisis of 2007 destroyed the illusion that the AKP was 
politically safe from the TSK and allied political interests in the Constitutional Court and 
CHP minority. For the AKP, bringing the military to heel became an existential task; 
politics could not allow both a dominant political party and a dominant politicized 
military. During 2007 and 2008, the AKP and the military/Kemalists would engage in 
complicated maneuvers attempting to establish support for their own position and 
undercut the legitimacy of the opposing institution. 
In conjunction with early elections, the AKP civilian politicians pushed new 
constitutional reforms in direct opposition to the stated positions of both the military and 
the Kemalist CHP.391 These constitutional changes sought to prevent future constitutional 
crises over presidential nominations by changing the number of votes needed for a 
quorum. In response, the Constitutional Court (whose membership still included two 
judges from the military as required by the 1982 constitution) accepted a closure case 
against the AKP, the chief prosecutor charging the party with violation of the 
constitutional principles of secularism. When the AKP narrowly avoided political 
dissolution, the politicians began aggressive pursuit of investigations into military coup 
planning, which would eventually conclude with the resignations of the heads of each 
branch of the armed forces in 2011. 
1. 2007 National Elections, Constitutional Reforms, and the Presidency 
The inability to successfully conclude the presidential election in parliament and 
the subsequent constitutional crisis precipitated by the CHP challenge to Article 96 of the 
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constitution allowed Prime Minister Erdoğan to move national elections forward from 
November to July 2007. Article 77 of the Turkish Constitution requires parliamentary 
elections every five years, traditionally held in the fall to encourage maximum 
participation.392 Moving the elections into July would lead to reduced voter turnout due 
to traditional Turkish summer vacations, but was motivated by twin desires: breaking the 
presidential deadlock and using the crisis to demonstrate greater voter support for the 
AKP. By moving the elections into July and pushing constitutional referendums through 
parliament during the earlier campaign season, the AKP could generate additional 
support for their policies and therefore greater electoral success. 
The spring constitutional crisis motivated the AKP to begin constitutional reforms 
even before the July elections. Having successfully improved the national economy, 
extended personal and religious freedoms, and increased formal control over the armed 
forces during the previous parliamentary session, from 2002 to 2006, the AKP now 
moved to consolidate those gains permanently and prevent future military challenges. 
Constitutional changes to the judicial and executive branches of government were key to 
these efforts. In June, Prime Minister Erdoğan convened a group of constitutional 
professors to begin drafting a new constitution in line with the AKP election platform and 
that would add additional controls to the increasingly isolated military. 
From the outset, the AKP campaigned on a constitution that advanced the interest 
of all civilians and was designed as a social contract in line with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 393 
Ultimately, the goal was to deliver a constitution predicated on the rights of the citizens 
rather than the rights of the state. The most important changes submitted by the drafting 
committee targeted those institutions that prevented the voters from exercising broad 
freedoms that had been hallmarks of legislation enacted by military juntas. In the run-up 
to the 2007 national elections, civilians were writing a draft constitution without military 
oversight for the first time since the inception of the Republic in 1923. However, for the 
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draft constitution to have a chance at receiving a parliamentary vote, the AKP had to first 
win another election and secure the right to constitute another five-year government. 
The July elections featured 14 parties competing for seats in the Grand National 
Assembly.394 Owing to the 10 percent minimum threshold requirement, several political 
parties formed official alliances before the elections in order to gain access to parliament 
for their candidates. Most consequential was the alliance between the Kemalist CHP and 
the Demokratik Sol Partisi (Democratic Left Party or DSP), which was intended to 
increase the CHP’s ability to stymie AKP initiatives in parliament, and potentially even 
block the new presidential election that would follow the parliamentary elections.395 The 
CHP–DSP alliance ran a campaign targeting the qualifications of the AKP for continued 
leadership, accusing the party of posing an Islamic threat to the republic in addition to the 
charges of corruption that minority parties consistently accuse governments of in Turkish 
politics.396 As Figure 3 indicates, of the 14 parties to run candidates, only three crossed 
the 10 percent threshold to receive seats in parliament.397 
 
Figure 3.  Turkish political parties and share of national vote. 
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Propelled by anti-Kurdish sentiment and having run on a platform of allowing the 
TSK to completely destroy PKK camps (including those in Iraq), the nationalist 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party or MHP) received 14 percent of 
the national vote and 71 seats in parliament. The CHP–DSP alliance significantly 
underperformed expectations, garnering just 21 percent of the vote and 112 seats in 
parliament, a reduction of 66 seats from the previous session. As in 2002, the top party to 
emerge from the elections was the AKP; their share of the vote increased from 35 to 47 
percent.398 For the 2007–2012 session then, the AKP would again enjoy single party 
government with 62 percent of seats in parliament. 
The 2007 elections represent a significant vindication for the AKP, which became 
the first political party since 1954 to increase its share of the popular vote from one 
election to the next. While the CHP performed well on the Aegean coast, and the 
nationalist MHP on the Mediterranean coast, the AKP had parliamentary representatives 
from every geographic region of the country. In 80 of 81 provinces, voters elected an 
AKP parliamentarian; only the predominantly Alevi Tunceli province failed to send an 
AKP deputy.399 The 2007 elections also continued the trend of growing geographical 
AKP support, beginning in the west in 2002 and creeping east across the country, 
spanning from border to border by 2007.400 Thus, despite losing parliamentary seats, the 
election results demonstrated the first truly national political party recent Turkish history. 
William Hale asserts that, while a major popular endorsement of AKP policies 
and performance from the previous five years (especially economic performance), the 
2007 elections represented a stunning rebuke of the CHP and their election platform.401 
Of importance to the voters was the constitutional crisis revolving around the presidency, 
with a majority of voters claiming that the office of president was the most important 
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issue of the election.402 That is, would the military and minority party CHP be able to 
prevent the AKP from nominating and electing a president of their choosing despite 
significant voter support? Finally, by rebuking the military after the April 27 
memorandum, which threatened military intervention in presidential elections, and 
forcing its removal from the TSK website, the AKP demonstrated a confidence that 
national elections would return the party to power. 
The AKP had successfully campaigned on both their previous record in 
government as well as the promise to permanently alter the presidency to become more 
accountable to the people rather than other government institutions, such as the military. 
Indeed the military’s decision to intervene in the presidential process proved to be a 
serious miscalculation. While respectful of the military as an institution, voters had 
always voted against military backed politicians at the first opportunity following each of 
the 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 interventions.403 Most important for the AKP—as the 
party had publicly and directly challenged the authority and prerogative of the military 
during the constitutional crisis—the overwhelming election results for the party enabled 
AKP to bring the full weight of their political mandate to bear against the TSK following 
the elections. In the coming years, however, the military was reduced to quiet protest 
while the civilians curtailed military influence in both domestic and foreign policy 
areas.404 One description from the spring and summer of 2007 depicted a contest between 
the AKP and the military for the fate of the country, with the winner becoming the de 
facto sovereign and the loser permanently marginalized and without a national voice.405 
Having successfully increased their percentage of the vote following the dramatic 
economic turnaround of the previous several years, the new AKP government 
immediately used their political support to renew the very issue that caused the original 
constitutional crisis and necessitated early elections: the nomination of AKP Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül to the office of President of the Republic. Parliamentary 
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elections for the Gül nomination began on August 28, 2007, and initially looked similar 
to the previous election months. In rounds one and two, when a two-thirds vote by 
parliament is required, the vote failed. On the third round, by simple majority (held 
commandingly by the AKP with 62 percent of parliamentary votes), Abdullah Gül was 
declared the eleventh president of the Republic of Turkey. 
Upon confirmation, Gül also became the first openly Islamist president, as well as 
the first president to have his inauguration boycotted by the military on the grounds that 
Gül was not representative of the secular state. The opposition party CHP chairman also 
boycotted the ceremony, believing the Gül election represented a departure from the 
traditional role of president as outside party politics. For the AKP and supporters, 
securing the office of president was a major accomplishment in Turkish civil-military 
relations. 406  Any political party with a pure majority of parliamentary seats was 
constitutionally able to secure a president from their political party; however, in those 
cases where the party might have done so and the military challenged a candidate, the 
party in power acquiesced, nominating instead a candidate from another party or from the 
military itself. The inauguration of Gül as president represented the first time a majority 
party pushed a party member successfully past the combined opposition of the military 
and other political parties. With a majority government under the prime minister and a 
party member as president, the civilian politicians of the AKP enjoyed an unprecedented 
ability to pass legislation without fear of provoking a presidential veto. 
The Turkish president enjoys significant veto and nomination authority as a result 
of the expansion of presidential powers in the 1982 constitution. However, Turkey’s 
parliamentary system does not imbue the president with unilateral power to act alone in 
executive matters.407  Recalling that the 1982 constitution was crafted under military 
supervision and that passage of the constitution was coupled with the election of coup 
leader General Kenan Evren as president, the document granted extensive powers to the 
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office of president in all aspects of government: executive, legislative, and judicial.408 
Section “b” describes the wide breadth of executive prerogatives available to the 
president, which include presiding over the Council of Ministers, mobilization of the 
armed forces, appointing a chief of the General Staff, calling and presiding over the 
National Security Council, appointing and directing the activities of the state Supervisory 
Council (in charge of investigations), and appointing members of the Higher Education 
Council. 
Legislatively, the president has the authority to veto laws and promulgate laws, 
but the most important power is the ability to appeal to the Constitutional Court for 
annulment of laws or provisions therein, effectively giving the president the ability to 
appeal laws before the Constitutional Court that the president was unable to permanently 
block.409 When the president has been a former military officer or sympathetic to the 
military, this power has effectively rendered reform efforts toothless. Anything legislated 
by parliament could be undone at the Constitutional Court and, owing to the original 
construction of the court, frequently was.410 
While most democracies enjoy a form of checks and balances, Article 104, 
Section “c” of the 1982 constitution also grants the president substantial judicial 
authority, specifically the powers to: 
Appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the 
members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the 
Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the 
members of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the 
Supreme Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme 
Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.411 
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That is, the president has the power to refer legislation passed against their veto to 
the Constitutional Court for review, the members of which court the president also 
appoints. In addition to appointing judges, the president also appoints public prosecutors; 
specifically those charged with bringing closure cases against political parties to the 
Constitutional Court. 
As the military has effectively maneuvered their own member into the presidency 
multiple times since multi-party elections began—and as the language of Article 104 
represented the express desires of the military and future President General Kenan 
Evren—the judicial provisions in Article 104 become even more powerful (and 
perpetual) bastions of potential military control in politics. When the military overthrew 
governments and installed a pliable president (or a recently retired officer), that president 
could then appoint Constitutional Court judges and prosecutors who would pursue the 
political purposes of the military. Rather than the apolitical institution envisioned by 
Turkish constitution, the office of president represented a key part of military tutelage 
over civilian political parties. For all of these reasons, securing the office of president by 
the civilian AKP in the face of a concerted and multi-pronged attack by opposition forces 
represented a colossal victory for civil-military relations and the AKP as a political party. 
The AKP pushed a candidate against the express wishes of both the opposition CHP and 
the TSK, lost a constitutional court case regarding the necessary quorum, held early 
elections, then pushed the same candidate again—after increasing their share of the vote 
by 12 percent—and eventually won control of the presidency. 
After again earning the right to form a government without coalition partners, the 
AKP delivered the proposed constitutional reforms in August 2007. Not surprisingly, the 
major changes aimed at reducing the role of the military in politics by curtailing the 
power of the president, changing the way that appointments are made to the 
Constitutional Court, and making it much more difficult to ban political parties.412 If 
passed, the new reforms would alter the presidency to be elected by a popular vote rather 
than a parliamentary vote to a renewable five-year term (as opposed to a seven-year non-
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renewable). Simultaneously, the reforms would transfer many of the nominating powers 
of the president to parliament, chief among those being seats on the Constitutional Court, 
the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. In addition to making it more 
difficult to ban political parties, the 2007 constitutional reforms also recommended 
abolishing the provision that party members in a closed party also automatically receive 
an individual five-year ban. 413  In efforts to increase popular participation (thereby 
keeping the government accountable to voters and increasing electoral competition) 
governments would be shortened from five-year to four-year terms of office, and 
parliament would require only a quorum of one-third for all sessions and decisions 
(directly targeting the ability of minority parties to force additional parliamentary 
elections).414 On October 21, these changes were approved by referendum.415 
Collectively, these reforms aimed at continuing the accretion of power from the 
Kemalist institutions towards the elected parliament, thereby allowing the AKP (and 
future parties) additional formal control over the armed forces. 416  Having lost the 
elections and the presidency, only one avenue remained for those parties targeted in the 
AKP reform recommendations: a closure case against the AKP before the Constitutional 
Court. Regardless of the election results or presidential election, a successful closure case 
would ban the party and members, and hand the government to the minority political 
parties. 
On February 27, 2008, the prosecutor filed suit before the Constitutional Court to 
overturn two recently passed constitutional amendments that lifted the headscarf ban on 
university campuses. The ratification of these amendments by the AKP and President Gül 
handed the secular Kemalists the ammunition needed to pursue a closure case. On March 
14, 2008, the chief public prosecutor filed a case before the Constitutional Court to ban 
the AKP, including the prime minister and the president, as well as another 40 AKP 
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members of parliament.417 A successful case would effectively destroy the AKP and 
Turkish government, and likely lead to significant rollbacks on the control mechanisms 
established over the military during the previous six years. 
The eleven judges of the Constitutional Court met daily during the last week of 
July, attempting to reach a verdict while the public and international community waited 
to see if a popularly elected government would be dissolved by the very court the 
government was attempting to reform; many observers were holding that a closure 
verdict would lead to political chaos.418 The case was described as a “war for power 
unfortunately bordering on civil war” between the elected AKP and the secular 
establishment supported by the CHP—and ultimately benefitting an independent 
military.419 As seven judges were necessary for a closure verdict, and eight of the eleven 
presiding judges were appointed by staunchly secularist President Ahmet Sezer (replaced 
by Gül in 2007), many suspected that the dissolution of the AKP and government was 
imminent.420 
On July 30, 2008, the Constitutional Court voted 10 to 1 that the AKP was guilty 
of being a “focal point of anti-secular activities,” and cut public funding for the party by 
50 percent.421 The only vote against cutting funding was cast by the president of the 
Constitutional Court Haşim Kılıç. More critically, Kılıç also cast the last outstanding vote 
on closing the party on July 30, two full days after the other ten judges had cast their own 
votes. Kılıç voted against closure, and with his vote the tally stood at 6 votes for closure 
and 5 against. With a 7–4 verdict required for closing a political party, the AKP survived 
by one judicial vote an existential threat against the party at the peak of their electoral 
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support, and directly contributed to the increasingly hostile tone that the AKP would take 
with the security establishment.422 
In hindsight, it would be difficult to overstate the ramifications of 2007–2008 for 
Turkish civil-military relations. In the face of every institutional challenge erected by the 
military following previous interventions, the civilian AKP emerged victorious, riding a 
growing wave of electoral support. The party survived a constitutional crisis surrounding 
presidential elections, stood up to a military intervention attempting to dictate the terms 
of the presidential election, and won an overwhelming victory in national elections. The 
party also won support for additional constitutional reforms and survived a constitutional 
court case challenging the very right of the party to remain in politics. Significantly, each 
of these victories occurred without consideration for EU accession (support for which had 
previously waned) and in the face of an increasingly nationalistic social setting. Electoral 
competition would expect, following this series of electoral victories, that the AKP would 
increase their control and push for additional military reforms. What actually happened 
was that the AKP emerged from the challenges of 2007–2008 increasingly determined to 
put the threat of military intervention permanently behind them, and to consolidate 
Turkish civil-military relations to permanently favor elected politicians. 423  The 
opportunity to accomplish both was handed to the AKP in the form of a devastating 
revelation of military coup plans against the government, the so-called Ergenekon 
investigations. 
D. CONSEQUENCES, 2007–2011 
In Turkish lore, Ergenekon was a mythical valley that sheltered ancestral Turks 
until they were led out by the grey wolf Asena. In modern Turkish history, Ergenekon is 
the largest corruption investigation in Turkish history, examining military coup plots 
against civilian governments, specifically the AKP. What began in 2007 blossomed into 
wide-ranging probes that have indicted military leaders and even former presidents. 
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Following the contestation between the AKP and the secular security sector in 2007 and 
2008, the focus of the AKP politicians moved towards permanently removing the threat 
of a military coup from Turkey. To accomplish that task, the government empowered 
Ergenekon investigators to leave no stone unturned, and in the process, completely 
upended the balance of civil-military relations, this time permanently in favor of the 
civilians. In their prosecution of coup plots, the AKP government also correctly read 
popular outrage in society over the relationship between previous governments, the 
military, and organized crime, as was uncovered after the Sursurluk scandal discussed in 
Chapter II. The popular notion of a “Deep State” consisting of elites in the military, 
government, and institutions whose aim was to perpetuate the Kemalist state at all costs 
was a popular fixture during the coup trials and elections held in 2007 and 2011.424 
Indeed, the Ergenekon trials themselves were originally presented as a necessary 
challenge to the “Deep State” apparatus.425 As a party formed after and apart from the 
scandals, elected specifically to combat government corruption in 2002, the AKP was 
able to parlay fears of the “Deep State” and anger over coup plans—as well as civil 
unrest from the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink by a Turkish nationalist—into 
voter support for the party. 
Shortly after the parliamentary elections in 2011 delivered an unprecedented third 
consecutive victory for the AKP, with a still-increasing percentage of the vote, the four 
most senior commanders in the Turkish Armed Forces would collectively resign over the 
ongoing coup investigations. After a decade in power, the AKP had not only won six 
consecutive elections in resounding fashion, but had survived every assault possible and 
had so forcefully taken control of the military that the chiefs of services tendered to 
civilians what they had previously demanded from civilians—resignation. 
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1. Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz): Investigations and 
Implications 
Ergenekon began in June 2007 when a cache of hand-grenades, fuses, and TNT 
molds were discovered in a Trabzon residence rented by ultra-nationalists. Subsequent 
raids of former military officers and non-commissioned officers uncovered additional 
weapons and high explosives. The purpose of Ergenekon was to provide a continuous 
ability to execute coups against civilian governments, specifically that of the AKP.426 
Ergenekon symbolized the institutionalization of the February 28 Process, a permanent 
infrastructure for maintaining military control over political processes. 427  The effort 
included the assistance of hundreds, if not thousands, of senior military officers and allied 
civilian experts in the media, academia, and legal system. As the investigations 
continued, press reports sourcing those close to the investigation linked the grenades to 
terrorist attacks on national/secularist institutions and media outlets, contributing to the 
thesis that the nationalists were targeting their own allies in order to cast doubt on 
conservatives.428 Owing to the rapidity that the investigations were moving, the first 
indictment against Ergenekon conspirators, lodged in July 2008, was riddled with 
inconsistencies, mistakes, and ran over 2,000 pages. While the pro-AKP media lauded the 
investigations, initial evidence of widespread conspiracies to commit coups against the 
government was thin.429 
Investigations and raids continued alongside the presidential elections, 
constitutional referendums, and the AKP closure case, and accelerated after the 
conclusion of the latter. In March 2009, a second indictment of over 1,900 pages brought 
charges of conspiracy against dozens of nationalists, again with mostly circumstantial 
evidence and without a “smoking-gun.” In most cases, raids were conducted in the 
middle of the night, and suspects were held without legal counsel for lengthy periods 
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while undergoing police interrogation.430 Despite these complaints, future appeals to the 
European Court of Human Rights, asserting that suspects were denied fair trials, were 
rejected by the court, which recognized Ergenekon as a terrorist organization attempting 
to overthrow the government.”431 
As investigations expanded, each raid and discovery yielded intelligence leading 
to the next link in the chain, with hundreds of journalists, military personnel, and others 
arrested in conjunction with Ergenekon. Advocates of the investigations cited the 2004 
discovery of the former naval forces commander’s diaries that listed a multitude of coup 
plans; using titles such as “Blond Girl” and “Moonlight,” the plans were crafted 
alongside the land and air forces commanders and with the assistance of the 
gendarmerie.432 Virtually anything related to the armed forces came under increasing 
scrutiny as investigators spent years researching computer files, wire-taps, and personal 
diaries. Searches of the homes of former military flag officers suspected of association 
with Ergenekon revealed detailed documents outlining plans to use private security firms 
for intelligence purposes, and linked the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Center 
(OYAK) to illegal surveillance.433 In addition to the intervention plans themselves, the 
military also laid the groundwork for explaining to both the domestic and international 
audience why a coup was enacted. To this end, propaganda campaigns utilizing 
university conferences, news articles, and websites were financed by the military to help 
generate the public sentiment necessary to intervene.434By crafting plans to “prepare the 
battlefield” for intervention, the military contradicted historical claims that the TSK only 
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intervened when necessary to preserve social order, instead showing that the military was 
willing to incite social unrest in order to justify interventions. 
The ever-increasing scope of the Ergenekon investigations continued to prompt 
new allegations. In 2009, the first three investigations were merged into a single court 
case. Additional cases, such as the 2006 murder of a Council of State judge, the Action 
Plan Against Reactionaryism, and an anti-government Internet campaign all made their 
way to the courtroom. In 2012, each of these and more were merged into one massive 
Ergenekon trial of 256 suspects held before the 13th High Criminal Court.435 
The complexities of Ergenekon grew such that a delineation was made to split the 
investigations into two cases: the first regarding an clandestine network imbedded within 
the existing military structure aiming to remove governments (Ergenekon); the second, 
including efforts aimed at inciting civil disobedience in order to justify intervention, was 
titled Balyoz (Sledgehammer).436 Plans for Sledgehammer included targeting mosques 
during Friday prayers, assassinations, and even initiating conflict with Greece, each with 
the intent to demonstrate a civilian government unable to control events and therefore 
necessitating a military intervention. Despite strong opposition to a politicized military, 
Turks generally found Ergenekon unsurprising and perhaps uninteresting. 437  Activist 
militaries with four successful coups under their belt do not simply melt away into an 
apolitical barracks lifestyle. Sledgehammer, however, was of a uniquely different nature. 
Targeting the very individuals that a military is charged with protecting in order to effect 
political outcomes represented a complete anathema to the public, and had a crushing 
effect on public opinion of the military.438 
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2. 2009 Local Elections and 2010 Constitutional Referendum: AKP 
Maintains Control 
Under the shadow of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, local elections held 
in 2009 continued the AKP streak of four consecutive elections as the preferred party. As 
in 2005, the 2009 elections saw a wider spread of votes across political parties than the 
2002 and 2007 national elections. As local elections serve to fill municipal political roles, 
this vote spread is not really surprising. What is important was the continuing prevalence 
of support for the AKP despite enormous international and domestic crises from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, PKK violence, internal military insurrections, an international financial 
crisis, and secular versus Islamic domestic unrest. In a country where elections frequently 
sport over two dozen parties to choose from, that the AKP received a percentage of the 
vote equal to the next highest two parties combined is not insignificant. And, as 
Hypothesis #1 and electoral competition predicts, each of these elections increased the 
ability of the AKP to pursue preferred policies and to increase control over the Turkish 
Armed Forces, indeed the most critical aspect of the 2010 constitutional referendum were 
expanding the authority of the parliament and President in order to prevent military 
interference.439 
As the 2007 elections showed the CHP and the TSK that Turks still preferred 
AKP governance (even if that mean an associated pious Muslim as President), the 2009 
elections demonstrated that the electorate had not broken faith with the AKP over the 
aggressive trials against military officers charged with coup plots. Overall, the percent of 
the vote from the 2007 national to the 2009 local elections were remarkably similar, with 
the CHP and the MHP increasing their vote share by a few percentage points at AKP 
expense. Essentially, the 2009 elections proved neither a ringing endorsement of the AKP 
and Ergenekon investigations, nor a vindication of the military and allied parties such as 
the CHP. As the party in power, however, the AKP could still claim that voters approved 
of their leadership more than the next two parties combined. 
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On the heels of the 2009 local elections and during the ongoing coup trials, Turks 
had yet another opportunity to express support or disapproval for key AKP policies, this 
time one of the most significant in the entire AKP period. In September 2010, Turks took 
to the polls for the AKP-proposed constitutional referendum, which voters passed with 58 
percent of the vote in favor of changes aimed at increasing democratic freedoms and 
further eroding military privilege. 440  The most important changes in the referendum 
targeted the judiciary branch, increasing the power of the president and parliament over 
the appointment of judges to the highest courts, thereby reducing the grip that the military 
and secularists had maintained for decades. Though the vote initially seemed to match 
typical national elections, with the heartland and rural areas in favor and the coastal elite 
areas against AKP initiatives, later reviews of the voting patterns reflected a less 
polarized electorate. Even in those regions that appeared to vote against the constitutional 
referendum, nearly 40 percent of the voters still voted for the constitutional changes. 
Generally speaking, support for the constitutional changes existed nationwide, with some 
geographical locations (central Anatolia) more supportive than others.441 
While elections in general can be considered a referendum on the performance of 
a specific political party or candidate, and occasionally reflect support for an issue or 
platform. According to Burak Özpek however, the 2010 constitutional referendum was 
always about expanding democratization and limiting the role of the military and security 
sector elites.442 In interpreting the meaning of the constitutional referendum results, there 
could be no confusion; the voters chose to change their constitution to diminish the role 
of the military and increase the power of elected representatives. Against the backdrop of 
coup trials, Turks spoke decidedly against a politically active military. 
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3. Coup Trials: Past Meets Present 
What began in 2008 would not conclude until 2013, and what began with a cache 
of grenades and a plot to overthrow the AKP would blossom into an indictment against a 
half-century history of military interventions in government. From the outset of the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, some made the case that the investigations were 
politically motivated and lacked credible evidence of senior military officers leading 
counter-government movements within the military.443 As the investigations expanded, 
however, prosecutors gained access to new files and continued to find linkages between 
coup plots, anti-government propaganda campaigns, and military leadership. With over 
half of all Turkish admirals and a tenth of all army generals imprisoned by 2012, it was 
inevitable that some implicated would have knowledge of events and share information 
that would help prosecutors build cases against other accused.444 
In 2010, the prosecution achieved one such breakthrough. A 2003 report detailing 
aspects of Sledgehammer, thought to be destroyed per military routine, was instead found 
stored in Turkish military archives.445 In another incident during the Sledgehammer trial 
in 2011, Lt. General Tevfik  zkılıç testified that, during a 2003 seminar, plans titled 
“martial law plan,” “rear area security plan,” and “state of emergency security plan” for 
post-coup management were discussed—instead of the official military plans that the 
seminar publicized. 446  Later in 2011, a female civilian suspect who applied to the 
military as a sociologist described being forced by the military to monitor and support 
anti-government propaganda websites to undermine AKP credibility.447 In addition to 
testimony, official files provided to the chief prosecutor also yielded significant evidence 
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of the plots, including signed military plans for the “Action Plan against 
Reactionaryism,” detailing one of several named Ergenekon coup plots previously 
identified from naval diaries.448 
As evidence increased and suspects packed Turkish military prisons, some 
defendants initiated appeals to the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that 
evidence was inadmissible, arrest warrants were incorrectly processed, and the 
prosecution had overstepped legal jurisdiction.449 The ECtHR accepted and reviewed 
nearly thirty such appeals, and in each case determined that no violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights had been violated.450 The European ruling reinforced the 
domestic view that the coup trials were legitimate and necessary in order to root out the 
elements within the TSK that viewed military interventions as an acceptable domestic 
role for the armed forces. 
4. 2011 National Elections and Civil-Military Relations: Resignation 
Before the headlines on the constitutional referendum election could run out, 
Turks were again subjected to a campaign season. This time it was for the June 2011 
parliamentary elections, the first since the special elections necessitated by the 
constitutional crisis of 2007. In 2002 and 2007, opposition parties expected greater voter 
support and underestimated how well the AKP would perform. In 2011, however, most 
analysts expected a third consecutive AKP government.451 In a now common occurrence 
for elections and the AKP, the 2011 vote was yet again unprecedented in Turkish 
political history when the AKP became the first political party ever to win three 
consecutive elections while increasing their share of the vote each election. As in 2002 
and 2007, voters granted the AKP a majority of parliamentary seats, the ability to form a 
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single-party government, and did so with a vote percentage far in excess of that cast for 
other political parties.  
Counting local, special, and constitutional elections, the 2011 elections increased 
to six the number of opportunities voters had to approve or rebuke the AKP. Each time 
they chose the former, prompting a frenzy of literature dedicated to analyzing the 
enormity of the AKP decade and what the future of Turkish politics might look like.452 In 
2011, the AKP received the most votes in 71 of 81 provinces and, for the first time ever, 
won the highest share of votes in all of the country’s seven voting regions.453 This 
geographical presence not only meant increased political support for the AKP, but also 
placed serious limitations on the ability of regionalized opposition parties to increase 
support at AKP expense, giving the AKP a significant advantage in the competition to 
stay in power.454 The 2011 elections also continued the trend of shifting power from the 
coastal cities to the Anatolian heartland. This area offered greater access to state 
resources as the AKP consolidated and expanded electoral support and rewarded those 
voting blocs that had been the backbone for the party since 2002.455 In the Southeast of 
the country, the oft-underrepresented Kurdish voter also showed significant AKP support, 
stemming from the party’s previous willingness to expand civil society to include 
Kurdish language, education, and broadcasting rights, often in the face of military 
opposition. 456  Regardless of the challenges placed before them—by the TSK, the 
Kemalist CHP, or other secular institutions—in each case, the AKP was able to overcome 
the threat through a combination of political savvy and persistent voter support. 
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Having lost every effort to prevent the AKP from placing the military under a 
civilian boot, and in the face of mounting adversity for military personnel stemming from 
the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations, multiple indictments, hundreds of 
arrests, and with no end in sight, in July 2011, the chiefs of the general staff, the army, 
the navy, and the army all resigned in protest. The resignations came just hours after the 
13th Court for Serious Crimes accepted the indictment demanding a life sentence for the 
General Hüseyin Nusret Taşdeler, commander of the Aegean army, for links to 
Ergenekon.457 Some pundits claimed the end of the coup era over, but this claim had 
been made prior to the transitions from military to civilian control.458 
Whether in 1972, 1983, or 1997, each time an analysts would claim that Turkey 
had moved beyond the point of democratization, wherein coups were no longer tolerated, 
the TSK successfully executed additional interventions. Political parties were banned and 
new rules promulgated to preserve military tutelage. What each of those periods lacked 
was a change in formal controls, followed by a demonstration of civilian strength that 
would actually legitimize claims of an end to the coup era. Unlike those previous 
occurrences, the July 2011 resignations were not an independent example of civilian 
authority, but merely the latest in decade-long ebb of military leverage. Only one service 
chief remained in his position, General Necdet Ozel of the Gendarmerie, who was 
promptly promoted by Prime Minister Erdoğan to the position of Chief of General Staff. 
Between 2002 and 2011, the AKP first increased formal controls over the 
military, such as limiting the National Security Council, reducing the strength of the 
military judiciary, and reforming the economic underpinnings of the military. Following 
the 2007 e-memo and subsequent constitutional crisis, the civilians continued to 
challenge the military, often directly, as through Ergenekon, Sledgehammer, and changes 
to the military promotion system. The mass resignation—in large part to protest the 
changing promotion system that favored civilian input over military seniority—had the 
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opposite effect of further handing control of military promotions to the civilians.459 A 
vacancy of the top positions in each branch caused a ripple effect down the chain-of-
command, with each new promotion opening a new job. Also, in each promotion, the 
AKP could (with control of the prime minister’s office and president) promote those 
officers to commands that were amenable to AKP interests. In this way, a mere four 
resignations can lead to major philosophical realignment within the armed forces’ 
leadership as certain officers are passed over in favor of those the AKP preferred. 
Civil-military relations would continue to evolve in Turkey, with each faction 
coming to terms with the new power relationship. In 2011, assessments that the coup era 
had ended (and that the era of civilian control was firmly in place) were more likely to be 
accurate because they were accompanied by constitutional, societal, and political changes 
that made not just coups less likely, but any military interventions aimed at coercing 
civilian policies. The generals resigned not because they believed Ergenekon trials would 
cease, but simply because there was no other course of action. To steal a phrase from 
Przeworski’s Democracy and the Market; democratization literature, civilian control 
exists when all parties accept civilian control as the only game in town. In 2011, the 
senior military commanders had no remaining options but to operate within the rules of 
the new civilian-controlled game.460 
In reality, the military simply came to this conclusion later than the civilians of 
the AKP who, despite a very recent contentious relationship with the military, did not 
devote even a single word to the military or to civil-military relations during the 2011 
election cycle, having already accepted that the military was no longer an existential 
threat to civilian governance.461  For the AKP, it was not necessary to campaign on 
military reform, because the party had already consolidated control through previous 
election cycles and coup trials. Instead of focusing the constitutional referendum on 
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curbing military power, the AKP focused on how to extend civilian control over the 
judiciary while working to avoid undermining the war-fighting capability of the TSK.462 
So confidant had the AKP grown in their control of the TSK (now populated with AKP-
friendly generals) that, after years of reductions in military spending by 12% during the 
previous decade, the first budgets to follow the 2011 elections increased military 
spending by 7.4 percent, with the Court of Auditors Law from 2011 set to monitor how 
the military spent the allocated resources for the first time.463 Having established proper 
roles apart from domestic security such as external defense, the civilians now saw fit to 
allocate resources to see those missions executed successfully. 
As electoral competition predicted, each successive election pushed the AKP to 
force greater reforms on the military, while crafting policies aimed at increasing voter 
support for the party in future elections. Over the course of the decade, support for an 
activist military simply dissolved amongst the populace as leadership changed due to 
coup trials so too did the political outlook atop the military hierarchy. The CHP 
campaigned aggressively for early elections in 2007 and in favor of the closure case 
against the AKP in 2008. By 2011, even the CHP abandoned their support for a political 
military. While decrying Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations, the CHP still 
recognized that the electorate would no longer tolerate an interventionist TSK.464 The 
2011 CHP election platform included radical changes to the role of the military, which 
was a shocking turn of events for a party that was founded in large part by former 
military officers. 465  The conversion of the CHP prior to parliamentary elections, 
combined with the resignations of the generals after the elections, removed any 
remaining challenges to constitutional changes. These reforms aimed at allowing 
governments to create a more representative Constitutional Court, and also included more 
constitutional reforms targeting the power of the military. All the major players in the 
Turkish civil-military relations dynamic had settled on the same conclusion: The will of 
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the electorate, in supporting the AKP at the ballot box on six different occasions in a 
decade, supported placing the TSK firmly under the control of an elected, representative 
government. 
While the narrative of civil-military relations in Turkey was by no means at a 
conclusion, 2011 was a watershed year in the transfer of actual control of the armed 
forces from the institution itself to the elected government. After 2011, civil-military 
relations would continue to find the water line, that point where things rest naturally 
between the politicians and the generals, but civilian control now consisted of both 
formal and actual control. What remained to be seen was how coup trials would 
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V. CONVICTIONS, CONSOLIDATION, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Following the 2011 elections and the resignations of the armed forces chiefs, the 
AKP civilians maintained legislative policies that aimed to increase both military and 
civilian politician accountability. Reforms passed since 2002, such as budgetary oversight 
and National Security Council composition, were implemented and monitored. Also, to 
increase politician accountability, the Turkish Parliament continued drafting a new 
constitution to replace the military’s 1982 version. 
The degree of change during the previous decade was stunning. The AKP went 
from an outside party elected to a majority—owing in part to a protest against the 
corruption and incompetence of previous political parties—to a party powerful enough to 
challenge the secular establishment in a presidential election. It successfully navigated a 
constitutional crisis as well a closure case before the Constitutional Court after just six 
short years in office and three election cycles. With the support garnered from successful 
policies, the AKP accomplished what no other political party had even attempted: a 
frontal assault on the most organized institution in the country, the Turkish Armed 
Forces. And, they won. Even the Kemalists of the CHP and other parties acknowledged 
the new realities of Turkish politics when amending their own electoral platforms in 2011 
to demand complete submission of the military to elected civilians.466 Not only had 
electoral competition changed the way the dominant AKP responded to the military, but 
it also forced opposition parties to alter their own stances in order to remain competitive 
in elections against the AKP. 
Before addressing the findings, this chapter first brings the Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer coup trial narratives to a conclusion and, in the process, briefly discusses 
the expansion of coup trials to include the February 28 Process from 1997, the 1980 
coup, and the 1971 “Coup by Memorandum.” Section A recaps the evidence presented in 
Chapters II though IV, while Section B offers revisits the research hypothesis—that 
electoral competition allows for increased civilian control over the military by discussing 
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the increasing reforms enacted by the civilian AKP following successful elections. 
Section C presents the findings from this dissertation, while Section D notes possible 
critiques of this analysis and discusses how criticisms might be reconciled. Lastly, 
Section E addresses policy implications for this research, as well as future considerations 
for Turkish civil-military relations moving forward. 
While effective civilian control of the Turkish armed forces can be traced to the 
pivotal events of 2011, the depth and breadth of the coup investigations were such that 
several cases would not come to a conclusion until 2014, over seven years since their 
beginning. In addition to the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer coup trials, charges would be 
brought against military officers who had participated in previous government 
interventions in 1971, 1980, and 1997, including former Turkish presidents. Because the 
constitution of 1982 included Temporary Article 15, which granted coup leaders 
immunity from prosecution for interventions, the AKP had to amend the constitution to 
allow for the indictment of those perpetrators. 467  Amending the 1982 constitution 
allowed for the prosecution of military officers for crimes committed three decades 
earlier.468 
From late 2012 forward, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer verdicts rolled in, with 
over 300 convictions in September 2012. These convictions reached former service chiefs 
and a current member of parliament, all charged with attempting to destabilize the 
government and create the foundation for a coup.469 In 2013, convictions continued with 
life sentences for multiple suspects including former Chief of General Staff General İlker 
Başbuğ, who was charged with supporting an online propaganda campaign against the 
AKP while serving as the highest military officer.470 Of the 275 defendants who were 
brought to trial for Ergenekon, over 90 percent were convicted for assisting coup plots. 
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Sledgehammer also had similar conviction rates, with 331 of 365 suspects 
convicted on charges of coup plotting and fomenting unrest in order to facilitate military 
interventions.471 Included in these convictions were 20-year sentences for former Navy 
and Air Force commanders. The Sledgehammer trials lasted for almost three years and 
presented over 5,000 pages of documents, including plans to bomb government buildings, 
mosques, and airliners.472 
In January 2012, while Ergenekon and Balyoz were still proceeding, the Ankara 
12th High Criminal Court accepted indictments against the 1980 coup leaders. If 
convicted, generals Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya faced life sentences without the 
possibility of parole.473 On April 4, 2012, with more than 500 co-plaintiffs protesting 
outside the courtroom, the trial began in Ankara, focused on crimes against the 
government and the nearly 650,000 people detained during the 1980 coup, 50 of who 
were executed.474 Then, in February 2013, prosecutors arrested nearly a dozen generals 
and admirals in conjunction with the February 28 Process in 1997. On February 27, 2012, 
five of the top military commanders during the period were arrested following testimony 
implicating them in the 1997 plot. Included in the arrests were the army commander and 
the deputy chief of general staff.475 The February 28 investigation also included civilian 
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conspirators against the government, such as the former Higher Education Board 
President Kemal Gürüz.476 
In addition to government officials, private organizations such as the Women and 
Democracy Association sought to join suit against the 103 defendants on trial for the 
February 28 Process, alleging that the coup also prevented the free practice of their 
democratic rights by restricting political freedoms. 477  Having successfully won the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, and having amended the constitution to remove immunity 
from coup leaders, the evolution of AKP government investigations into coups, from 
current to former coups decades past, forced Turks to question the entire legacy of their 
armed forces. If the AKP sought to gain lasting control over the armed forces, the goal 
had been accomplished; but was jailing former heroes and old men the narrative that the 
politicians wanted? 
In a conciliatory effort, the AKP parliament passed legislation on February 21, 
2014, to abolish the special courts created to try military officers who had participated in 
the 1971, 1980, and/or 1997 interventions. The measure also allowed retrial before 
civilian courts for the hundreds of officers convicted in the past several years.478 This 
olive branch, offered during a time of significant domestic pressure against Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, was an effort to prevent further erosion of military prestige. It also 
sought to bring closure to coup trials that had begun in defense of civilian government six 
years prior, but had transformed into prosecutions of crimes from previous 
generations.479 
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In 2012, parliament established the Coup and Memorandum Investigation 
Commission to study the nature and origin of Turkish coups, as well as the potential for 
future coups. The Commission concluded that, while Turkey was no longer likely to 
experience a coup d’état thanks to the AKP reforms, it was also impossible to state that 
another would never take place.480 The Commission recommended additional reforms to 
the Internal Service Law, increased professionalization of the armed forces, clear limits 
on martial law, and “improvements in democratization” such as a new civil society that 
would encourage a political culture that opposed military politicization.481 By targeting 
improvements to civil society and democracy in general, the commission aimed to further 
defend society from an interventionist armed forces. The recognition that many military 
interventions cannot succeed without some degree of support from the population returns 
us one final time to Hunter’s electoral competition and the notion that, ultimately, the 
voters decide where to set the boundaries for a politicized military. 
A. CHAPTER REVIEW 
Chapter I introduced Turkish civil-military relations and identified the problem 
that this dissertation has sought to answer: How did an inexperienced political party with 
no significant record of national government manage to succeed where dozens of other 
political parties failed, in asserting civilian control over a highly politicized Turkish 
Armed Forces (TSK)? After considering how various civil-military relations theories 
might be able to explain the change in control, each was unable to account for the 
particulars of the Turkish case study. The professionalism of the Turkish Armed Forces 
did not grow during the period from 2002 to 2011, and the civilians have yet to change 
professional military training and education to reflect an officer corps wholly subject to 
civilian control. Similarly, the TSK did not suddenly become loyal to the notion of civic-
republicanism of Janowitz; rather, the TSK continues to perpetuate their own vision of 
                                                 





what the Republic of Turkey should look like, often in direct contrast to that of the 
elected politicians.482 
The nature of historical Turkish civil-military relations, with four direct 
displacements of government, countless routine interventions, tutelary control over 
courts, the media, the MGK, all while maintaining good relations with favored political 
parties (the Kemalist Republican People’s Party or CHP). Combined with large public 
support, this history also stymied more recent civil-military relations theories such as 
structural, principle-agent, and concordance. While the high external threat environment 
helps explain why structural theory informs the AKP decision to maintain a military 
budget in-line with that of the United Kingdom, Turkey from 2002 to 2011, was not 
internally secure but externally threatened. Principle-agent theory expects that the 
military will at least start from the position that civilians have the right to be wrong 
(which the TSK has never accepted), and concordance only seeks to explain an absence 
of coups, without regard for who is actually in control of the state. Only electoral 
competition—with the premise that, given time, civilians will challenge and defeat an 
activist military by advocating a non-path dependent process—was able to explain the 
reversal in power between the military and the civilians. 
Chapter II helped set the stage for the AKP reforms by detailing the half-century 
of military interventions that made the civilian success so unexpected. On multiple 
occasions, the TSK took control of the government, implemented new laws in order to 
perpetuate military tutelage, and then handed the government back to those civilians the 
military deemed appropriate, typically former military officers. As recently as 1997, the 
military displaced an elected government, while the constitutional court banned the party 
from politics. However, the complete economic and social upheaval of Turkey from 1999 
to 2002 bred such voter disgust that the AKP was able to secure an absolute majority of 
parliamentary seats in 2002, an election whose results stunned elites and bought the party 
time to craft policies to improve their standing with the voters. 
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From policies improving the economy, to changes to religious and political 
freedoms, from 2002 to 2007, the AKP purposefully engaged particularistic (using 
resources to gain and keep constituents) and particularistic (endorsement of popular 
public policies) incentives designed to increase their voter appeal and provide protection 
against military interference.483 Chapter II discussed how these incentives early in the 
first AKP governments laid the foundation for formal control measures over the military 
while also meeting voter needs. For both the 2002 national and the 2004 local election, 
the AKP was the party of choice by a large margin. 
Chapter IV demonstrated that, while formal control increased during the first 
government, it was the national election in 2007 and the events surrounding this election 
that allowed the AKP to truly subject the military to civilian control. The constitutional 
crisis generated by the presidential elections of 2007 forced the AKP to call for early 
elections in the summer. The outcome of the parliamentary elections would decide who 
filled the office of president, and the opposition CHP had high hopes to cut into the AKP 
majority. Instead the AKP increased their share of the popular vote, and their candidate 
Abdullah Gül became president. As a last ditch effort, prosecutors brought a closure case 
against the AKP, accusing the party of actions against the Republic, by which was meant 
the public practice of Islam. 
When the closure case failed by a single vote, all available surreptitious paths of 
opposition to the AKP were closed. In response to efforts to destroy the party, the AKP 
prosecuted hundreds of military officers under the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations 
detailed in Chapter IV and previously in this chapter. After only a decade, the AKP had 
increased formal control through changes in the NSC, the budgeting process, budget 
oversight, military jurisdiction in the judicial branch and in civil-society, and defeated 
multiple attempts against the party’s agenda. Electoral competition and the forces created 
by competitive elections explain how this was possible. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS REVISITED 
Despite a long history of scholarly interest in civil-military relations in 
democracies, the Turkish case managed to receive scant attention in many classical works 
on the subject, which often focused on the fact that yet another intervention had taken 
place with a subsequent return to civilian “control.” In The Third Wave, Huntington 
includes the Turkish Armed Forces when discussing “the Praetorian Problem” of 
rebellious and strong militaries. Despite supposed support for the military, Huntington 
observes that Turkish voters immediately return civilians to power once the vote is 
returned—often those same civilians the military previously banned, as the citizens 
distinguish between supporting stability and supporting military politics. 484  Also, in 
Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington addresses the role of the military in 
the formation of the Turkish government. He notes that playing a major role in the 
founding of the country influenced the psyche of both the state and the military as Turkey 
transitioned to multi-party elections.485 Similarly, Finer draws attention to the unique 
character of Kemal Atatürk in commanding legitimacy after a military takeover, where 
most military officers who lead conspiracies tend to rapidly lose civilian support.486 
Missing from each of these brief discussions is an in-depth analysis of how the 
Turkish case relates to the civil-military relations canon. Despite possible inclusion in 
multiple areas—such as military rule after war, after regime change, or after state 
transformation—Turkey is often left out, an unfortunate circumstance considering how 
much information is available on the long history of Turkish civil-military relations.487 
With nearly a century of historical data, not including previous Ottoman civil-military 
relations, multiple interventions, constitutions, and transfers of control, Turkey is an ideal 
case study for the field, because it straddles so many possible research interests. For 
studies of democracies that suffer coups, authoritarian states transitioning to democracies, 
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and civil-military relations after regime change or after war, any and all would benefit 
from consideration of the Turkish case, which experienced all of these scenarios. The 
purpose of this dissertation has been to contribute to the expanding body of literature on 
Turkish civil-military relations by addressing the question: How did the civilian AK Parti 
gain and maintain control over the armed forces from 2002 to 2011? 
Owing in large part to the very reforms and expansions of civil-society discussed 
previously, a growing body of literature on Turkish civil-military relations is being 
produced within Turkish academic circles; some is produced by Turks completing 
advanced academic degrees abroad, and more by academics inside Turkey. Much has 
been written about how various interventions came to be, what institutions and laws have 
perpetuated the military tutelage, what reforms have been enacted under the AKP, and 
how these reforms affect Turkish civil-military relations. What this dissertation has 
attempted to explain is what enabled the changes. It is one thing to list reforms and to 
state what those reforms do; it is another to draw the line between elections, subsequent 
reforms, and the impact of each on the course of civil-military relations in a complex 
democracy. 
During the previous half-century of government, the Turkish military exercised 
significant political influence. This power dissolved during the first decade of AKP 
governance from 2002 to 2011. This research explains the shift in civilian control by 
employing Wendy Hunter’s electoral competition framework. That is, the AKP was able 
to exert control over the TSK from 2002 to 2011 through repeated electoral and policy 
successes that enabled emboldened AKP challenges of TSK prerogatives. 
From the initial electoral landslide in 2002, through three consecutive 
parliamentary elections and six opportunities for voters to reject the AKP and their 
policies, the voters demonstrated consistent and ever-increasing support for the Justice 
and Development Party. Electoral competition predicts that politicians will make use of 
programmatic and particularistic incentives to increase their voter support and extend 
their political lifespan. Particularistic incentives use the resources available to governing 
parties to sustain and expand the politicians’ support networks. Programmatic incentives 
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are those public policies—such as education, economic reform, and political freedoms—
designed to increase voter support.488 
Together, particularistic and programmatic incentives provide benefits for those 
who support the party and bring new voters into the party. In the Turkish case, 
programmatic incentives played a larger role in increasing civilian control of the military 
than did targeting the military budget to facilitate greater patronage networks. While the 
AKP did make significant inroads in reforming and monitoring the military budget, these 
efforts were less about increasing patronage than about decreasing and monitoring the 
extra-parliamentary sources of funding that allowed the military to operate independent 
of civilian oversight. AKP reforms of the military budget aimed to increase the 
survivability of themselves, as well as future governments, by reducing the autonomy of 
the military in the economic arena. 
When wielded, these programmatic and particularistic incentives can lead to 
challenges from a politically active military, and will lead the civilians to exert greater 
control over the armed forces. And, as Hunter observes: 
If electoral competition unleashes incentives to diminish military 
influence, the popular support that electoral victory certifies enhances the 
capacity of politicians to do so. A military organization would incur great 
risk and cost in taking forceful measures against a government with solid 
popular backing.489 
Not only does success at the ballot box provide the civilians the legitimacy to 
curtail an activist military, the magnitude of that success also correlates to the scope of 
reforms that politicians can attempt. The electoral competition hypothesis answers the 
question of how the civilian AKP gained control over the armed forces by asserting that 
repeated electoral victories allowed increasing challenges of the TSK, an assertion 
supported in Chapters III and IV. 
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C. FINDINGS 
It has been said that establishing a democracy means institutionalizing and 
subjecting all interests to uncertainty.490 In an authoritarian regime, the military will 
often have the ability to intervene when uncertainty creates an environment or conflicts 
that go against their interests.491 Inasmuch as fair and open elections allow voters to 
choose their government and avoid authoritarianism, it should be no surprise that these 
elections also mitigate the ability of the armed forces to intervene when on the losing end 
of a social conflict. While all elections demonstrate support for parties, platforms, and 
candidates, the political mandate generated by the results varies according to the type of 
election. Local elections demonstrate support for parties on local issues, while 
referendums demonstrate clear political support, or lack thereof, for a specific issue, such 
as a constitutional rewrite. Voter support for a national government, however, comes 
from parliamentary elections; the AKP competed in three such elections, in 2002, 2007, 
and 2011. After each election, the power between the civilian AKP and the Turkish 
Armed Forces moved demonstrably towards the civilians, eventually reducing the 
military to mass resignations following the 2011 parliamentary elections. 
In 2002, the AKP won 34 percent of the vote and 363 of 550 possible seats in 
parliament (roughly 66 percent).492 While the party’s 34 percent was more than triple that 
of the only opposition party to earn seats in the Grand National Assembly, the 178-seat 
CHP at 10.7 percent of the popular vote, less than half of all votes cast went for a party 
that received members of parliament. The election results were an unquestionable 
landslide wins for the AKP and provided the party with a significant advantage in 
parliamentary representation. Predominant sentiment amongst voters and experts alike 
was that the 2002 elections represented less an intentional desire for AKP leadership (the 
three-year-old party having no national record or accomplishments) than an absolute 
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mandate for a change in direction of the government.493 The disastrous 1990s had given 
the AKP the opportunity to demonstrate that their new political party could provide the 
leadership and policies that the Turkish voter demanded. 
1. 2002 Elections 
Following the 2002 elections, the AKP pursued policies designed first and 
foremost to meet voter expectations—such as economic improvement and increased 
political freedoms—and thereby increase their political support. The success of these 
particularistic and programmatic incentives, along with a supportive atmosphere for EU 
accession and the necessary military reforms to align with the acquis communautaire 
(combined with a comparatively liberal-minded Chief of the General Staff in General 
Hilmi Özkök), allowed the AKP to also pursue greater formal controls over the TSK than 
previous political parties could enact. Between 2002 and 2005, the TSK was creating 
multiple plans to remove the AKP from power while maintaining an outward appearance 
of toleration for limited military reforms. It is, therefore, likely that the military 
considered any powers relinquished as temporary losses. Once the public grew 
dissatisfied with AKP government, the military would simply take back the powers given 
up during the post-election euphoria. The Balyoz coup plot aimed to increase this 
dissatisfaction and thus accelerate the TSK return to politics. The Turkish military’s 
miscalculation, assuming that AKP leadership was a temporary condition, proved to be a 
major mistake. No formal controls enacted following the 2002 elections would be 
repealed, and the appearance of civilian control became self-sustaining. 
Correctly interpreting the election mandate, immediately following the 2002 
elections, the AKP began to enact policies demanded by the public in order to 
demonstrate their desire to constitute a government whose policies would cut across voter 
affiliation. The Urgent Action Plan sought to combat the widespread corruption that had 
plagued previous coalition governments, while the Law of Associations and reforms to 
the Diyanet sought to expand civil society by encompassing a wider variety of 
organizations. In the process, these measures were benefitting the AKP and increasing 
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their support network. Perhaps most importantly, the AKP maintained support for IMF 
reforms in order to help the country recover from the economic collapse that cast a 
shadow over the 2002 elections. Under AKP economic policies, the Turkish economy 
made a dramatic turnaround between 2002 and 2006, and it was better prepared to 
weather the international financial crises later on in the decade. 
Each of these policies proved to be popular amongst the voters. They enabled the 
AKP to enact multiple military reforms that would harmonize Turkey with EU standard 
practices, while also increasing formal civilian control and decreasing the leverage senior 
military officers had vis-à-vis politicians. Reforming the military and responding to 
particularistic incentives, the AKP parliament passed extensive control measures over the 
TSK budget and its allocation process, including increased oversight of the various 
institutions created to perpetuate military autonomy. These included the Defense Industry 
Support Fund, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, and the 
Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund. Using control of parliament after the 2002 
election and the success of these popular policies, the AKP expanded formal controls 
over the military in a wide variety of areas. It changed the nature of the National Security 
Council, passed constitutional reforms that reduced the role of the military in civilian 
advisory boards, and reduced the power of the military judiciary system. 
Between 2002 and 2007, AKP-led military reforms began to hem in military 
independence without leading to open challenges by the military. While busy making 
plans to oust the AKP, the military was immobilized by the popularity of the AKP and 
the effectiveness of the government in delivering sound policy. As formal control 
increased through legislative changes, the AKP was also able to transform the debate 
about the definition of state security, shifting the focus from political Islam and ethnic 
divisions to external threats and internal terrorism.494 In doing so, the civilians removed 
the prerogative of the military to determine threats apart from civilian oversight and also 
removed themselves from the list of potential state threats. 
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After the 2002 elections and the first AKP government—considered by some the 
results of an angry electorate rather than one with a specific intent to put the AKP in 
power—reform efforts were largely formal, non-threatening, and easily undone (should 
the military ever displace the AKP with another political party). These reforms increased 
legal control over the armed forces, but were untested, and also uncontested by the 
military. Following the 2007 elections, often viewed as a statement against military 
intimidation of elections, and the conflict surrounding the constitutional crisis and closure 
case against the AKP, the party’s reform efforts became direct challenges to TSK 
authority, both legal and moral. The Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations proceeded 
alongside constitutional reforms to further curtail military prerogatives.495 
2. 2007 Elections 
Precipitated by the collapse of presidential elections and the subsequent 
constitutional crisis of 2007, parliamentary elections in that year were, from the outset, 
substantially different from the 2002 elections. Voters knew who the AKP was, what the 
party’s policy objectives and platforms were, and how the party viewed the office of 
president (as a vehicle for party policy rather than an apolitical institution). Going into 
the 2007 elections, voters knew with certainty what would happen regarding the 
constitution and the office of president if they chose to return the AKP to power: The 
constitution would be amended to allow direct election of the president, who would have 
his/her power curtailed in favor of a stronger prime minister as the head of government. 
Pointedly, the AKP running for re-election in 2007 had made clear that they would seek 
additional reforms purposefully intended to increase the political power of the AKP by 
changing the ostensibly apolitical office of president to one filled by popular ballots 
instead of parliamentary procedures. Thus, while the opposition CHP and the military 
were stunned by the results, no one could conceivably make the case following the 2007 
elections that voters were not making clear decisions on the direction they wanted 
Turkish politics to go, namely against the military.496 
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With outgoing President Sezer warning voters that the secular republic faced its 
greatest threat since the foundation of the republic in the form of a political party 
incompatible with the state ideology of Atatürk, and with the full knowledge that an AKP 
victory would mean an AKP president (a vastly more powerful political party), the 
Turkish voters increased their support for the AKP from 34 percent to 46 percent. The 
AKP again formed a non-coalition government, this time with 341 out of 550 
parliamentary seats. The party did everything they had promised during the campaign, 
including the re-nomination of Abdullah Gül to the presidency and constitutional 
reforms. After surviving a closure case before the Constitutional Court by a single vote, 
the AKP then dramatically upgraded the size, scope, and aggressiveness of coup 
investigations against hundreds of senior military officers, both on active duty and 
retired. 
The military had explicitly challenged the AKP leadership and credentials during 
the presidential elections and the parliamentary election campaign season. By supporting 
the closure case, however, the AKP (fresh off the largest increase in voter support during 
elections in half a century) fought back with the full knowledge that, short of actually 
executing a coup, the military had no counter moves. Military legitimacy had been 
challenged by the AKP, undermined by the growing coup investigations, and questioned 
by voters who no longer trusted that the military had the best interests of society in mind. 
From 2007 to 2011, civil-military relations were a tale of a military and its leadership 
being indicted by public opinion and legal courts; on the former, the public lost faith in 
the military as an institution, while the latter indicted leadership for crimes against the 
government and the people. Any hope that the military had of regaining privileges given 
away during the first AKP government were lost following the events of 2007 and 2008. 
This too is as one would expect from electoral competition. A buoyant political party, 
moving further away from the last transition (1997) and increasing their electoral support 
at every opportunity, the AKP came to see the military as more than an obstacle, viewing 
it as an existential threat. The AKP was determined to permanently eradicate that threat. 
Constitutional reforms after the 2007 elections removed military roles from 
multiple civilian institutions, diminished the ability of the military to place officers on the 
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Constitutional Court, and made it far more difficult for the court to ban political parties or 
their members. Combined with the now ubiquitous Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations 
that cast ever-widening nets, the AKP used their support from the 2007 election to gain 
greater concessions from the military. Any hopes that the voters would turn against the 
AKP, based on coup trial proceedings, were dashed with the 2009 local elections and the 
2010 Constitutional Referendum. While neither would have cost the AKP the 
government, together they might have indicated a loss of electoral support for the party 
and the new direction civil-military relations had taken. Even when the coup 
investigations were at their most acrimonious, voters still turned out in record numbers to 
voice their support and cast their vote for the politicians and policies of the AKP. 
Electoral competition had shackled the courses of action available to the military. 
3. 2011 Elections 
Between 2007 and 2011, the military lost control of all of the institutions, laws, 
and norms that had allowed influence of political outcomes, even where those institutions 
directly impacted the readiness of the armed forces. The coup trials destroyed whatever 
credibility senior military leadership had left after decades of perpetuating a stunted 
democracy. Despite repeated military warnings that the coup trials were having negative 
consequences for morale and retention, the voters in 2011 increased their support yet 
again for the AKP. They did so with the full knowledge that this would mean the coup 
trials would continue and likely expand to include more suspects, precisely because the 
coup trials were the foremost issue of the election, with voters having already approved 
the constitutional referendum in 2010.497 By 2011, even the opposition parties had begun 
to demand more military reform, but the difference between the CHP and the AKP over 
the continuation of coup trials was a key dividing line between the parties and society. 
The arrest of journalists who were critical of the due process granted suspects by the 
government in February and March of 2011 prompted protest internally and abroad, and 
                                                 




evidenced the clear intent of the AKP to perpetuate the investigations until achieving 
total submission from the military.498 
After the 2011 elections and the resignations of the military chiefs, debate on the 
issue of final authority on the civil-military relations in Turkey was ended. The voters 
had supported the civilians and their policies through three parliamentary elections, two 
local elections, and a national referendum to change the constitution and further curtail 
military privilege. The AKP began to shift the focus from gaining control of the armed 
forces to consolidating that control, a shift that was possible when the AKP populated 
senior military positions with individuals who tolerated—though they did not overtly 
support—civilian control and an apolitical military. Nil Satana refers to this final 
consolidation as demanding the military elites’ recognition that society and government 
have agreed that democratic control of the armed forces is the preferred condition, and a 
matching behavioral shift from the military is the next logical step.499 As organizational 
attitude flows from leadership, by putting officers into positions of leadership that were 
more amenable to civilian control, the politicians aimed to encourage such a behavioral 
shift. 
In many cases, consolidation of control meant applying the formal controls passed 
years earlier, as in early 2012 when the Turkish Court of Accounts initiated an audit of 
military expenditures, the first in history. 500  Additional measures of civilian control 
included the 2012 parliamentary passage of regulations allowing the publication of audit 
reports of the military to give the public greater openness.501 In 2013, the AKP finally 
succeeded in amending the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which, as 
described in Chapter II, directly enabled military tutelage by giving the military the legal 
duty to protect the country from internal threats, often through coups. The amended 
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version makes it clear that the TSK role is national defense from external threats, 
emphasizing external over internal roles and responsibilities.502 
D. CRITIQUES AND CHALLENGES TO THE FINDINGS 
The evidence presented herein argues strongly for the effects of electoral 
competition and election results in influencing the course of civil-military relations after 
transitions to civilian rule. It is also important, however, to consider possible challenges 
or objections to these findings. While some may argue that other theories could explain 
the change in control under the AKP, those theories could not address the question: Why 
now? Turkey has had multi-party elections since 1946. If electoral competition claims 
that elections will drive civilian control, why did it take half a century to come to 
fruition? In addition to this challenge, one might argue that the specific set of 
international and domestic pressures present during the 2000s played a greater role than 
election results. Finally, assuming each of these can be successfully defended, a final 
protest against the arguments in this dissertation might be that if the electoral competition 
logic is in play, then we should observe greater reductions in the military budget than 
actually took place under the AKP, because budget reductions were a key component in 
the Brazilian case as analyzed by Hunter. Each of these potential challenges merits a 
response, none of which, however, undermine the conclusion that electoral competition 
explains the increase in civilian control under the AKP from 2002 to 2011. 
If competitive elections drive inexorably towards civilian control over the 
military, why did elections in Turkey not facilitate this transfer of power sooner than 
2002? Perhaps more powerfully, though active under the Ottoman Empire, the modern 
Turkish Armed Forces remained largely out of politics until the advent of multi-party 
elections. Does that mean that electoral competition triggered the political interventions? 
Of these questions, the latter is swiftly deflected with consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding both the beginning of multi-party elections and the 1960 coup. As Chapter II 
examined, the TSK has been consistent in their position that the Republic of Turkey, as 
established by Atatürk, was entrusted to the armed forces. One position the TSK 
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stridently upheld was the severe laïcité implemented at the founding of the republic, and 
a reason for military suspicion of Islamist parties and politicians.503 
Under single-party rule of the Kemalist CHP from 1923 to 1946, however, there 
would be no reason for an active military. On the contrary, it was the authoritarianism of 
the non-Kemalist Demokrat Parti that prompted the 1960 military coup and a new 
constitution favoring a politicized military.504 According to Hunter, the mere appearance 
of infringement on military interests (of which national stability and Kemalism are 
essential components) will prompt military interference in politics unless there is actual 
civilian control.505 It is important to note that Stepan points out that situations can exist 
where low conflict between the military and civilians takes place alongside high military 
prerogatives. 506  This condition occurs because the power asymmetry between the 
civilians and the military is such that civilians simply accommodate themselves to the 
military prerogatives.507 This scenario is reflective of Turkey in between interventions, 
such as in the early 1990s when observers convinced themselves that Turkey had 
developed past the point of military tutelage, and from 1923 and 1956 when the Kemalist 
CHP governed under single party rule. The scenario, however, is not reflective of the 
AKP governments, who never accommodated themselves to military prerogatives, 
instead constantly chipping away at them. That being said, multi-party elections did not 
trigger an activist military; the Turkish Armed Forces is not opposed to civilian 
government in principle, but in practice. While the armed forces have considered Islamist 
parties a threat, parties from across the political spectrum have been banned for crossing 
paths with the military over Kemalism and the strict adherence to those principles in 
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government.508 In each case, the primacy of security issues as interpreted by the TSK led 
to party closures.509 
If multi-party elections did not, in and of themselves, cause the military 
interventions, what prevented the consolidation of civilian control over the military for so 
long? The answer is that, despite the fact that the initial conditions and constraints 
following a transition from military junta to electoral democracy does not create 
permanent limits on the democracy and civilian control, electoral competition predicts 
growing civilian control the further countries move from a transition.510 That the Turkish 
politicians entered office with a firm awareness of power-relationship between the 
military and the civilians also demonstrates the importance of political awareness in 
pushing for greater civilian control. 
The powers of electoral competition take place over time, as political parties that 
do not face reelection (because they are disbanded) cannot effectively wield the 
programmatic and particularistic incentives necessary to increase their political support 
and challenge military privilege. 511  Each instance of a military evicting an elected 
government should be considered a form of transition. Despite the fact that in 1971 and 
1997 the Turkish military did not physically take the reins of government, they did effect 
a transition—from a government elected by the voters to one operating with the approval 
of the military. And, as discussed in Chapter II, each military intervention in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997 also added additional military privileges and adjusted the laws and 
institutions that set the boundaries of Turkish politics. 
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From the first multi-party elections in 1946, until 2011 and the mass military 
resignations, the most consecutive elections to take place without an intervention, and 
therefore transition, were the four between 1980 and 1997. Four election cycles, however, 
is one more than the AKP enjoyed between 2002 and 2011. If electoral competition 
explains changing civilian control, where was the change from 1980 to 1997? Civilians 
were unable to force military reform between 1980 and 1997 for several reasons. The 
first reason was that the 1980 coup leader Kenan Evren assumed the presidency from 
1980 to 1989, thereby insuring that final authority for laws executed rested with the 
military despite the appearance of civilian leadership. The second reason is that only 
during the 1983 and 1987 elections did a single party, the Motherland Party in each case, 
earn enough votes to form a government without a coalition. This is important because, 
as Hunter makes clear regarding the Brazilian case, legislatures suffer from a collective 
action problem, the desire to pursue patronage can prevent representatives from working 
together against military authority. 512  This feature is even more pronounces in a 
parliamentary system where even the Prime Minister is governs alongside his party as 
opposed to a president who is directly elected and accountable only to voters. 
The collective action problem made it even easier for coup leader Kenan Evren 
president to check the unified government throughout the tenure of each, opposition 
parties could benefit from Motherland being rendered powerless. With a new 
constitution, new legal institutions protecting the military tutelage, and a military general 
as president, the enormity of the military transition was too much to overcome. As the 
elections continued and civilians could have garnered the public support necessary to 
challenge the military, the vote fractured. Throughout the 1990s, no political party could 
demonstrate major political support. 
Only in 2002 did another political party receive enough votes to form a single-
party government. And, as the coup trials would prove, while the military was 
accommodating of formal changes to civil-military relations, the TSK was also crafting 
and refining plans to unseat the AKP. During this period, however, the AKP worked 
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furiously to wield the programmatic and particularistic incentives necessary to earn an 
electoral mandate sufficient to deter military intervention. Without a clear voter mandate 
in support of the AKP rather than against other parties in 2002, the military and secularist 
allies did challenge the AKP—through coup plans and by preventing a presidential 
election. The deadlock was broken only after the 2007 elections, wherein the Kemalist 
CHP expected to challenge the AKP for government, but instead voter support for the 
AKP actually increased by 12 percent. It was this second election that subdued the 
military via the clear mandate for the AKP policies and presidential nominee, in 
conjunction with the previously increased formal control mechanisms. 
The second potential challenge to the evidence presented in this document, that 
the increase in formal control was due to the unique combination of domestic and 
international pressures rather than electoral competition, is essentially an argument in 
favor of a structural analysis. That the domestic unrest of the 1990s contributed to the 
AKP election is generally accepted, and argued previously in Chapter III. That the 
combination of a moderate as the Chief of General Staff and a national attitude of 
excitement over EU accession from 2002 to 2005 afforded the AKP a brief window to 
govern without an overtly excessive military opposition is similarly acknowledged and 
accepted. However, while these conditions enabled an increase in formal (legal) control 
during the early AKP administration, none of these factors was present during the open 
contestation during 2007 and 2008. While I have argued that the waning EU interest and 
waxing nationalism contributed to a more active military, they did not similarly 
contribute to an atmosphere that allowed a successful military challenge. As a historical 
fact, the challenge to the party from a resurgent TSK during this period was put down at 
the ballot box. Therefore, to claim that the removal of the EU and a friendly Chief of 
General Staff was causal in a more active military is true, but does nothing to refute the 
point that this more hostile TSK was defeated by electoral forces, specifically, a very 
clear mandate from the voters that AKP changes to the office of president were 
supported. 
A final charge that might be leveled against this research is that not enough 
emphasis was given to the use of the military budget as a weapon against the TSK. This 
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dissertation treated the AKP challenge of the TSK budget in a fashion mirroring the 
civilian politicians themselves, as part of a multi-faceted program of incentives, all of 
which featured degrees of challenge to military autonomy whose intent was to ensure re-
election of the party. Indeed had the AKP attempted to reduce TSK budget authority 
between 2002–2006 without explaining the move as necessary for fiscal stability and 
economic recovery, it is highly likely the TSK would have rejected the reductions. 
However, reductions in average spending as a percentage of GDP dropped from 3.2 
percent during the period of 2000–2004 to 2.0 percent from 2005–2009 demonstrate the 
AKP willingness to use the budget to increase civilian control over the TSK.513 Over the 
AKP decade from 2002–2011 military expenditures were in reduced by 12% while 
average global military expenditures increased by 4.5% annually. Meanwhile, military 
cuts were diverted to education and national health care, providing even greater services 
for the voter, even as per-capita income tripled.514 
Chapter III illustrated the lengths to which the AKP went to increase oversight of 
the military budget, including the cancellation of multiple military platforms, 20 percent 
reductions to military budget between 2002 and 2006, and multiple changes to the 
budgeting process and transparency. There are two important considerations for 
discussing the magnitude of politician challenges to the military budget. First, for the 
AKP the purpose of military reform was to demonstrate governance, increase oversight, 
and increase voter approval for the party. This the AKP did in reducing budget allocation 
both in real expenditures and as a percentage of GDP, by establishing civilian control 
over weapons procurements, and by increasing transparency of the budgetary process. 
Without eviscerating the military budget, the AKP managed significant reductions at a 
time when average national military spending was increasing globally. Thus, in both 
absolute and relative to other states, the AKP politicians made major reforms to TSK 
spending. 
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Recent military failures by the TSK—such as an accidental explosion at an 
ammunition depot in Afyon that killed twenty-five soldiers in 2012, the Turkish fighter 
jet shot down by the Syrian military in 2012, and inability of the TSK to defeat the 
PKK—has triggered severe public criticism of TSK capabilities. 515  David Mares 
describes democratic control of the military as sustained by two bargains: one between 
civilian sectors and one between the civilians and the military.516 The agreement between 
the civilians and the armed forces requires a degree of autonomy and resources necessary 
to accomplish the military mission.517 Having removed politics as a mission, the AKP 
still budgeted for the other military roles in order to uphold their end of the implicit 
agreement and ensure the effectiveness of the military. 
As a major NATO military—bordering the Middle East and Russia, pivotal to 
combating international terrorism, promoting democracy in Islamic countries, and 
deterring a resurgent Russia—the Turkish military must be able to defend daily against 
the threat of major regional war. Turkish security concerns necessitate a controlled and 
combat-effective institution; budget reductions that advance the former at the expense of 
the latter are not sound policy when politicians consider the threat environment.518 The 
aforementioned outrage at recent failures of the TSK demonstrates the public’s 
expectations that their military be effective in carrying out the national defense. 
A final distinction should be drawn between electoral competitions as applied to 
South American case studies and Turkey regarding the cutting military budgets. The 
reduction of armed forces budgets was the method of civilian challenge of military 
autonomy, rather than the purpose. Hunter makes clear that going after the military 
budgets in Brazil was a decision based on the unique political culture of the country. As 
described by Hunter, the exceptionally clientelistic nature of the Brazilian voter 
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demanded a source of assets to distribute because political parties base their appeal “more 
on patronage than on programs.”519 In Turkey, however, voters consistently rank the 
economy, jobs, and security as the most important items, by a margin of almost 10–1 
over poverty and social programs.520 Reducing military autonomy, therefore, comes not 
merely from reducing the amount the military spends, but rather the manner in which the 
allocated money is spent, and the AKP accomplished both. The Turkish case shows that 
the patronage “generates strong pressures against the continued entrenchment of the 
military in the political and economic fabric of the country” can be accomplished without 
reducing military spending to levels that reduce the ability of the military to carry out 
their (now newly assigned by the civilian) roles and responsibilities.521 
Electoral competition rests on the premise that wielding incentives allows 
politicians to exert control over the military. Particularistic incentives concern the 
distribution of public resources to gain and keep constituents, and the AKP engaged in 
multiple efforts to create a lasting electoral base by allocating resources to areas that 
would increase political support, such as increasing spending on education, religious 
instruction, and economic growth as detailed in Chapter III.522 Programmatic incentives 
create or endorse public policies popular among the electorate. These incentives, 
alongside a strong commitment to IMF reforms, despite the resistance to such policies by 
the AKP base, helped increase voter support for the AKP, and the increasing share of the 
popular vote at successive elections demonstrated the wisdom of this approach.523 The 
enthusiasm for the party was brought about by policies that reduced poverty and 
facilitated economic growth, social stability, and greater national confidence.524 
In concluding this research we have come nearly full circle, back to Samuel 
Huntington and his conceptions of objective and subjective control. Not satisfied with 
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what was meant by “civilian control,” Huntington offered that subjective control meant 
maximizing civilian power relative to that of the military. 525  Of the three forms of 
subjective control listed, control by government institution, by social class, and by 
constitutional form, the latter has been the method by which the AKP asserted control 
over the TSK. There are two major limitations to this type of control, the first of which 
has historically been a serious problem for Turkey, namely that “In a democratic country 
the military may undermine civilian control and acquire great political power through the 
legitimate processes and institutions of democratic government and politics.” 526 
Throughout this dissertation I have referred to the increase in relative power between the 
military as “civilian control,” as opposed to “democratic civilian control,” which would 
include such trappings as institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional 
norms.527 
While I have shown that AKP reforms have constitutional control mechanisms, 
the ministry of defense remains weak, with the TSK answering directly to the Prime 
Minister. Similarly, parliament still has limited oversight and control over all the TSK 
revenue sources. Thus, while the civilians have gained increased control over some senior 
leadership promotions, and expanded control of the NSC, there is still a need for greater 
institutional control. Democratic civilian control also implies oversight of the military 
from a variety of sources outside the government including an independent media and 
nongovernmental organizations. 528  Though the AKP has increased freedoms of 
association, outside international organizations such as SIPRI and NATO, 
nongovernmental oversight of the TSK remains minimal. Finally, professional norms 
within the TSK are still controlled by the military. Education, training, and indoctrination 
all remain under the purview of the military. Thus, while civilian control has 
demonstrably improved through the mechanisms of electoral competition, Turkey has a 
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journey before full democratic civilian control is established, and this journey will be an 
important area for future students of civil-military relations and Turkish politics to 
monitor. 
E. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
If democratic civilian control of the armed forces is a process, then Turkey 
remains a work in progress. The current and future trajectory of Turkish civil-military 
relations and democratic civilian control bear watching, with implications for Turks as 
well as regional neighbors and scholars. Will the elected politicians continue to expand 
institutional control mechanisms, knowing that doing so weakens military loyalty to the 
political party in power? Can a bipartisan parliament increase oversight of budget 
allocations, professional military education, and all the while maintaining warfighting 
effectiveness? Each of these questions bears consideration, and will require further 
research in the short future. This is even more so because, as the AKP accelerated civilian 
control of the military, the rest of the Middle East and North Africa began to pay 
attention. Other Muslim countries with electoral systems of government began to increase 
relations and commission studies of the advances in Turkish civil-military relations such 
as the PILDAT papers published by Pakistan in 2009.529 
With the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, outside interest in Turkey soared. 
While the Western world attempted to market Turkey as an ideal democracy with open 
elections and (by 2011) near complete civilian control of the military, others looked to 
Turkey for different reasons.530 Shortly after Egyptians forced Hosni Mubarak out of 
office, attention turned to the military and discussion as to whether the Egyptian military 
would countenance an avowed Islamist government or use the opportunity to impose a 
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managed democracy without losing popularity.531 Concurrent to these discussions were 
the discovery that Egypt had requested translations of Turkish constitutions, and that they 
might model Egypt’s new constitution on the Turkish version, the supposed model. The 
question that went unanswered was: Who requested the Turkish constitution? Was it the 
civilians, who saw recent reforms as a means to prevent the military from taking over the 
government? Or, was it the military, which recognized the Turkish constitution as the 
means by which the military established tutelary oversight of the civilian politicians for 
decades? Unlike China, Iran, and Russia, however, Turkey has not actively represented 
itself as a model for neighboring states, preferring instead to encourage those states to 
respect human rights and democracy, and to respect their citizens as Abdullah Gül 
recommended Arab states do when speaking at the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference.532 
Externally, Turkey was held up as a model for the former authoritarian states of 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Internally, however, the political debate before and following 
the 2011 elections began to turn around a different notion: Had the government taken a 
turn towards authoritarianism itself? 533  Observers cited flaws in the Ergenekon 
investigations, the jailing of journalists in conjunction with the investigations, and the 
growing tendency of the AKP to utilize the coup trials as a pretense for actions that 
would otherwise be termed authoritarian.534 As early as 2010, at the height of coup 
investigations, constitutional referenda, and in preparation for 2011 elections, Turkish 
experts began to question whether the AKP would actually take the country down the 
pluralist path more common in Western democracies or instead maneuver to establish 
themselves as a permanent governing party. 535  The strong centralization of Turkish 
government means that a popular prime minister can wield extensive political powers. In 
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past decades, Islamic parties bemoaned the centralization of power; once in office, 
however, the AKP proved more than willing to use the powers of government to clamp 
down on opposition media, political opponents, and protesters.536 For many Turks, the 
Gezi Park protests of 2013 demonstrated what others pointed out years before: the 
extreme centralization of Turkish political power almost rewards authoritarian 
tendencies. 537  Those who turned out to protest loudly bemoaned the lack of 
representation in government for views different than the majority AKP, and the 
government backlash against these protests was severe.538 
While potential growing authoritarianism by the elected politicians is dangerous, 
in the Turkish case, the voters have (and will have) had the opportunity to turn out the 
AKP on several occasions and have failed to do so. This dynamic is likely to continue 
because Turkish voters also believe that politician personality and whether or not the 
politician is from the party in power are important considerations for casting votes.539 
Ironically, the only previous political party to win three consecutive electoral wins was 
the Democrat Party of the 1950s, which also became the first political party ousted by the 
military for, of all things, authoritarianism. This is not to say that Turks in 2014 will 
tolerate the arrest and execution of the elected prime minister by the military. It does, 
however, demonstrate a hazard in electoral competition: When a party has been in power 
long enough, the inherent self-interest that motivates politicians to challenge the military 
can also lead them to stifle the media, average citizens, or any voices of dissent. As the 
2015 Turkish parliamentary elections approach, some believe Turkey to be on a path 
towards a dominant party model, with the AKP having maneuvered state institutions and 
bureaucracies to effectively become extensions of the executive branch.540  If such a 
scenario does in fact become reality, Turkey would much more resemble those states in 
                                                 
536 Ibid. 
537 Nilüfer Göle, “Gezi: Anatomy of a Public Square Movement,” Insight Turkey 15, no. 3 (2013), 9. 
538 Coşkun Taştan, “The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: A Qualitative Field Research,” Insight Turkey 
15, no. 3 (2013), 29. 
539 Interactive, "International Republican Institute: Turkish Public Opinion Survey." 17. 
540 Esen and Ciddi, “Turkey’s 2011 Elections,” 13. 
 170 
the Middle East and North Africa who looked to Turkey as a model, than the states of 
Europe whom Turkey has traditionally aspired to mirror. 
Despite the initial interest in the “Turkey as a model for the Middle East” 
narrative, the story never played out. On the Turkish side, the politicians did not want to 
be viewed as a model for their neighbors, instead aspiring to what Turkish politicians 
have considered even greater heights, such as in the unsuccessful attempt with Brazil to 
broker nuclear deals with Iran.541 Apart from the lack of Turkish interest in cultivating 
states molded in its image, the Turkish experience was also simply too unique to be 
transferred to other countries by simple constitutional mandate. As Chapter II showed, 
the eventual tutelary nature of Turkish civil-military relations was a half-century process 
of attempting to create a Kemalist state as envisioned by military and elites—rather than 
what the protestors of the Arab Spring wanted: a state dedicated to protecting and 
promoting the welfare of the citizens. 
Though Turkey does not translate well as a model for neighboring states, it serves 
unquestionably well as a case study for the Middle East and other regions of the world 
still attempting to consolidate civilian control over the military. If electoral competition 
can break the imbalance between the military and the civilians in Turkey, then it can 
likely lead to similar outcomes in other hard cases. Despite the historical legacy, the 
civilian AKP was able to gain unprecedented control over the military in only a few short 
election cycles. While the Turkish case is exceptional in that the level of entrenchment 
was so severe and public support for the military consistently high, the outcome does not 
need to be exceptional, nor is it likely to be in future cases. 
What then can American and other Western policymakers do to truly improve 
civil-military relations in Egypt, Pakistan, and other notional democracies that struggle 
with military interventions? The research herein has indicated that, given enough time, if 
elections are in fact free and open, the force of electoral competition will meliorate the 
activist military. However, the essential component that is often unavailable (as it was for 
decades in the Turkish case) is enough time. When politically active militaries interfere 
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with elections in a manner that inhibits electoral competition, such as banning political 
parties in Turkey, external actors might be able to provide the necessary support structure 
to give electoral competition time to take root. In the Turkish case, the influence of the 
EU accession process assisted in granting the civilian AKP enough time to demonstrate 
effective governance on areas such as political freedoms, religion, and most importantly, 
economics. 
Western states aware of these dynamics could craft policies designed to keep 
interventionist militaries from interfering with politics, therefore allowing political parties 
and politicians the time they need to actually legislate those programmatic and 
particularistic incentives that increase their political lifespan. Consider, for example, 
Egypt after the 2011 Arab Spring. Had the United States immediately tied military 
assistance to the Egyptian Army to avoiding political intervention—to include direct 
subsidies, foreign military sales, and planned joint exercises to the Egyptian militaries 
steering clear of the national elections (as well as demanding a policy of non-intervention 
by the Egyptian military in following the election)—then perhaps the Egyptian politicians 
would have had time to craft and implement the policies electoral competition predicts. 
The three primary areas that might use this research as a springboard are the 
continuing democratization of Turkey, the potential influence of electoral competition on 
those countries of the Arab Spring, and the effectiveness of the TSK going forward. As 
previously touched upon, the tendency towards a single-dominant party system in 
Turkish politics, with potentially authoritarian tendencies, hazards outpacing pluralism 
and putting the gains of the last decade at risk. While the material presented herein can 
explain how the civilians were to overcome the activist TSK, it makes no attempts to 
claim that such consolidation leads inevitably to a pluralistic democracy, or democratic 
civilian control, merely one in which the civilians have exerted control over the armed 
forces. Will Erdoğan stand aside in 2015 as party rules dictate? Or will he make a move 
for the presidency at the end of Abdullah Gül’s term? That one decision will have a major 
impact on which trajectory Turkish politics will travel. The former could open the door to 
a more pluralistic system with the exodus of the immensely popular and successful 
Erdoğan from the scene, while the latter could further stunt continuing democratization 
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efforts. Erdoğan will have to decide whether to follow the George Washington model, 
and leave on top, or the Vladimir Putin model, forever claiming that the good of the 
country necessitates his own leadership. 
The Arab Spring represents possibly the best opportunity to expand future 
research on electoral competition in the immediate future. If the theory is to provide 
general accuracy, then these cases are important to follow. While the South American 
states enjoyed structural advantages, such as low external threats, and Turkey NATO 
membership and many trappings of western European nations, including a strong 
centralized government, global economy, and democratic history, the Arab Spring states 
have none of these advantages. While in the Turkish case these structural conditions did 
not determine the evolution of civilian control, they most certainly inform and influence 
political decision-making. Regardless, electoral competition expects that even these states 
will see consolidation of the military by civilians given enough time and open elections. 
While in the Turkish case these structural conditions did not determine the evolution of 
civilian control, they most certainly inform and influence political decision-making. 
Civilian control can be established by strengthening the formal control 
mechanisms or by decreasing the relative power of the military or both. In Turkey, both 
took place, with both the civilians increasing formal control and diminishing Turkish 
autonomy. The hazard of the former is the impact on effectiveness. While AKP has 
directed the military towards external security roles, the question of effectiveness has not 
yet been resolved. Roles such as waging war, anti-terrorism campaigns, humanitarian 
assistance, and border security are all measures of effectiveness.542 As more data are 
compiled on the ability of the TSK to perform these roles, it will be important to analyze 
whether the reduced autonomy, changes to promotion systems, and loss of faith in the 
military by the citizens will negatively impact mission effectiveness. 
What should be clear from this research is that constructing civilian control over 
the armed forces is first and foremost an internal exercise. External factors such as threat 
environment and foreign influence can help or hinder the process of reform, but not 
                                                 
542 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 34. 
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generate reform ex nihilo.543 While judicial branch agents, bureaucrats, and other state 
actors can influence processes, only elected officials are the only actors tasked by the 
voters to wield the programmatic and particularistic incentives occurring naturally in 
democratic states necessary to force reforms on a politically active military. What a party 
such as the AKP does with that power once the military is subdued is an altogether 
different matter, yet that too the voters will decide, accepting the possible emerging 
single-party dominance or elevating another party to challenge the decade-plus 
superiority of Justice and Development. 
  
                                                 
543 Jan Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–
2006 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138. 
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